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Introduction
Langua ge is in its essence not utterance of an or ganism nor is it
expression of an animal. Thus it
is never thought of with exactness
in its symbolical or semantic character. Language is the clearing-andi
concealing advent of Being itself.
All of Heidegger's work has been concern ed with one question:
th e Seinsfrage.

He approaches the question from many directions,

but one direction seems to predominate:
I

of language.

a phenomenological analysis

The quote above, along with the now famous character-

ization of language as "the house of Being," evidence the significance
Heidegger places on langua ge in his quest of Being.
meaning of these claims?

Hhat is the

Why did Heidegger focus on language?

Is it

merely an application of his ontology, or perhaps just a means to an
end?

Or is there a more signi f icant relation between lan guage and

Being?

These are the questions that the following work is desi gned

to answer.
Heidegger has said: " . . . reflection on language, and on Being ,
,2

has determined my path of thinking from early on
will not t ouch upon the works prior to Being and

Tim ~ ,

Though I

I have tried

to incorporate everything he published from that work on.

After

Being and Time his work can be seen in two broad categories - a rethinking of past philosophy and being und envay on a ne\v path of thinking.

1

Heidegger "Letter on Humanism" trans. by Edgar Lohner in Phenomenology and Exist entialism ed. Richard Zaner and Don Ihde (Ne\v York:
Capricorn Books, G.P . Putnam 's Sons, 1973) pp. 155 - 6.
2Heidegger On the Way to Language trans. by Peter D. Hertz (New
York: Harper & Row, 1971) p. 7.
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These are not totally separate tasks for, a s he says, " . . . we c a n
learn thinking only if we radic a lly unlearn what think i ng has been
t raditionally.' '!

With th ese consid e ration s in mind, I ha ve divid ed

this work into five sections :

the first dea ls with th e import a nce

o f language to the question of Bein g as approached in Be ing a nd Time ;
t he second with the relation of l angua ge and Being in Heidegge r ' s
rethinking of the roots of the history of We st e rn philosophy; th e
t hird with th e meaning of Being as i t was finally worked out in
t he late works; th e fourth with th e mea ning of language in thes e
late works and how it relates to th e meani ng of Being; and finally
in t he fifth I step back to ask for the si gnificance of Heidegge r's
work on Being and language to our quest for wisdom in gene ral .
The first four sections nec essa rily stay as close to Heidegge r's
thinking as possible.

My ma in goal has be en to und e rst a nd Heidegger,

and in order to do this I have attempted to give an interpretation
t hat presents Heideg ger ' s way as consi s t e nt and insightful, for to
find fault prior to this attempt is not really to find fault .

In

short, my prime conc e rn is to find Heid egger, and only i n the las t
section do I give some hints as to whe re we can go beyond him .
Despit e this, I do not intend to merely repeat what Heidegger said,
rath e r my hope is to give an interpretation that helps open up his
enigmatic and often misund e rstood \.Jritings .

For this reason I chos e

neither to give a book to book summary of Heid egge r's work (as, for
example , Richard s on did in He id egger:

1

Through Phenomenology to Thou gh t)

Heidegger What is Called Thinkin~ trans. by Fr ed D. Wieck and
J . Glenn Gray (New York: Har per Torchbooks, Harp e r & Row 1968) p. 8.
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nor a purely problematic approach that raises the questions of Being
and lan guage in general .

Rather, I tried to trace a continuous

dev elopment throu gh various broad stage s of He idegg e r's caree r to
find how he appro a ch e d and worked out the relation of Being and
language.
To se e how this is don e we must start with a preliminary
indication of how the issues are viewed by him.

As th e op ening quote

indicates, he is concerned with language in what he calls its ontological dim ension rath e r th a n its antic.

He is not after facts and

information about language, but rather th e Bein g of language and
how this Being is related to Being in general .

To und erstand this

distinction (i. e ., between the t\.JO differ e nt approach es to language )
we must give a preliminary sketch of th e question of Being itself,
for this distinction springs from th e so ca lled 'ontolo gica l differ e nce',
th e differ ence betwee n Being (S ein) and beings (seienden; things ,
entiti es ).

Objects that can stand be fore us as thin gs with properti e s

that can be defined and analyzed have traditionally be en the prima ry
conc ern of philosophy and science.

However, th e happening of the

standing before us of th e object is a completely differ ent issue;
this is the thing's Being, and cannot be viewed a s a thing itself.

A

conc ern with information about things is an antic study, while a
conc ern with th e standing b ef ore ( i.e. , Being ) is an ontolo gical on e ,
and its me thodolo gy must be as dif fe r e nt as that which it is studying .
We can infer only that 'B eing ' cannot
have th e charact e r of an entity. Thus
we cannot apply to Being the concept
of 'definition' as presented in traditi onal logic, which itself has its

4

foundations in ancient ontology and
which, within certain limits, provides
a justifiable way of characterizing
"entiti es ." The indefinability of Being
does not eliminate the question of its
meaning; it demands that we look the
question in the face.l
Thus when we ask for the Being of language we are searching for
how language occurs as what it is, and this is not merely a definition
or a list of features about language .

In traditional terminology it

would be said that we are looking for the essence of language, but
we must be careful to note that an essence has been historically
considered as an abstractable form or definition that is separate
from the concern of existence, and this is not how Heidegger views
it.

For him the distinction between essence and exist ence is a pr e -

judice of the development of metaphysics, and the question of Being
really lies at the source of this distinction.
If the questions raised are though t
through even rough ly, the illus ion
of being a matter of cours e , in which
the distinction of essentia and
exist entia stands for all metaphysics
disappears . 2
Therefore, when Heidegge r raises the question of Being, he is
not raising the same issues as traditional metaphysics.

He is neither

searching for a substance that whatever is actual (i . e . , exists)
possesses such as a substratum, the will to power, or unity, nor is

1

Heidegger Being and Time trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) p. 23 .
2
York:

Heidegger The End of Philosophy trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New
Harper & Row, 1973) p . 3 .
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he attempting to give an eternal definition of what is "truly real"
about some thing.

Being for Heidegger is the process of standing

before (pr esencing) of the entities which are present, and this process of pr esencing must be thou ght on its own t e rms and not merely
as the dichotomized ess e nce or exis t ence of an object.
As we shall see it is a different task to ask for th e Being of
something, like language, and the meaning of Being itself.

1

To a sk

for the mea ning of Being is to ask how it is that the re is anything
at all, i.e., why is th ere something rather than nothing?

Toques-

tion the Being of langua ge is to ask how language occurs as language,
and as such is closer to the qu es tions of traditional metaphysics.
However, if we insist on the t erms of metaphysics, the Being of
language addresses itself to both existence and essence , for as we
noted Being lies at the source of this distinction.

However, it is

misle ading to insist on questions of essence and existence, despite
the ability to do so, for this is still not thinking th e Being of
languag e in the \vay it is meant to be thought.

As Heidegger summariz ed

what he is qu es tioning when he asks for the Being of something:
But what really are we asking? Why the essent
(Seiend es ) as such is. We are asking for th e
ground of the essent: that it is and is what
it is, and th at th ere is not rathe r nothing .
Fundamentally \ve are asking about being. We
are asking about the being of the essent.
We are questioning the essent in regard to its
being. 2

1

Though we shall see that langua ge can not be considered as an entity
among th e others of the world, our first approach to it sees it that way,
and though th e Being of langua ge will eventually lead us to Being qu a
Being, they are clearly not the same.
2Heidegge r Introduction to Me taphysics trans. by Ralph Manheim (G arden
City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co ., Inc., 1961) p. 26. Essent is
Manheim's translation of Seiend es (i.e. ,entity, thing, existant etc. )
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Thus whether questioning the Being of an entity or Being itself
a new type of thinking is needed .

We must learn a type of thinking

that lets the mysterious dynamics of Being come forth, and not a
thinking that encapsulates everything in the clear and distinct
categories of "Logical Reasoning."

To explain and

was the goal of traditional metaphysics.

1

~nd~_r.s tand

Being

Because this means placing

the meaning of Being within the limits that the medium of human
reason constitutes, Heidegger sees that its mode of thought is one
of re-presentation, and thus regardless of its assertions is basically
subjectivistic in nature .

This is why he sees the history culminating

in Nietzsche whose Will to Power is the essence of all metaphysical
thinking of control, adaptation, and manipulation, and why he considers
his quest for Being to be a needed radical new beginnin g rather than
a developed continuation of the tradition.
His attempt is to return to the Presocratics, the source of
Western thought, and show how the development of metaphysics is only
one direction that thought could have taken.

Heidegger is not in a

real competition with this tradition since he is trying to follow
out a different branch of thought, and not perfect or add to the old
one.

Metaphysics is suited for understanding and explaining universal

structures and essences of things, but it is not suited for the
thinking of Being as the presencing of whatever is present .

Heidegger's

attempt at overcoming metaphysics is, therefore, not a nihilistic

1

Bergson \vas among the first to be bothered by the alienating
distance of this traditional view, and his method of empathy as an
alternative to ~nd~_standing contains many of the seeds of Heidegger ' s
thought.
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destruction, but an Aufhebung; a return to Being itself that exposes
metaphysics for what it is - an epoch of Being that is characterized
by the submission of the world to the logic and categories of
rationality, and thereby a for ge tting of Being itself.

As he develops

his own thinking he is not illogical or irrational, but claims that
for the thinking of Being a different kind of thought from what is
commonly known as logic and reason is needed.

As he summarizes it:

Calculative thought places itself und er
compul sion to mast e r everything in the
logical terms of its procedure. It has
no notion that in calculation everything calculable is already a whole
before it starts working out its sums
and products, a whole whose unity
natura lly belongs to the incalculable
which, with its mystery, ever eludes
the clutches of calculation. That
which, however, is always and everywhere closed at the outs e t to the
demands of calculation and, despite
that, is always closer to man in its
enigmatic unknmvableness than anything
t hat "is," than anything he may arrange
and plan, this can sometimes put the
essential man in touch with a thinking
whose truth no "logic" can grasp. 1

The clarity and developme nt of this paragraph makes it obvious
that Heideg ger is overstating his position when he claims th at th e re
is no logic to his thought.

But what is important is that he is

after a ne\v mode of thinking, one that cannot be r ed uced to traditional

1

Heid egger "\fuat is Hetaphysics" trans. by R. F .C. Hull and Alan
(Chicago: Henry
Crick in Exis t e nc e and Being ed . Werner Brock.
Regnery Co., 1949) p. 357.
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thinkin g .

This new mode of thought will first allow us to approach

Being in the way proper to it , and thereby first enable us to ask for
the Being of lan guage in a
Being and language.
examine later,

1

n~nner

s uited to finding the r elation of

HO\vever, a difficulty arises for , as we shall

our thinking is not independent from our language,

and thus until we know the Bein g of lan gua ge we cannot know the Bein g
of thought, and until we know the Being of thought we cannot properly
think Being .

As we saw above, to ask about the Being of language or

of thought is not to formalize a unique essence of them, but rather
to ask how they stand with Being itself.

That is, to ask for the

Being of language or thought is already to ask for the relation of
Being, langu age , and thought .

Until we do this we cannot know what

the proper mode of thinking is , but it must also be noted that we cannot find Being, lan guage , and thought until we are thinki n g properly .
We are thus caught in a circle of interrelations between our three
major issue s , which unexpectedly has given us a preliminary answer
to why language is important to our quest of Being .
Though this circle makes us wonde r whether we can ever start, l et
alone s uc ceed , in the project we intend, we must view it as a methodologica l difficulty that forbids any traditional logical structure (e.g.,
ded ucti ve , inductive, transcendental, or dialectical) but does not make
it completely impossible .

We must recognize that though He discuss

thinking, language, and Being individually, the truth of each one can

1

se e for examp l e the relation of legein, noein and logos in the
chapter on the early Greeks.
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only emerge in light of the others for they are not really independent.
Thus the full significance of our thesis emerges in the unfolding develop ment which occurs rather than being stated or asserted .

What is said

at each stage along the way is not an isolated explanation that later
will be related to other isolated explanations .

Nor is any one sec-

t ion any type of logical consequence of another section .

Each part

is an inextricable component of the deve l oping interplay of interr e l ations which is the only possible methodology for thinking how
Being , language , and thought stand with one another .

If we under-

stand how to approach the work in this way we have once again un expectedly found ourselves in the midst of the iss ues rather than
merely introducing them , for we are a l ready thinking in the " non lo gical " way , that is , we are already unden.;ray to thinking Being by
thinking the belonging together of language, thought , and Being .
With these introductory re marks we hope to have given a prel iminary sketch of the issues by shmving how they are dealt \vith .

The

circle of interrelations we discus s ed and the resulting concern with
t he development as crucia l to understanding the individual statements
is in l ine with the way Heidegger sees the parts of his own career:
" • •• only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain
access to what is to - be-thought by Heidegger II.

But [ the thought of]

Heidegger I becomes possible only if contained in Heidegger II. "

1

1

Heidegger ' s fonvard to Heidegger : Through Phenomenology to
Thought by W. J . Richardson ( The Hag ue : Martinus Nijhoff , 1963) p .
xxii. Though ' Heidegger I and II ' refers specifically to early and
late Heidegger the same point holds for any one part to any o t her .

As
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we mentioned in the beginning, we do not want to merely repeat what
Heidegger stated, and we now see that this would be a mistaken approach
for it would be reducing his significance to a collection of independent
statements and ignore the importance of the active process and development.

Therefore , our own methodology will hopefully be true to him

by thinking along the path with him.

Our interpretation is not, of

course, a final and complete word on Heidegger , but we hope it will
be s uccessful in disclosing the Being of Heidegge r's concern with
Being and language.
One thing is necessary, though, for
a face-to- face converse with the thinkers:
Clarity about the manner in which we en counter them. Basically , there are only
two possibilities: either to go to their
encounter , or to go counter to them. If
we want to go to the encounter of a thinker's thought, we must magnify still further
what is great in him. Then we \vill enler
into what is unthought in his thought.
Everything here is the path of a responding that examines as it listens.2

1
2

What is Called Thinkin g ?

p. 77.

Heidegger Poetry , Language , Thought trans. by Albert Hofstadter
(N e\v York : Harper & Row , 1971) p. 186.
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I.

Being and Time:

Discourse as th e Language of Being.

Our aim in th e following tr ea tise is
to work out the ques tion of the meaning of Being and to do so concret e ly.
Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the po ssible horizon
for anr understanding whatsoever of
Being.

On the first page of Being and Time Heidegge r tells us his task, but
unfortunately this task was never completed.

The book opens with a

preliminary analysis of Dasein, and ends with the t empora lity of
Dasein, never reaching the concrete analysis of time and Being which
was scheduled for the third divis io n of part one.

2

Posterity is

pla gued by the question of why th e work was never completed, and
what th e significance of the unfinished sections really is.
The fact of the matter is that in a sense Heidegger's goal was
complet ed , and the third division could only have r epea ted what was
already said.

Dasein can only be und ers tood in terms of th e ques -

tion of Being, for oth envise Being and Time must be v ie\ved only as
philosophic anthropology, a possibly interesting and rewarding path,
but one that Heid egger repeatedly repudiates.

Therefore, the ques-

tion of Being is really an issue every step of the way, and in that
sense the task of Being and Time was achieved.
Why then did Heidegger simply not print the original division
outline and have a short concluding final chapter indicating how the
question of the meaning of Being has been dealt with already?

An

!Being and Time p. 19.
2"In thus interpreting Dasein as temporality, however, \ve shall not
give the answer to our leading question as to the meaning of Being in
general." Ibid. p. 38 .

.....

2

.interesting possibility he might have chosen not to do this is because
he realized that though in one sense the book was complete, in a more
signific a nt sense one book co uld never sufficiently deal with the
question of Being .

In other words, Being and Time is both comple te

as it stands and also could never be complete, no matter how
was added to it .

~uch

I t is one way to Being , and Heidegger ' s mistake

was that at first he thought i t was the definitive route .

Later h

realized that though t he general content of the book was valid ,
important, and in a sense complete, at the same time it was only a
beginning and therefore had to be understood as such.

Being and Time,

we now realize, is an introduction to the later works, and not a
completely self-standing enterprise .

As an introduction it works

in t he mysterious way of setting the concerns of t hat which follows,
b ut the significance and truth of thes e concerns can only be understood if seen in the light of that which follows .

These reasons

might explain why Heidegg er was willing to publish the book with its
open ended quality , and it is with these ideas in mind that we
approach it .
Our concern is with language and we therefore make no pretense
of giving a complete account of Being and Time.

We intend to deal

only with t hose sections most directly related to understanding the
role of language in understanding Dasein, Eeir.g, and their relationship .

Our first step must be t o try and make clear what Heidegger

means by Dasein.

Taking heed of our previous warning, we must be

guided by the question of Being from the very beginning .

13

'Dasein' is oft en translated as 'man ' or 'human being,' and there
certainly are grounds for doing so .

However, this tra nslation can be

very misleading, and t ends to mis guide th e reader in the direction of
erroneously interpre ting Being and Time as primarily a study of man.
But if 'Dasein' is not a direct equivalent for 'man ' what is it?
Let us first look what a few commentators have said.
In direct or literal translation into
English, this word means 'to-b e-there .'
Such a litera l translation does not
adequately express the mea ning of the
word which it has in the German langua ge or in which it is used in Heidegger's
philosophy .... In German, Dasein means
'existence, ' 'life, ' and 'presence.'
Generally it expresses the concreteness of here and now. In Heidegger's
philosophy t he word ' Dasein' retains
all these shades of meaning in
contemporary German but in a deepened
and unifi e d way. Primarily, Dasein
for He id egge r is the presence of Being
in concr e te life and situations. Man
is the only being who has an understandin g of Being , therefore, only for
man can Being be pr esent. Han is the
place of the presence of Being; he is
this presenc e . Man is Dasein. Dasein
is not identical with empirical man,
but rather his essence. 1
In other words, the ego, the subject,
is not the Da-sein . Dasein is rather
the understanding (Lichtun g ) where
Being 'opens' itself and therefore
'und erstanding' occurs.2

1

vincent Vycinas Earth and Gods (The Hague:
pp. 24-5.
2

Martinus Nijhoff, 1961)

Egon Vietta "Being, World and Understanding" Review of Metaphysics #5 1 951 /52 page 166.
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Though in traditional German philosophy
it may be used quite generally to stand
for almost any k i nd of Being or ' existence' which we can say that something
has (the 'existence' of God for example),
in everyday usage it tends to be used
more narrowly to stand for the kind of
Being that belongs to persons. Heidegger
follows the everyday usage in this respect, but goes some\vhat further in
that he often uses it to stand for any
person who has such Being and who is
thus an 'entity' himself. 1

Though I find this last quote misleading because the final sentence
suggests 'Dasein' is concerned with an entity rather than Being, it
indicates why there arose so much confusion over the meaning of
Dasein and Being and Time as a whole.

It shows that Heidegger often

uses the term for an entity, i.e., as an ontic term, while the other
quotes show that it also stands for the Being of this entity, i . e.,
an ontolo g ical term .

As we saw in the introduction this is the

ontological difference, and we must ask whether th e se two uses result
from carelessness on Heidegger's part, or whether something significant
about Dasein and Being itself is revealed by it?
l~e

first note that all three quotes make reference to man, or

traditional philosophical understandings of man as ego or subject,
but distinguish Dasein from this.

They recognize that Dasein is an

ontological concern, and not simply an antic or empirical one.

The

justifications for this move come from both the dictionary definition
o f 'Dasein,' and from its etymology .

1

For someone as concerned with

John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson translators footnote Being
and Time p . 27.
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language and etymology as Heidegger , these clu es are not to be ignor ed
for th e s ake of a neat and clea r word s ub stit ution for ' Dasein. '

Let

us turn to Being a nd Time itself for t extual support for some und erst anding of Da s ein in line with th ese e ty mological hints.
And be ca use we cannot de fine Dasein ' s
essenc e by citing a "wha t" of the kind
that pertains to a subject-matter, and
because its essence li es rather in th e
f ac t that in each cas e it has its Being
to be, and has it as its own, we hav e
chose to designat e this e ntity as "D asein,"
a term which is purely an expression of
its Being . 1 (p. 33)
So when we desi gna t e thi s enti t y with th e
t erm ' Dasein, ' we ar e expressing not its
"wha t" (a s if it v1ere a t able , hous e or
tree ) but its Being . (p. 6 7)
Thus Das ein is n ev e r to be taken ontolo gically as an instance or special
cas e of some genus of en titi es as
things that are present-at-hand .( p. 68 )
One of our
that i f we
that which
complet ely
of Dasein.

first t asks wi ll be to prove
po sit an "I" or subject as
is proximally given , we shall
miss th e phenomena l content
(p. 72)

Dasein do e s not fill up a bit of space
as a Real Thing or it em of equipment
would. . . (p. 419)
What emerges from thes e quot es is that the word ' Dasein' do es refer

1

Not e the last thr ee words i n Ge rman are " als r e ine r Se ins a usdruck"
and should be tr a ns lated " as pure Being expression" l eaving out th e
poss ess ive "its" which indic a t es th e r e ified s ubstantiali t y which is
pr e s e ntly in ques tion.
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to man, but in terms of his unique Being and not in terms of any ontic
properties .

Unfortunately, as we shall see, Heidegger waivers in his

recognition of Dase in as an ontologica l concern.

Oft en he calls

Dasein an e ntity, which makes it an ontic rather tha n a n ontological
term.

Further, as the history of interpretations of Being and Time

testify, th e entity he is concerned with is man.

Thus he falls in

the trap of having his fundamental concept (Dasein ) speak about man
himself r a ther tha n of Be ing-in-the-world.

Howev e r, we will att emp t

to maintain the ontologica l interpretation of Dasein as strictly as
possible for it seems clear that the reason Heidegger used the term
'Dasein' rathe r th a n more common t erms for man or man's Being was
that he wants to re ac h a new conception of man's Being in its r elation to Being in general.

In ord er to gain further insight into

hmv Heidegger views this unique way of Being we again turn to Being
and Time.
Dasein is in such a \vay as to be something which und e r s t ands something like
Being. (p. 39)
"Being-in" is thus the formal existential
expression for the Being of Dasein, which
has Being-in-the-world a s its essential
stat e . (p. 80)
Dasein is its disclosedness.

1

(p. 171)

... only as long as Dase i n is, 'is there'
(gibt ~) Being .... As we have not ed
Being is dependent upon the understanding of Being ... (p. 255)

1
Disclos e dn ess (Er schlos senh ei t) can signify either a laying op e n
or the state of b eing laid op e n.
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If no Dasein exists, no world is 'there'
either. (p. 417)

Th ese quotes indicate th a t Heidegger is inter es ted in the Being
of man insofar as man allows for, or enables, the emergence of what ever is.

He is not inter e sted in man's Being as body, soul, rationality,

will, as a socia l, cultura l or political entity , or any combination of
these.

Of cours e much of what he says is pertinent to th e under-

st anding of man in thes e respects, but that is secondary.

His prim e

conc e rn is to reach Being itself , and his conc e rn with man is to
shmv him in relation to th e question of hoH anything can first be
pres ent.

'' ... the analytic of Dasein remains wholly oriented towards

the guiding t ask of working out th e question of Being ."

1

Dasein is not a bl ank screen that records or refl ec ts the world,
rather it e nabl e s the world to b e there altogether, in it self, not in
a mind, soul or re a l m of mere appea rance.

Nor should Dasein be viewed

in the sense of a tr a n scendental s ubjec tivis m whereby it constitutes
entitites, for Dasein is not a subj ec t, but man in his fundamental
unit y \vith the \vorld, and because Dase in does not constitute the "Wha t"
or cont ent of entities, only th e ir ability to occur as entities .

Dasein

constitute s or e nables th e appearance of whateve r is, and as such
without Das ein entities could not be there, i.e., there co ul d not be
anything.
In this way \v e seem to have identified Being and appearing, and
sinc e this connection is of crucial importance to Heidegge r, it n eeds

1

Being and Time p. 38.
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some further clarification.

Though he spends a great deal of effort

distinguishing his ph enomenological concern with one of appearances,
he does conclude:

"And finally one can use ' appearing' as a term

for genuine sense of 'phenomenon' as showing itself."

1

To use it in

this correct way we must be car eful to note that he does not mean
appearing in th e sense of mere appearance as opposed to the "really
real," nor appearing in the Berkeleyan sense that only when something is sensually experienced (i.e., appears) does it exist; he
does not need to resort to a God to grant Being to the tree alone
in the forest.

For what he means by Being is that which allows

something to occur as what it is,
continuing subjective reception.

2

and this is not dependent on a
In order to und ers tand in what

way app earing and Being are then brought together for Heidegger we
must first see how the question of Being is und erstood.

The qu es tion

of Being is rais ed in the li gh t of the question "why are the re entities rather than nothing?"

Heidegger devotes a great deal of

energy in Introduction to Me taphy sics, and elsewhere,to just raising
this question.

Merely to utter it is not enough.

For this question

to be truly asked we must hold ourselves in the s way of Nothingness,
over the abyss that is not the negation of something positive, but
nonbeing itself.

Only then do we not take it for granted that there

already are entities and merely ask for their original cause.

1
2

Ibid. p. 53.
Ibid. pp. 25-26.

Only
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in th e face of Nothingness can the meaning of Being itself be asked.
Instead this essent, through questioning,
is held out into th e pos sibility of nonbeing . There by the why ( i .e., "why are
th ere essents rather than nothing?")
takes on a very different power and
penetration. Why is the esser.t torn
away from the possibility of nonbeing? Why does it not simply keep
falling back into nonbeing? Now the
essent is no longer that which just
happens to be present, it begins to
waiv er and oscillate, . . . • 1
What is it to Be?

vfuat is the meaning of Being?

Asked about in this light Being is no longer questioned as a
first cause, nor as a property or quality of things, for in both
th ese cases it too wo uld be something among all the things of th e
world, and we would have to ask about its Being .

Being cannot be a

something, entity, or anything that is, for it is the is itself .
Why are there e ntities rather than nothing?
does it mean to Be?

Because Being .

\.fuat

It means to be th ere , to have abiding presence,

to be held up over a nd against th e void but not disappear in it.
It is in this sense th at we say Being means appearing.

Appearing not

taken as appearance , i.e., perceptual manifestation or semblanc e ,
but as first coming on the scene, being th ere, existing.

Thus we must keep in mind that the expression
'phenomenon ' signifies that which shows itself
in itself, th e manifest .... When 'phenomenon'
signifies 'semblance,' the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as th a t upon which the second
signification is founded. 2

1 Introducti on to Metaphysics p. 23.
2

Being and Time p. 51.

20

It is in this sense of phenomenon as showing itself that we have
interpreted app e arance and Being, and why in his quest for Being
Heidegger feels he is continuing the essential path of phenomenology.
Clearly, we have not in the least answered what it means to
appear, what the meaning of Being is, or why there are entities
rather than nothing.
path of the question.

All that we have

done is establish the

We have only first begun to lay out that

about which we are questioning, i.e. Being as presencing, appearing,
being there.

But, though just a beginning, that is a big step for

it is the beginning.
The project of Being and Time is to show the role Dasein plays
in the meaning of Being.

As the etymology of Dasein indicates, it

is strongly relevant to the question of Being (S e in) itself.

Dasein

is man, but ma n in his Being as that which allows whatever is to Be.
When Dasein does not exist, 'independence'
'is' not eith e r, nor 'is' the 'in-itself.'
In such a case this sort of thing can be
neither understood nor not understood.
In such a case even entities within-the world can neither be discovered nor lie
hidden. In such a case it cannot be said
that entities are, nor can it be said
1
that they are not.
We are now in a position to return to a question we raised
earlier.

We have seen that Dasein refers to man's Being in a very

special way, and yet we have noted that 'Dasein' is often used to
stand for the entity man itself.

The significance of this double

usage is summarized in one sen t e nce:
in its existence."

2

To clarify what this means we turn briefly to

!Being and Time p. 255
2

Ibid. p. 67.

"The 'essence' of Dasein lies
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"Letter on Humanism."

In this work the Being of man is defined as

"standing in the clearing of Being."

1

Heidegger goes on to say

"Ex- sistence can only be said of the essence of man, i.e., only of
the human way 'to be,'"

2

and "All that man is, i.e., in the tradi-

tiona! language of metaphysics the "essence" of man, rests in his
ex- aistence."

3

It should be noted that Heidegger writes existence

in this work as 'Ex-sistenz' (rather than
~nd

'Exi~tenz'

as in Bein£

Time) in order to emphasize man's transcending himself, and

standing in the light (truth) of Being.

From this we see that

for Heidegger man is man only insofar as he stands in this relation to Being, i.e., insofar as he ex-sists, insofar as he is Dasein.
Thus Dasein is understood as both man and the emergence of whatever
is, because man in his essential Being is this emergence.

If he were

not this emergence he would not be man and the world would not be
"there. "

Man as Dasein constitutes the "there" (da- sein), so that

there can be something rather than nothing.
carries in its

o~mmost

"This entity Dasein

Being the character of not being closed off,

in the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness.
By reason of this disclosedness this entity (Dasein), together with the
Being- there of the world, is 'there' for itse1f." 4
vle now have explained why 'Dasein' can be used as an equivalent

of 'man,' and yet preserved the full significance of this word.

1

"Letter on Humanism" p. 154.

2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Being and Time p. 171.

It
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is only with this effort that sense can be made of Heidegger's
claim that his late work is not a reversal of Being a nd Time.

1

We must make a constant attempt to understand Dasein in res pect
to the emergence of whatever is, and not as man understood in some
subj ectivistic sense.

As Heid egger summarizes it:

But to lay bare the horizon within Hhich
something like Being in general becomes
intelligible, is tantamount to clarifying the possibility of having any und erstanding of Being at all - an underst anding
which itself belongs to the ~onstitution
of the entity called Dasein.With the understanding of Dasein that we have reached it is
not surprising to see Being-in-the-World declared as Das e in's
basic state.

The analysis of Dasein is th erefore an attempt to

unravel the structures (exi stentialia ) of Dasein as Being-in-theWorld.

Heidegger is careful to point out that Being-in-the-Vorld

is a unit ary phenomenon, it is not the glueing toge ther of t\vO
separate objects.
and the World."

3

"Subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein
Thus the task is not to bring together two sides

1

"The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is
justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in
mind: only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain
access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But (the thought
of) Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in
Heidegger II." Heidegger's preface to Richardson's Heidegger:
Through Phenomenology to Thou ght p. xxii.
2
3

Being and Time p. 274.
Ibid. p. 87.
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of a dualism, but rather to show how and in what way Dasein is
Being-in-the-World.

Chapter V of Being and Time, in which language

(Discourse) is discussed, focuses on just this issue.

It is en-

titled "Being-in as Such" and is meant to "s e t forth the ontological
Constitution of inhood itself."

1

Therefore, as a preliminary to

an examination of the role of Discourse it is necessary to examine
the chap ter as a whole in order to understand what is meant by
the "inhoodness" of Dasein.
We start with a quote that further elucidates how Being-in
is to be approached:
Being-in is distinct from the presentat-ha nd insid e ness of something presentat-hand 'in' something else that is
present-at-hand; Being-in is not a
characteristic that is effected, or
even just elicited, in a present-athand subject by the 'world's' Being present-at-hand; Be ing- in is rather
an ess ential kind of Be ing of this
entity its e lf. But in that case, what
else is pres e nt e d with this phenomenon
than the commercium which is presentat-hand between a subject present-athand and an Object present-at-hand.
Such an interpretation would come
closer to the phenomenal content if
we were to say that Dasein is the Being
of this 'between.' Yet to take our
orientation from this 'between' would
still be misleading. For with such an
orientation we would also be covertly
assuming the entities bet\.;een which
this 'between,' as such, 'is', and we
would be doing so in a way which is
ontologically vague. The 'between' is

1

Ibid. p. 79.

24

already conceived as the result of the
convenienta of two things that are presentat-hand. But to assume these beforehand
always splits the phenomenon assunder,
and there is no prospect of puttinT it
together again from the fragments .
This quote is crucial for understanding Heidegger's project,
and it leads us to an understanding of Being-in as an existentiale
of Dasein that constitutes Dasein in its very special mode of Being.
We have understood the Being of Dasein as its Disclosedness, Disclosedness not as a property or accidental attribute of Dasein, but
as its fundamental Being.

We now must see that this Disclosedness

constitutes the 'inhood' of Being-in.

The key to unraveling the

structures of this phenomenon lies in the "there" (da) of Dasein:
When we talk in an ontically figurative
way of the lumen naturale in man we have
in mind nothing other than the existentialontological structures of this entity, that
it is in such a way as to be its "there."2
This "there" is the root of Dasein' s having a world, i.e. Being-ina-world.

It is through its Disclosedness that Dasein is its "there":

" . .. disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to
which it is its "there"."

3

In other words, Dasein, Disclosedness,

'There,' and Being-in are ontologically the same- Dasein is Beingin because it is its Disclosedness, by which it is its 'there'

1
2
3

Ibid. p. 170 .
Ibid. p. 171.
Ibid . p. 263.
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(i.e., Disclosing Being-in-the-World).

Thus, the structures of

disclosure not only constitute the 'there' of Dasein, but, since
Dasein is Being-in-the- World, these structures also constitute the
'there' of the world.

This is a difficult point to grasp without

reducing ourselves to an idealism, but we must recognize that there
is an inherent connection between disclosing and constituting which
emerges from the primordial interrelation of Dasein and the world,
and not from a subjectivity.

Constitution is not to be understood

as one side molding or constructing the other, but rather as "makeup" or structure which allows both Dasein and the world to first be
what they are.

In short, because there is Dasein, because Dasein

is "there" as the disclosing of Being which it is, a world can
emerge as something that Dasein is already alongside (present-athand) or within (ready-to-hand).

"To say that in existing, Dasein

is its "the re," is equivalent to saying the \vorld is "there;" its
Being-there is Being-in."

1

The "there" is not to be understood in the sense of geometrical
space of the present-at-hand.

Rather than referring to a specific

location, it is that which makes possible all ideas of location,
whether spatial or temporal location of the objectified present-athand or the lived involvement of the ready-to-hand (e.g., the nearness of Athens and the distance of my glasses when reading Plato).
To speak metaphorically, the structures of the "there" constitute

1

Ibid. p. 182.
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the stage which gives the entities of the world a place to unfold,
and without which, therefore, nothing could Be.

And as the constitu-

tion of a stage affects the Being of a play that takes place within
its region, the constitution of the "there" creates a r egion tha t
inherently affects the Being of the world.

Not as a molding of a

world that already is, for just as a play is not (a play) unless
it has some t ype of stage within which to 'come to life', nothing
is unless it has a place to be, i.e., unless the "there " of Disclosure provides the open spac

for it to emerge.

1

Thus Disclosed-

ness, as that which constitutes the "there" of Dasein and thus the
"there" of the world, is what constitutes the possibility of the
being there of whatever is.
Disclos e dness:

There are four basic structures of

State-of-mind (Bef indlichkei t), Understanding

(Ver steh en), Discourse (Reden ), and Falling (Verfallen).

An ana lysis

of these will thus give us how, whatever is, can be.
Stat e-of-mind is an existentiale of Dasein that is known to us
as mood.

Hoods reveal something special:
Phenomenally we would wholly fail to
recognize both what mood discloses and

1

Though the metaphor of a stage is misleading because the "there"
is not a pre-existing spatial 'container' as a stage seems to be, we
chose it because of the sense of independence of a play yet the influence
the stage has on the structur e of its Being. The 'there' is what
Heidegger later calls the free or open space, and though this does not
exist apart from the things which appear within it, we felt the idea of
a stage conveys its significance.
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how it discloses, if that which is disclosed were to be compared with what
Dasein is acquaint ed with, knows and
believes 'at the same time' when it has
such a mood . . . . for the mood brings
Das ein before the "that-it-is " of its
"there" , which, as such, stares it in
the face with the inexorability of an
enigma. 1
Thus, the facticity of the being there of something is revealed in
mood, and not a specific whatness of that which is there.

This

determination of the "ther e" of Dasein constitutes it as already
alongside something, i.e., as confronted with a given, and is
characterized by Heidegge r as "thro\vness" (Ge\vorfenheit).

In other

words, the "there" of Dasein is revealed as a h e ine 'd elivered over'
to something, i.e., it is not an isolated pure ego but is cast into a place where it can be affect ed.

At the same time the world

is revealed as "there" as something that matters .
The fact that this sort of thing (i.e. ,
something within t he worl d ) can ' matter'
to it (i.e., Dasein) is grounded in ones
state-of-mind; and a s state-of-mind
it has already disclosed the world-as
something by which it can be threatened for instance .... Dasein's openness
to the world is constituted existentially
by the attunement of a state-of-mind.2

State-of-mind is one way in which the "there" is constituted:
Dasein is "there" as something thrown and as attuned to its thrownness, and the world is "there" as something which is in such a way

1
2

Ibid. p. 175.
Ibid. p. 176.
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as to matter.
In short,

State-of-mind both reveals and constitutes the "there."

insofar

as whatever is, is "there," and the "there" is

revealed and constituted by Dasein, which is characterized by stateof -mind, whateve r is "there" must be disclosed and constitut e d as
something that matters in on e way or another.
Und er the strongest pressure and resistance,
nothing like an affect would come about,
and the resistance itself would remain
essentially undiscovered, if Being-inthe-world, with its state-of-mind, had
not already submitted its e lf ( sic~ schon
angewi esen) to having entities withinthe-world "matter" to it in a \vay which
its moods have outlined in advance.l
State-of-mind is one exis t ential structure whereby the "there"
is disclosed in its Being; Underst anding is a second.

It is

equiprimordial with State-of-mind, which means that though we can
consider them separately they in fact are always tog e ther in the
revelation and constitution of the "there."

Heideg ge r defines Under-

standing as "the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-forBeing; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself
what its Being is capable of." 2

Another way of saying this is that

Understanding is charact erized by "projection" (Entwurf), which means
that it places Dasein 'ahead of itself' and as 'mor e than it already
is.'

Understanding thus reveals the world in accordance \vith future

possibilities, and not as factual here and nmv given as State-ofmind does.

1
2

Ibid. p. 177.
Ibid. p. 184.
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Understanding is not the thematic, conscious grasping of something present-at-hand, rather it is the ground of this insofar as
the "ther e " of whatever can be known is constituted by its po s sibilities .
I can comprehend that this item in front of me is a hammer because
its possibility of driving in a nail is available to me.

The

existentiale Und erstanding is what makes possible my ability to
reach ahead and be aware (at some level of consciousness) of
possibil ities .

Understanding does not reveal specific possibilities,

but just as State-of-mind makes possible specific moods by disclosing
and constituting the world as something that matters, understanding
makes possible the derivative modes of comprehending, knowing, recognizing, seeing, etc . which do make use of specific possibilities.
\fuat Understanding does is to reveal possibility as possibility, by
projecting ahead .
Furthermore, the character of understanding as projection is such that
the understanding does not grasp
themat ically that upon which it projects - that is to say possibilities.
Grasping it in such a manner would
take av1ay from what is projected its
very character as possibility, and
would reduce it to th e given contents which we have in mind; whereas
projection, in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as
1
possibility, and lets it be as such.

Thus Understanding is an existentiale of Dasein that constitutes
it as more than it immediately is, and lets it reach ahead to that
which is not actually present.

1

Ibid. p. 185.

Remembering that Dasein is its
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Disclosedness and the interconnection of disclosure and constitution,
we can conclude that whatever is disclosed is constitut e d in its
Being by its possibilities.

In other words , whatever is "there"

is so as it is becaus e Under s tanding is op e n to its possibilities.
Understanding does not primarily have the role of delimiting something in advance of its becoming (being) present, rather Understanding's role is to disclose and constitut e what is present her e
and now by reaching (proj ecting) ahead of the here and now a nd
op ening up the possibilities which enable that which is present to
be "there" as it is.

"In the projection of Understanding, entities

are disclosed in their possibility."

1

As was noted, Understanding does not explicitly work out the
possibilities, but th is can be done by what Heidegger calls I nterpretation (Auslegung). 2
The projecting of th e Understanding
has its mvn possibility - that of
developing itself. This development
of the Understanding we call "interpretation" .... In interpretation, underst Rnding does not become something
diff erent . It becomes itself . Such
interpretation is grounded existentially
in und e rstanding; the latter does not
arise from the former. Nor is interpretat ion th e acquiring of information
about what is understood; it is rather
th e working-out of possibilities projected in understanding.3

1

Ibid. p. 192.

2
we bre~k with the Macquarrie and Robinson conve ntion and
capitaliz e 'Int erpretation ' since it is a primary existentiale.
3

Ibid.pp. 188-189.
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Another way of putting this is that Interpretation
tion of the 'fore-structures' of Understanding.

is the elabora-

That is, in Inter-

pretation something ge ts explicitly disclo sed as what it is.
'~'

This

is not a tacking on of addi tional qualifications to a true

or naked entity; rath e r, since th e "the re" is r eveal ed and constitut ed
by Und erstanding in accordance with its possibilities, the asstructur e is inherent to th e Being of whatever th e re is.
It seems th a t this l eaves us with a circle in which all our
unfoldin g knowledge of th e world is an interpre t a tion which is "preordained " by th e fore structures of Dasein's possib ilities , i.e.,
by Understanding.
But if interpretation must in any case already
op e rat e in th a t which is understood, and if it
must dr aw its nurtur e from this, how is it to
bring a ny scientific r es ults to maturity without moving in a circle, especially if, moreover, t he understanding which is presupposed
still operates withi n our common information
about man and th e world? 1
But this circle is not to be thought as a vicious circle of subjectivity becau se Understanding provid es the structure that simply
det ermines th e fact th a t whatever is is (at least partially) constituted
by its future, i.e., its pos sibili ties, whil e the un fo lding of thes e
possibilities is grounded in the thing, and in no way is dictated by
a subj ec t.

Dasein provi d es the structures in accordance with which

something may Be something at all, the things themselves provide
what is known a nd und e rstood.

1

Ibid. p. 194.

This point is seen in Heidegge r's
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discussion of meaning.

He states:

"Meaning is an existentiale of

Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying 'b ehind' them,
or floating some\.;rhere as an 'intermediate domain'. ,l

This does not

mean that the meaning of an entity is tacked on by a subjectivity,
rather it says that \vh atever is "there" is disclosed and thereby
constitut ed by the structures of Dasein, which includes Understanding
and its r e sulting meaningfulness.

2

Thus meaning belongs to entities

in their very Being, and not as something tacked on.

Therefore,

though we s a y that meaning and knowledge are rooted in Dasein we
are asserting anything but a subjectivism.
To furth e r clarify these notions Heidegger turns to an analysis
of a derivative mode of interpretation :

Assertion (Aussage).

II

we may define "assertion" as a "p ointing-out which gives some thing
a definite charact e r and \vhich corrnnunicates" ." 3

In other words, an

assertion communicates to someone a definite cha racter of something
by means of predication, and thereby that something is pointed out,
i.e., shown to be there.

It is different from Interpretation in

general because Int e rpretation does not have to be carried out in

1

Ibid. p. 193.

2

Though "meaning" will be discussed later, we note: " ... "meaning"
must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosednes s which belongs to Understanding." Ibid.
3

Ibid. p. 199. It is interesting to note that both the German
'Mitteilen'and the English'communicate'etymologically speak of taking
part together, or sharing, and this is just the sense Heidegger intends a sharing in the thing and not the imposition of one person's thoughts
on another.
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word s or a statement.

The placing into words is not an irrelevant

difference, for assertion has a very definite structure of its own
that discloses and constitutes th e world in its own way.

Assertion

entails a specific judgment abo ut the thing and thus changes the
relation of Dasein to the thing.

The thing is taken out of its

orig inary involvement with the world and possibilities, a nd is placed
on a pedestal, as it were, to b e v iewed in a detached way and in a
specific manner.

This mode of relating to the object is what we

have been calling the present-at-hand.

Presence-at-hand, however,

is only one mode of Being, and according to Heidegger not a primord ial one.
Interpretation in general does not necessarily formulate the
poss ibilities in a thematic statement:

in picking up the item in

front of me and driving in a nail Hith it I am Interpreting it.
In so doing Interpretation is operating in the ready-to-hand; rather
than the present-to-hand.

Assertion, on the other hand, takes the

entity out of this originary "there" of the ready-to-hand, and
const itutes and reveals a

ne~..r

isolated and delimited factum .

and different "there" - that of an
1

We hasten to point out that not every thing put into language
do es what assertion does - poetry being th e most striking counter
example.

Assertion is one aspect of language, and one that can provide

access only to a limited and derivative mode o f Being .

It is in

this light that Heidegger's critique of tr aditional philosophy finds

1

In the later works this mode is called Framed (G e-stell ) thinking.
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its directive.

Heid egger says that because of the fetters the

history of philosophy has plac ed upon itself with logic it has
forgotten Being; and the importance logic has been given arises
out of an int erpretation of logos as assertion.

" ... by knowing

that logos has been interpret e d in a way which is ontologically
inadequate, we have gained a sharper insight into the fact that
the methodological basis on which ancient ontology arose was not
a primordial one.

The logos gets experienced as something present-

at-hand and interpreted as such ... "

1

We hasten to point out that

Heideg ge r is not r efuting logic, but merely exposing its limitedn ess .
As he says elsewhere:

"The very idea of "logic" disintegrates in

the vortex of a more original questioning"
exposition of the nature of thinking ."

2

and '"'Logic" is only one

3

In short, logic's predominance in the history of philosophy
arose from con s idering lo gos strictly as predic a tive judgment, and
thus limiting the scop e of the world to the pr e sent-at-ha nd.

There-

fore, it is not the significance of logos that is to be diminished,
but we need to reinterpret it in a more fundamental manner which
recognizes that the interpretation of logos has degenerated from a
fundamental understanding of language, to language as assertion or
judgment.

1
2
3

Being and Time p. 203.
"\vhat is Hetaphysics" p. 342.
rbid. p. 365.

35

In his attempt to rethink logos he introduces the term Discourse
( Rede) which he considers a translation that can help recover the
full significance of logos.
is "discourse" ... "

1

" ... the basic signification of logo s

As he points out this does not help us any

until we work out what is meant by Discourse itself, but the
direction this will take is clear for he says '' . . . the function of
the logos lies in merely letting something be seen, in letting
entities be perceived .. . "

2

We have thus been led from an analysis

of Understanding to Interpretation and then to Assertion, which
finally led to Discourse itself.
The basic stock of 'categories of signification', which passed over into the
subsequent science of language, and which
in principle is still accepted as the
standard today, is oriented towards discourse as assertion .. . The task of liberating grammar from logic requires
beforehand a positive understanding
o f the basic a priori structure of discourse in general as an existentiale . 3
We now move on to a discussion of Discourse itself, in order to
bring out how Heidegger views language and to see how it fits together with the project of Being and Time as a whole.

We start with

a group of excerpted quotes that give a basic characterization of
Discourse .

1

Being and Time p. 55. Though not elaborated in Being and Time
this conception of logos is grounded in the connection of logos to
legein (originally 'to lay forth' now 'to say ' or ' to tell ' ). This
will be dealt with explicitly in the next chapter.

2
3

Ibid . p. 58.
Ibid. p . 209 .

See note 1.
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The existential-ontological foundation
of language is discourse ...
Discourse is the articulation of
intelligibility (Verst a ndlichke it ) ...
That which can be articulated in interpretation and thus even more primordially
in discourse is what we call "meaning " ...
The way in which discourse ge t s expressed
is language ...
Hearing and keeping silent are lossibilities
belonging to discursive speech.

From these quotes two major points emerge :

first, we see that what

Heidegger has in mind with Disco ur se is the ground of language and
not identical to it; and second, Discourse, as an existentiale of
Dasein's disclosedness reveals in some way something that is somehow prior to it.

What this means is that Discourse cannot simply

be considered as an entity present-at-hand that is an attribute of
man,

2

it must be viewed in its Being, a nd this Being lies in its

r evelation and constitution of the "there," i.e. in its making
something present.
Heidegger states that there are four items that make Discourse
what it is:

what is said in the Discourse, what is talked about,

the manifesting (Bekundung) and communication.

However, we cannot

assume to have a full understanding of th e Being of Discourse by

1
2

rbid. pp. 203-204.

••were language not ontological, it could not disclose anything
pertaining to the world ... Language cannot be just another thing (have
antic, that is, psychological status) for then it would net be a
di scloser, but itself be in need of being disclosed." Loy Vail
Heidegger and the Ontolo gical Difference (University Park: Penn State
University Press, 1972) p. 163.

37

merely putting together explanations of these four components.
Discourse must be seen in its own light, and viewing it in terms
of its components is only a step in that direction.

What these

aspects do tell us is that Discourse is primarily concerned not
with itself but with a manifesting communication of the world.
This concern of Discourse with the world is further evidenced
when we remember that "hearing" and "keeping silent" are \vays of
Discour se .
to it.

They are not merely derivative modes, they are essential

In so far as Discourse is primarily an opening up of the

world, and not necessarily a delimiting judgment about it, "hearing"
and "keeping silent" are necessary.

When words are spoken the

words themselves are not as important as what they let be heard.
True Discourse is not mere wor ds, as is exemplified in the cry of
a desperate man \·l ho pleas "Can you hear \Yhat I am saying?," or the
angry parent \vho threatens "You did not hear a word I said" and is
not really satisfied by the child's ability to re-call the words.
Words are not enough for Discourse, for Discourse is primarily a
communicative opening-up to the world, and \VOrds in themselves do not
always do this.
At this point we are led to two crucial questions:

exactly what

is that to which Discourse opens up, and in what way does Discourse
have input into the constitution of that which is opened up.
Heidegger states:
Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility (Verstandlichkeit) .... That which
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can be articulated in interpretation, and
thus even more primordially in discourse,
is what ~ve have called "meaning ." That
which gets articulated as such in discursive articulation, we call the "Totalityof-significations."l

We have made brief note of meaning in the discussion of Interpretation,
but in order to deal adequately with the questions we have now rais ed
it is necessary to return to this point.
The first thing we must not e is that by 'meaning' Heidegger does
not have in mind 'a definition'.

He uses the word Sinn, which like

the French sens, has the connotations of sense and tendency, so that
we can talk of the meaning (Sinn) of a painting, a play, or any object in general, as well as of a sentence or a word.

2

To clarify

meaning we must see it in relation to significance (B edeutun g), which
as that which is Articulated (specifically laid-out or opened up)
must be similar to meaning but not identical - meaning being that
which can be Articulated.

Since it is through Discourse that signi-

fications first are, and since Discourse is more fundam ental than
spoken language, Heidegger can say "To significations, words accrue.
But

~vord-Things do not get supplied ~vith significations. " 3 By this

1

Being and Time p. 204. The connection between intelligibility
(yerst a ndlichkeit ) and Understanding (Verst ehen) is, as we shall see,
a crucial one, and is unfor tunately lost in translation.
2
This is why Heid egger can sp eak of the meaning of Being and not
just the meaning of 'Being.' See Ma nfr ed Stassen's Heideggers Philosophie Der Sprache in Sein und Zeit.
3Being and Time p. 204.
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Heidegger is saying that though our access to significations may
be through words, the words get their guidance from significations.
To find the right words we must first listen to the significations
(significance) of a situation - i.e. Discourse must occur.

1

It is

in this same sense of significance being prior to words that meaning
is prior to significance:

- though it is through significations

that meaning gets expressed (articulated), significations get their
guidance from meaning.

As human speech must listen to Discourse,

Discourse must listen to meanings.

But how can meanings be listened

to if they are by definition unarticulated?
We take as a clue for the answer to this question the fact
that meaning is introduced and discussed in conn ec tion with Understanding.
lies.

It is in the structure of Understanding that our answer

" •.. "Meaning" nust be conceived as the formal- exis tential

framework of the disclosedness which belongs to Understanding." 2
Now, since the di sclosed ness of Understanding is characterized by
projection, we can see that meaning is constituted by the 'forestructur es '. These fore-structures constitute the interconnection of
the world, in so far as they reach ahead of the 'here and now' in
order to constitute that which is 'here and now' as what it is.
I understand that someone is Just, because I have a fore-conception,
though not necessarily explicit or specific, of a range of possibilities of behavior of this person.

1

This fore-conception of possibilities

"We never come to thoughts. They come to us.
hour of discourse" Poetry, Language, Thought p. 6.
2

Being and Time p. 193.

That is the proper
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is in accordance with having a fore-conception of the meaning of
Just; and the fact that philosophers can try for thousands of
years to articulate what it means to be Just, shows that though we
in some sens e understand the Just (i. e. have a fore-conception of
the meaning of it) the meaning

is not explicit or articulated

(thou gh it is that which can be articulated).
We are now in a position to return to our question, and show
how Discourse can be guided by the unarticulated meaning.

Thou~h

the meaning is not presently explicitly before us (and because of
the compl ex ity of things probably never completely can be) it do e s
implicitly constitute our understanding of that which is presently
before us, and thus is in some sense available to us.

List ening

to meaning is a matter of unravelling the meaning from what is
given to us, i.e., articulating thos e charact e ristics of th e forestructures th a t make tha t

~vhich

is before us what it is .

"Both

discoursing (Reden) and hearing are based upon Understanding . "

1

Discourse, therefor e , does not mold the world according to its
own design, rath er it is the coming forth of a meaningful world,
announcing itself in some articulated fashion,
hearing is constitutive of Discourse.

and this is why

Discourse is thus not the

making meaningful of what originally was not so (i .e. sense data or
pure sensation), but rather direct attunement to meaning itself.

It

is in this way that we understand Discourse to reveal and constitute
the "there" of the world, and thus recognize that it is not merely an

1

Ibid. p. 208.
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~

.... ~

entity for scientific study, but more fundamentally an existentiale
of Dasein's disclosedness.
To conclude our analysis of the role of langu a ge in Being and
Time we must turn to Discourse as it is manifested most often, that
is in its 'fallen everydayness'.
course "Idle Chatt er " (G erede ).

Heidegger calls this form of DisHe characterizes it as a closing

off of that which is talked about, i.e. ,a lot of words that end up
burying what they want to say.
We do not so much understand th e entities
which are talked about; He already are
listening only to what is said-in-the- talk
as such. What is said-in-the-talk gets
understood; but what the talk is about is
und erstoo~ only approxima t ely and s uperficially.
This is significant for it points out that Discourse in its authentic
stat e is characterized not by Hhat is said as such, but by what it
lets speak.

The gr ounc of Discourse is t he world, and Discourse is

an existentiale that l ets the world speak; but idl e chatter,on the
other hand, gets its direction from what people want or expect to
hear,or from a role or image that the speaker wants to project, and
thus cuts itself of f from its true ground.
Discourse, which be longs to the essential
state of Dasein's Being and has a share
in constituting Dasein's disclosedness
has the possibility of becoming idle
talk and when it does so, it serves not
so much to keep Being-in-the-World open
for us in an articulated understanding ,
as rather to close it off, and cover up
the entities within-the-world. 2

1

Ibid. p. 212.

2rbid. p. 213.
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The danger of idle chatter is aggravated by the fact that it
does not recognize itself for what it is.

We believe we reach an

und erstanding of what is talked about, even though this is just what
it lacks.

"Idle talk is the possibility of understanding every-

thing without previously making the thing one's own."

1

A prime

example of this phenomenon takes place in museums, where in front
of a great masterpiece, we hear so much chatter about "colorful, "
"pretty," "Oh, I know this painting" and other such conversation
that does anything but let the painting speak.
Idle chatter is the form of Discourse in fallen Dasein.

This

is not a rare state of Being, for Falling is an existentiale of
Dasein

a way of constituting the "there."

It is a way of Being-

in-the-world that is as real as any other, and one that we all
spend most of our time in.

"Falling reveals an essential ontological

structure of Dasein itself .

Far from determining its nocturnal side,

it constitutes all Dasein's days in everydayness ."

2

However, it is

important to recognize it for what it is, and to recognize its
cons equences.

As a cutting off from the world, idle chatter, and

falling in general, is the ontological root of alienation:
Ontologically this means that when Dasein
maintains itself in idle talk, it is - as
Being-in-the-world - cut off fron its
primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards
Das ein-with, and towards its very Being3
in. Such a Dasein keeps floating unattached ...

1

Ibid. p. 213.

2 Ibid. p. 224.
3Ibid. p. 214.
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Heidegg e r has therefore laid the groundwork for much social and
anthropologica l philosophy, but that is not his primary concern;
he merely wants to lay bare the way Dasein constitutes the fundamental relation between man and the world.

Discourse is an

exist entia l e of disclosedness, of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, and
as a form of Discourse Idl e Chatter reveals and constitutes Dasein
and the world as being cut off from each other.

But such a cutting

of f from the world is only possible for a Being who is in a fundamental relation with it.
To be uprooted in this manner is a
possibility of Being only for an
entity whose disclosedness is
constituted by discourse as characterized by und ers t anding and statesof-mind - that is to say, for an
entity whose disclosedness, in such
an ontologically constitutive statei
is its " there," its 'in-the-wo rld'.
At this point we conclude our interpretation of Being and Time .
Before going on we must bring together the ground we have covered.
We have attempted an analysis that shows Dasein as not merely an
entity among others, but rather the Being of man in his fundamental
relation (unity) with the world.

The Being of Dasein is the revela-

tion and constitution of the world, and the Being of the world is
its emerging and its being "there" as it is.

Thus the constitution

of Dasein is at the same time the constitution of the emergence (the
"there") of the world.

1

rbid. p. 214 .

This "there " that we spent so much time
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trying to expose is the place of something that allows it to be.
The "there" of Dasein is its Disclosedness, its b eing in a position to be open to the world and allow the world to emerge.

Thus

becaus e of the exis tentialia of Disclos edness, Dasein is "there";
that is, its "there" is constitut ed by State- of-mind, Und e rstanding ,
Discourse and Falling.

The "there" of the world is also constituted

by these existentialia, but seen in a diff e rent 'direction'.

The

world's "there" is constitut ed by State-of-mind as something that
matters, has facticity, and, though we did not examine t emporality,
has a past.

By Understanding the \vorld' s "there" is constituted

with possibilitie s, more than what is actually (concretely) or
factually present, that is, a future.

Discourse constitutes the

"there" of the world as something that can announce itself, be articulated.

And from Falling the "the r e " r eceiv es a constitution as

cut of f, alien, something to be ma nipula ted and controlled.

It is in

this way t ha t \vhatever is ("there") is "there" as it is because of
the Disclo sedness of Dasein, a nd why we can say that Dasein
simultan eo usly r evea ls and constitutes the "t he re" of the world.
\fuat has tradi tionally be e n considered as two separate real!:.ls,
i.e., subjectivity and obj ec tivity, we express as a unity by saying
that the structures we have examined are constitutive of (the "th ere "
of) Being-in-the-world.

Working out the structur es (existenti a lia)

of Dasein, is thus undertaking the task of working out the structur es
of the possibilities of Being-in-the-world in general, i.e. of Being
itself.

We have not undertake n the task of discussing all the
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structures, nor have we expressed them in their temporality, a project necess a ry in order to show Dasein in its essenti a l completeness .
Instead, we simply gave an exerg esis of the four basic existentialia
that constitute Being-in as such, and in so doing the role of language,
as Discourse, became a topic of obvious concern.

We saw that Dis-

course is constitutive of Being-in because in its authentic mod e it
is essentially a coming forth of the world, an articulation of the
meaning of entities of the world.

Without Discourse the structures

constituted by Understanding, and also State-of-mind, since every
Understanding always has a State-of-mind, would remain unarticulated,
and thus the "there" would be reveale d and constituted in a quite
differ ent way.

In fact, to be exact , since State -of-reind, Under-

standing and Discourse are equiprimordial in the constitution of th e
"there",

1

we would not hav e anything "there" at all.

Discourse gets

its dir e ction from Understanding , but without the articulation of the
world there would be nothing "there" for Understanding to underst a nd.
Understanding gives us possibilities as possibilities and thus without Discourse there would be nothing actual, which is impossible
since possibilities are always possibilities of some thing actual .
Discour se, as articulation of an intelligibility (und erstandability)
which goes \vith a State-of-mind, is a gathering of facticity (thrownness, past) and possibility (proj ec tion, future) into a self manifesting
pr esence that is not otherwise "there."

1

2

Thus a concern with Discourse

Being and Time p. 203.

2The threefold significance of logos (Discourse) as gathering,
Saying , and Being-present will be of continuing concern.

46

is imperative for the question of Being, for without i t there would
be nothing (nothing would be "there").
In this section we have raised many points that will continue to
concern Heidegger in his analysis of Being .

The relationship between

Discourse and that which is (can be) articulated, as well as between
man, Being, language, listening

and silence have all been introduced .

In the mere seven pages on Discourse Heidegger raises all these
issues in an almost staccato form.

It therefore seems that he was

only beginning to realize the signif i cance of the se questions to the
quest for Being.

Thus I do not consider any of these issues to have

been fully worked out, but they have been exposed, and Heidegger's
vie\vS on them as present ed in Being and Ti me have been given.

In the

later works we shall see a clarification and elaboration of these
projects, goals and views of Being and Time, rather than an abandonement of them, as many interpret e rs of the 'Heid egger reversal' maintain .

This is not to say that Heidegger considers his first work to

be perfect, or that the later works make no attempts to overcome
mistakes, but the crucial issue of the relation of man, language, and
Being is developed and not reversed as the categorical vie1ving in
terms of subjectivity and objectivity might claim.

In order to see

this issue we attempt to make a brief comparison of the Heidegger of
Being and Time to the transcendental idealism of Kant .
It is an obvious concern to the consideration of Heidegger as
an ontologist to ask whether or not he has gone beyond Kant.
Heidegger holds the First Critique (up to the Dialectic) in high esteem,
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though he has a fairly unique interpretation of it.

However, the

value of Heidegger's contribution to the developme nt of ontology
would be ques tionable if he gave us nothing other than a new version
of transc endental idealism.

We ther ef ore must make a comparison

of Dasein's disclosedness to th e Kantian categori es of intuition
and underst an ding - in order to see whether they are serving the
same function.
The most obvious difference between them is that Kant is
after a justification of science and the refore finds the limits
of experiencability of an object in terms of tradition al logic,
while Heidegger is after the meaning of Being in general, and ther e fore considers a concern

~ith

the possibility of objects of scienc e ,

i.e., concerns of the present-at-han d , of limited scope.

Secondly,

Kant's categories and forms of intuition are clearly un de rstoo d
as prop erties of man's finite rationality, and thus we are inescapably
left with the unreachable thing-in-itself.
existentialia for Heidegger

On the othe r hand, the

are not merely properties of finite

man, but rather th e constitutive structures of man and Being in their
fundament al unity of Being-in-the-\vorld.

Another way of saying thi s

is that Kant starts with the Cartesian dualism between man and the
world, and then tries to bring them together on the grounds of a
transcend ental functioning of man, while Heidegge r starts with a fundamental unity - man and \<lDrld need each other, nei th e r is primary and thus his task is to unravel the components or structures of the
unity, rather than to piece together two divided realms.

It is for
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this reason that Heidegger is n ever plagued by the division between
phenomenon and thing-in-itself

~

for him phenomenon cannot mean

mere appearance, it mus t be understood as the thing manifesting itself, in its elf.
It should be noted that these two differences between the
thinkers are rooted on a common ground.

Kant tries to analyze the

conditions of objectivity becaus e he understands the world as object (present-a t-han d) - an under s tanding that necessarily separates
it from subjectivity which is understood as the uniqu e thinking
object.

Heidegger , on the oth er hand , tries to unravel the meaning

of Being in general, for rather than seeing the world strictly in
terms of th e objectivity of the present-at-hand, he r ecognizes
another, more primary, mode - the r eady- to-hand - in which the awareness of the world is no further remov ed than that of my o'vn subjectivity.1

In the ready-to-han d the world's meaning and my meaning

are intrinsically unit ed - a primordial unity and not t'vo separat e
realms affecting each other.

2

Thus Heidegger must be concerned with

the ground of whatever is, the meaning of Being itself, and not with
the subjective constitution of objectivity.
However, notwithstanding these differences and our understanding
of Dasein in light of Heidegger' s '"arning to escape subjectivist
thinking (interpretation), there seems to be an inescapable link b etween Kant and Heidegge r.

Dasein, though not equivalent to subjectivity,

1 Note that this idea is the root of the transformation of the
Cartesian starting point of "I think" to an "I can" by thinkers like
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.
2

see Being a nd Time p. 170; quoted p. (23ff) of this work.
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is certainly 'tied' to man (i.e. constituted by human possibilities),
and thus it seems as though Heidegg e r has merely made Being itself
grounded in transcendental constitution.

Even though constitution

is understood as 'structure' or 'make-up' and not 'molding' or
'constructing' (the traditional understanding of Kant's transcendentalism), Dasein's equation with being human leaves the ground
of Being in the being of (finite) man.

Certainly because of the

fundamental unity of man and world, and because Being is designated
(op ened up) by a term of man's language, the question of Being cannot
be asked apart from the question of man, but must Being be reached
through a study of the being of man as in Being and Time?
answer is no, and Heidegger himself recognized this.

The

That is why

in the later works Dasein becomes understood more in the sense of
existing or being-there in general, and not strictly as man 's
ess ence,

1

and why the later works emphasize that when in Being and

Time he said "Allerdings nur solange Dasein ist_ ... "gibt es" Sein,"
(Surely, only as long as Dasein is ... is there Being (is Being given))
the "it gives" \vas consciously and caref ully considered and the "it"
which gives, is Being itself, the ground of man, Dasein and the giving.
We reiterate that the analytic of Dasein in Being and Time is not
thereby invalidated by these considerations.

The fundamental struc-

tur es of the "there" revealed by the unravelling of Dasein's
existentialia are intrinsic to and cons titut ive of the meaning of

1As early as Introduction to Metaphysics when concerned with
man's being he always speaks of 'human Dasein' and not merely 'Dasein' .
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Being, and this can nev e r be forgotten .

Howev e r, Being a nd Time

its e lf occasionally f el l into tr aditional subjective traps becaus e
it first def ine d Dasein in th e sense of the essence of man, and
was thus guid ed by tr a ditional under s t a ndings of man.

lfuat has

to be done is first und ers t and Dasein as th e oc c urr i ng unity of
man and th e world (Er eignis) and then und erst a nd man \vi thin the
guidance of this understanding of Dasein.
by th e l a t e r works .

This is th e rout e followed

Thus Dasein is essential to the ques tion of

Being, and th e l a t e r works maint a in this, but Dasein as Ereignis,
not strictly as th e essence or being of man, and c e rtainly not as
the e ntity man .

Dasein is not an ent i t y , a nd as we h av e shown

Being a nd Time itself tri ed to move in this dir e ction, but could
not fully c a rry it out .
Sinc e Heidegger hims elf was led into t he problems of 'subjectivist
thin king ' \vhile explicitly try i ng to lay out a n ew direction, the
tend ency of th e r eader to do so is c e rtainly an un de rst andab le danger.

Heidegg e r recognized thi s , and has said one of the problems

with Being and Time was that th e t erminolo gy was too strongly root ed
in traditio nal metaphysics (subj ec tivist thinking ) for what he was
saying to be really heard.

This exposes another reason why a concern

for language is impo rt a nt to him .

If the init ial a tt empt to r ea ch

Being was failing beca use of l angua ge di ffic ult ies , he must expose
th e being of language so that th ese difficulti es can b e und e r s tood
and thereby avoided .

When we l earn that authentic language listens

as much as it speaks, is guided by and gains its Being from what is
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talked about, is not always an assertion or judgment, and is not
primarily a property belonging to man, we learn how to read
Heid egger hims e lf.

Tied to this is a second consideration which

indicat es the importanc e of language.

On the first page of Being

and Time we have seen Heidegger proclaim "Our aim is to work out
the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely."
We have also seen that th e questions of meaning and the concr ete
working out of meaning are ontological problems solvable only in
the ontology of language.

From what we have done we realize that

meaning is not linguistic definition, not a subjective formula
for a mere word.
it is its Sinn.

Meaning is rooted in that \vhich is "there" itself,
Therefore, \ve know that when Heidegger asks "what

is the meaning of Being ," he is not asking simply how man uses the
word ' Being,' rather h e is calling for a thinking encounter with
Being its elf .

Thus by asking for th e meaning of Being he is

avoiding the circul a rity of asking what is Being , i . e ., of asking
for the Being of Being.

He is not, however, abandoning Being itself

for a mere linguistic concern.

Thus, only by having worked out

Heidegger's ontology of language and meaning were we able to understand his project in the quest for Being.
Thus Heidegger's concern with language is anything but an
incidental interest or even an example used as a trial application of
the power of his ontology.

Rather , Being and language are intricat e ly

tied, not in the domain of one or the other, but in a unity more
fundamental than either individual concern.
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Not the spoken word - itself a thing but the Saying, as the chime of stillness of which the spoken word is but
an echo, bestows world and he nce also
that wh i ch we call by the little word
'is'. Word and thing, Saying and Being ,
are bound together in a unity.l
The task before Heidegger in 1927, and the one befor e us now, is to
unravel how language and Being can be reached only in each others
light.

1

J. L. Mehta The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger ( New York:
Harp er & Row , 1971) p. 226.
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II.

Language and the origins of philosophy
In our first section we have seen that in Being and Time

Heidegger interprets logos as Discourse, and sees it as the essence
of Dasein.

1

In this section we plan to elaborate the concept of

logos as he developed it after Being and Time, where logos comes
to mean Being itself, but as still tied to a concern with language.
In this way we shall be developing an understanding of how language
tied into his basic concern with the meaning of Being.
seen hmv

logo~

We have

as Discourse has to do primordially ,.,ith Being-there,

and not with human utterance.

However, the human element can not

be ignored, and one of the functions of this section will be to
explore the relation of man as a thinker and speaker to logos understood as Being.

As this relation is discussed we will be touching

on many areas that can only be fully elaborated in later sections,
but ,.,e will have at least seen what issue s are of concern in
Heidegger's work with language, and how these are always directed to
the basic question of Being.
The concept of logos is developed by Heidegger in his work on
the early Greek philosophers.

Heidegger's analyses of the history

of philosophy are notoriously unique, and we must therefore understand how he views his

approac~

to other thinkers.

He states:

Only when we turn thoughtfully toward
what has already been thought, will
we be turned to use for what must
still be thought.2

1

Being and Time p. 47.

2Heidegger Identity and Difference trans. by Joan Stambaugh
(N ew York: Harper & Row, 1969) p. 41.
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In various works Heidegger did perform this thoughtful r e turn to
various thinke rs, especially with the Greeks , Kant, Nietzsche, and
Hegel.

These works fulfill the promise of the never published

s ec ond part of Being and Time, \vhich called for a "ph enomenological
destruction of the history of ontology," and in order to understand what Heidegger was doing we must become clear on how he means
'destruction'.

He does not intend a nihilistic annihilation of

everything the great philosophers have done, rath e r he views his
task as the exposing of what is unthought or \vhat underlies what
they have said.

Thus when he calls for a 'destruction of the his-

tory of ontology' or says " every inte rpretation must do violence,"
he is neither calling for a re evaluation of their greatness nor
for an unjustified misconstrual of what they said, rather he is
calling for a violent shaking up of what they said, in order to expose their roots.

Heidegger admits that much of th e though ts he

draws out of the historical thinkers they themselves were never aware
of:

"The more original the thinking, the richer will be what is

unthought in it.
can bestow."

The unthought is the greatest gi ft that thinking

1

Thus Heidegger approaches past philosophers
himself, and not as an historian.

As he says:

as a philosopher
"That \vhich really

is, Being, which from the start calls and determines all beings,
can never be made out, however, by ascertaining facts, by appealing
to particulars."

2

He is not using the Greek thinkers as support

~at is Call ed Thinking p. 76.
2 rbid. p. 66.
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for his own position, but rather he is attempting to bring us into
a new and thoughtful relation with them that at the same time is
bringing us into a thoughtful relation with Being itself as
Heidegger is trying to approach it.

Further, since he is after

the unarticulated relation to Being that underlies these thinkers
and not a factual determination of their specific intentions, any
argument against Heidegger's interpretations, on the basis of an
alternate interpretation of the writings, can not belittle the
philosophical import of Heidegger's endeavor.

Heidegger's goal

in the return to earlier thinkers is the same as everywhere else:
to disclose Being.

He must ask about the Being of these thinkers,

that is how they stand with Being:
Destruction does not mean destroying,
but dismantling, liquidating, putting
to one side the merely historical assertions about the history of philosophy.
Destruction means - to open our ears,
to make ourselves free for what speaks
1
to us in tradition as the Being of beings.
As we have stated we will be concerned solely with the work
Heidegger has done on the Presocratics, and more specificly on
Heraclitus and Parmenides.

Though he is concerned with various

aspects of these thinkers, his attention focuses on a retrieving
of the significance and meaning of logos.

In this endeavor he must

be concerned with two other terms, legein and noein, and show how
the current interpretations of these miss their true meaning, and
how this affects our understanding of logos.

1

Heidegger ~at is Philosophy trans. by Jean T. Wilde and William
Kluback (New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1955) p. 73.
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We must merely free ourselves from the
notion that originally and fundamentally
logos and legein signified thought, understanding and reason. As long as we cling
to this opinion and even go so far as to
interpr e t lo gos in th e light of logic as
it later developed, our attempt to rediscover the beginning of Gree k philosolhy
can lead to nothing but absurdities.
The retrieve of the Greek meaning of logos begins with the claim
that rather than originally having the significance of reason, word,
or judgment,it meant to gather or collect.

"Originally logos

meant, according to Heidegger, gathering or collection, having the
sense of both collecting and collectedness; it was the primal
gathering principle."

2

The support for this interpretation comes

from an analysis of the etymology , a technique Heidegger repeatedly
H. G. Liddell states 3 that logos is a verbal noun of legein

uses.

whi ch in addition to meaning to say or speak, originally meant to
pick up or pick out for oneself, and also to be counted among (e. g .
the members of a group) .

The sense of ga thering is also present in

logeia which means a collection of money for taxes or charity.
And Charles Kahn states:
The term logos is a verb a l noun, '"hose
primitive meaning is inseparable from that
of the verb legein to which it corresponds
In its earliest usage (for example, in Homer)
legein means either 1) to pick or gather, or
2) to count or enumerate . The und erlying
idea, reflected in both senses, seems to be

1

rntroduction to Metaphysics p. 104.

2

J. L. Mehta The Philosophy of Mar tin Heidegger p. 144.

3H. G. Liddell A Greek-English Lexicon Clarendon Press Oxford 1843.
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"to group or gather, passing from one thing
to another ."l
The notion of logos as counting or enumerating is a common one (even
as late as Plato's Theatetus), and what Heidegger is emphasizing is
not the mere listing but the fact that in counting or enumerating
we bring things into a grouping which gathers or holds to gether the
individual things that are listed or counted.

Thus the connections

of logos and legein through the sense of gathering is scholastically
supported, and as we continue this idea must be kept in mind.
The sense of logos as a gathering which we have gained can now
be used to interpret (i.e., enter a thinking relation with) Heraclitus
in a vmy that is more valuable to us than some more common translations.

Rather than und erstanding logos merely as The Word (as

for instance John Burnet does in Early Gre ek Philosophy), we now see
it as that which gathers together, and holds in a balanced tension,
the warring opposites that for Heraclitus make up whatever is.
"Logos is the steady gathering , the intrinsic togetherness of the
essent (Seiendes); i.e. Being (Sein). "

2

In other words, logos is

the binding force that runs through the world of becoming or flux
and grants it the abiding permanence of Being in a similar manner to
the way counting binds together th e isolated entities which are
enumerated.

We can therefore, view Heraclitus not merely as a rela-

tivist,that results from a theory of pure process and flux of isolated

1

charles Kahn "A New Look at Heraclitus" American Philosophical
Quarterly Vol. 11 No. 3 July 1964 pp. 191-2.
2 rntroduction to Metaphysics p. 110
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opposites, as Plato seems to und erst and him, but rathe r as a thinker
of Being, one \vho r ecogniz es the diversity, change and tension of
the world of things which we encounter, yet const a ntly has an eye
on tha t which gra nt s it an abiding presence, i.e. Being.
is the gathering of this conflict and unr es t."

"Being

1

Thus, though it cannot be denied that logos has a meaning tied
to language as the usual tra nslations indicate, it, as our analysis
of Discours e indicated earlier, is concerned with a more fundamental
notion than 'langua ge ' ordinari ly indicates.
There can be tru e speaking and hearing
only if they are direc t ed in advance
toward Being, the lo gos. Only where
the logos discloses itself does the
phone tic sound become a word. Only
where the Being of the essent (S eiend es )
is heard does a mere casual list ening
b ec ome a hearing .2
In short, as a gathering , logos holds to ge th er \varring fragments of
transi tory becoming , and grants them Being.

But we have under s tood

Beir,g (and ther efo r e logos since the above quotes shm.,r the identification of Being and logos ) as a presencing, coming-forth, or disclosure, and we must now see how ga thering and pres encing belong
togeth er.

It is for the purpos e of developing this connection that

a discussion of legein and no ein becomes necessary.

1

Ibid. p. 113. Just as fire is the tying together the two
distinct states of that which is burned.
2

Ibid. p. 111.

59

The usual translations of legein and noein as saying and thinking
are tied to the usual conception of Jogos, but we must now retrieve
a more fundamental notion of these terms that coordinates with, and
thus clarify, the new understanding of logos.

The first step is

to see how legein is viewed in a way which brings together the
ideas of saying, gathering and Being.

In the first sec tion we saw

that there are four aspects to any saying:

"what-is-said," "what-

is-talked-about," "communication," and "manifesting ."

In Being and

Time Heidegger emphasized the notion of "what-is-talked-about" by
dist inguishing authentic Discourse as that which does not lose sight
of "what-is-talked-about"by becoming too narrowly concerned with
"what-is-said."

Now Heidegger focuses on the companion aspect

"manifesting," for insofar as we are to be concerned \vith "what-istalked-about" we must see how a s2.ying lets this come forth .
The saying and discoursing of mortals
occurs fro m the earliest times on as
legein, laying. Saying and discoursing
occur essentially as the letting-lietogether-before of everything which,
1
laid in unconcealment, comes to presence.
In this quote legein is seen as talking of both gathering and
letting-lie (manifesting).

We have seen the etymological support for

interpreting it as gathering, and Liddell also confirms the interpretation of laying-out, or manifesting, but as a separate listing,
and the question facing u s is how th e two senses of legein work together
as a characterization of authentic saying .

1

Early Greek Thinking p. 63. Das Sagen und Reden der Sterblichen
ereignet sich von frUh an als legein, als legen. Sagen und Reden wesen
als das beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen alles dessen, was, in der
Unverborgenheit gelegen , anwest .
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In order to find the foothold for an answer
we need to reflect on wh~t actually lies in
legein as laying. To lay means to bring to
lie. Thus to lay is at the same time to place
one thing beside another, to lay them together.
To lay is to gather . l
This quote certainly can not serve as a completely satisfactory
solution to our question .

However, it can not be ignored, for it

points in the direction of the gath e ring a letting-lie actually
does entail.

As we shall see, letting something lie means to place

it in a context, i.e . , within a world, and thus there is a
gathering of the thing with its context (world) .
It can help us to look at the Gennan \vord that Heidegger uses
for gathering:

Lesen, which in addition to gathering means to read .

The connection between reading and gathering points the way to the
connection of laying-out and gathering in general, for reading is
a gathering of letters, words and sentences that lets a nexus of
meaning come forth.

Reading is a gathering that lets an explicit

understanding take place; it gathers the various parts so that something may be there for us to listen to and think about.

The parts

which a reading gathers are easy to point out, but this is not the
case with legein.

We have seen Discourse as a gathering-laying-out

of Understanding, and logos as a gathering-letting-Be of whatever is,
but this takes us only part of the way toward an understanding of
how Heidegger views the fundamental gathering of an authentic saying.
As we shall see, a saying gathers ourselves into a fulfilling unity
with Being, but a full elaboration of this must wait until a later

1

Ibid. p. 61.
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point.

The idea will finally come to culmination only in the

thinking of the Fourfold (gods, mortals, sky, and earth), so for now
we must be satisfied with the recognition that the two roots of legein
can work tog e ther to characterize a fundamental notion of a saying:
a gathering lets something lie before us and be manifest.

"Legein

in the sense of "saying" and "discoursing" is intelligible only if
it is thought in its most proper sense- as "laying" and "gathering."
We must now turn to another notion, noein.

1

As evidenced by

Parmenides' famous fragments "It is necessary to speak (legein) and
think (no ein) what is; for Being is, but nothing is not" and "For
thought (noein) and Being are the same,"
for the Greeks in understanding Being.

2

noein plays a crucial role

In line with this Heidegger

attempts to rethink noein in a way free from the prejudices of subjectivism which links it to the tra ditional conception of l ege in
and lo gos by understanding it in the Cartesian sense of representational thought.

This traditional approach focuses on thinking as

a non-material process of the soul which in some way re-produces the
objective world, and as such is dependent on God or transcendental
categori e s for a claim to knowledge.

In short, this vie\v of thinking

cuts it off from any real belonging to the world and presents us with
an eternal dualism.

Parmenides' statement thus becomes that of a

naive thinker who dogmatically overlooked the complexities of this
dualism.

1

It is Heidegger's claim that this criticism of Parmenides

Early Greek Thinking p. 73.

2J.M. Robinson translations in An Introduction to Early Greek
Philosophy. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1968).
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is based on a distinction which is not coherent with the Greek conception of Being .

His attempt is thus to reinterpret no ein with

specific emphasis on Being rather than man.

In line with this it

is important to note that even in the subjective developments of
metaphysics the conne ction of Being, logos, and thinking remains
strong.

But as the understanding of thinking develops more and more

into an individual subjective proc ess of the soul logos is understood as rules of th o ught (logic), and thus as metaphysics culminates
in the idealism of nineteenth century Germany, Being becomes pure
Idea.

To overcome this Heidegger stat es that just as the source of

logos and legein was found in Being as presencing, and not in subjectivity, so too must the original sense of no ein be retrieved .
Noein - translated for short as thinking is thinking only to th e extent to which
it remains dep e ndent and focused on the
einai, Being . Noei n is not "th i nking"
simply by virtu e of occurring as a nonma terial activity of the soul and spirit.
Noein qua noe i n belongs together with
1
einai; and thus belongs to einai itself.
In What is Called Thinkin[ Heidegger undertakes the rethinking
of noein in terms of a receptivity or receiving, rather than as a
grasping or prehending .

The latter view sees the direction of noein

going from the subject outHard, and thus considers it as a manipulating
or forcing into categories on the part of subjectivity of that which
is by itself passive and unreachable in its true Being.
on the other hand states:

~at is Called Thinking p. 240.

Heidegger
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In noein, what is perceived concerns
us in such a way that we take it up
specifically, and do something with
it. But where do we take what is
perceived? How do >ve take it up?
We take it to heart. What is taken
to heart, hmvever, is left to be
exactly as it is. This taking-toheart does not make over what it
takes. Taking to heart is: to
keep at heart.l
Heidegger justifies this interpretation by again returning to the
etymology, and again Liddell confirms his claims.

One of the

early meanings of noein is "to see so as to remark or discern, distin guished from merely seeing," and therefore Heidegger's claim of
taking to heart as a special receptive or retaining perception is
insightfully accur ate .

Further, by noting the connection of no ein

to nous, or noos, we again see his interpretation confirmed.

Usual

translations see the connection of no ein as thinking to noos as mind
or reason, but th e re is a more fund amental int e rpr e t a tion of noos
that goes along with our findings on noein.

The early meaning of

noos is "the mood or temp e r of man," and in such sayings as ek pontes
no on, "with all his heart," and chaire no oi, "he is glad at heart,"
we see the connection to, and thus the justification of, Heidegger's
und erstanding of noein.
Noein implies a perceiving which never
was nor is a mere receiving of something .
The noein perceives beforehand by taking
to mind and heart. The heart is the wardship guarding what lies be fore us, thou gh

1

Ibid. p. 203.
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this wardship itself needs that guarding
which is accomplished in the legein as
gathering.l
Thus noein as a taking to heart is dependent on legein, which
as the gathering-letting- lie- forth provides
to take up.

noei~

with something

Therefore it seems that the original naming of ].egein

is prior to thinking, or, in terms of another phase of Heidegger's
vmrk, the poet is prior to the thinker.

Hm..rever, this is not

completely correct, for as Heideg ger states:

"J_egein and poein are

coordinated not only in series, first legein and then
enters into the other."

2

~oein,

but each

Further, Heidegger sees thinking, and as

we shall see later also saying, as a mergence of these two terms.
One can not be viewed as independent of the other, and thus thinking
involves both letting- lie and taking to heart.

"The conjunction of

legein and no e in is the fund amental characteristic of thinking which
here moves into its ess ential na ture."

3

This conjunction is not the glueing together of two separate
processes; rather we must see that each essentially entails or includes
the other.

In legein, gathering-letting-lie, we must be already taking

to heart, for, as we saw, taking to heart is a holding of the Being of
that which manifests itself, and thus we could not let something lie
before us, i.e., be there, if we did not take it to h eart.

In other

words, the gathering which lies at the source of authentic saying as

1
2

Ibid. p. 207.
Ibid. p. 208.

3 Ibid. p. 211.
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a letting lie can only take place insofar as there is a taking to
heart.

It is poein as taking to heart which lets authentic saying

(~egei~,

gathering-letting-lie) occur.

But at the same time we

must remember that noein can not occur except as a

-~ein,

for until

there is a gathered something lying before us, only Nothing can be
taken to heart, i.e., nothing can be taken to heart.

Thus though

they may be considered separately, on the ontological level a
letting- lie is a taking to heart and a taking to heart is a lettinglie, and this conjunction is what is called thinking.
We can now return to logos.

Heidegger has stated:

"

for

thinking is the legein of the logos," l and elsewhere "in thought
Being is taken up in language."

2

This relation of thinking (legein

and noein) to Being (logos) thus rises to the foreground in our
attempt to rethink language and Being for the Greeks.
recap what we have accomplished so far.

Let us briefly

We started with a discussion

of logos, which, though never losing overtones pointing towards
language, has a primary meaning of Being; but Being understood in
two ways:

as gathering and as presencing.

Thus be examining logos

we are led to a thinking of the coming together of language, Being,
presencing, and gathering, and the task is then to further progress
our thinking towards this belonging together.

To do this we moved

to the etymological source of logos, i.e., legein.

1

as

11

Legein started us

Ibid. p. 162. We, of course, must at this point understand this
the legei~ and noein of the _;Logos_. 11

•••

2 11

Letter of Humanism 11 p. 148.
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at a thinking of saying, but led to a notion of gathering- lettinglie.

And th e reby we onc e again r eached a belonging tog e th er of such

notions as saying, gathering, and lying.

To further clarify this

we then examined Parmenid es' statements which led us to another
term, i.e. , noein.

A thinking of

~ oein

starts at an understanding

of it as thinking, but leads to a more fundamental notion of taking
to heart.

Taking as our clue Parmenides' statement that legein and

noein are the same, we were then led to a thinking of how these two
entail each other and belong together.

In other words, Heid egger

interprets Parmenides' TO AUTO ("The Same " ) as a belonging together
of a mutual depend ency and entailment.

This point is elaborated

in I den tity and Diff e rence as well as the essay "Moira," and, as
should be evident, this notion is becoming increasingly significant,
a nd it shall continu e to be of conce rn to us.
What this l ed us to was the mutua l entailment of l egein and
noein insofar as a gathering-letting-lie occurs as a taking to heart
and visa versa.

It is not as if they were one and the same, but

they belong together, each requires the other.

Thus thinking is no

longer merely the equivalent of noein,nor is it understood as a process of representational ideas by a subjectivity.

Thinking becomes

the combination (which results from the mutual entailment) of legein
and noein.

Thinking is a taking to heart which gathers and lets lie.

Though we did not emphasize the point, the same holds for saying
(language) as for thinking.

Language and thinking are obviously

closely tied for Heidegger, 1 but saying is no longer understood merely

lNote for example: "Thinking of Being is the original poetiz ing.
Language first comes to language, i.e., into its essence, in thinking ....
Thinking is primordial poetry." Early Greek Thinking p. 19.
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as a translation of

legei~,

nor essentially as human utterance.

Saying is a gatherin g-letting-lie which takes to heart.

In this

way we have come quite far in thinking the belonging to gether of
thinking and saying through an examination of the Gr e ek s, and we are
now in a position to return to the question about the two senses of
logo~

(Being) as gathering and as presencing.

Logos as presencing is the thinking-saying (i.e., legein and
Iloein) that lets whatever i s Be what it is by a laying out \vhich takes
to heart.

We indicated that the letting-lie of legein is a gathering,

and we saw for He r a clitus

logo~

can be unde rs tood as a gathering of

the transitory flux of opposites into an enduring tension of Being.
However, for Heid egger the notion of logos as a gathering is something different - it is the gath ering of thinking and Being (and
the othe r rel a tions that belong togethe r) in a mutual dep endency.
This gathered relat e dness Heideg ge r later calls Erei gnis (Appropriation) and we shall discuss it in depth in the next chapter.

For now

it is important to note that as paradoxical as it seems the relation
of thinking and Be ing is Being (logos) itself.

The clearest evidence

that Heidegger considers Being as the relation of itself to something
appears in "Letter of Humanism" where in discussing man's essense
as ex-sistence he stat e s:
What relation has Being to ex-sistence?
Being itself is the relationship, insofar
as it retains and reunites ex-sistence
in its existential (i.e., ecstatic)
essence - as the place of the truth of

6G

Being amidst the beings ... man as an
existing one comes to stand in this
relationship which Being itself professes to be.l
In other words, as Dasein was the meeting of man and world in
Being and Time, logos as gathering is, for Heidegger, the meeting
of thinking and Being.

Logos (Being) as the gathering belonging

together of thinking and Being tells us that Being as presencing
needs thinking (and visa versa), and thus when Heidegger says
"es gibt Sein" the it (es) which gives Being (presencing) is Being
itself in the sense of gathering.
But since the da\m of thinking "Being''
names the presencin g of '1-lhat is present,
in the sense of the gathering which
clears and shelters, which in turn is
thought and designated as the logos.2
Presencing, the emergence of whatever is, can only be understood
in the light of the primordial gather ed unity of thinking and Being
(man and world).

We can see that it is out of this unity that

presencing is possible.

Further, we must note that the way or manner

that this unity historically occurs determines what can Be present in
that age.

For example, contradictions can not occur (Be, present

themselves) in a logically dominated era and gods can not be present

l"Letter on Humanism" p. 159. Note also: "But in wha t else could
the exceptional charact er of gods and men consist if not in the fact
that precisely they in their relation to the lighting can never remain
concealed? Why is it that they can not? Because their relation to the
lighting is nothing other than the lighting itself, in that this relation
gathers men and gods into the lighting and keeps them there." Early
Greek Thinking p. 119-120.
2

Early Greek Thinking p. 39.
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in a technological one.

Finally, looking from the other direction,

it is as pres encing that the gathered unity is manifested or occurs,
i.e., Being as pre sencing is the legein of Being as the relation.
In other words, it is through the presencing of what is present that
the togetherness of thinking and Being can show itself.

Thus the

two senses of logos (Being) actually need each other and rather than
ambiguously shifting its meaning, as it might first seem, these
different ways of viewing it actually work together in widening our
grasp of its meaning.

As Heidegger states in a discussion of

Parmenides' fragment "For thought and Being are the same ":
But what is to be thou ght is named in
the enigmatic key word ~ aut~, the
Same. What is so named expresses the
relation of thinking to Being.
Specifically, it (the Same) reigns
as the unf olding of the twofold - an
unfolding in the sens e of disclosure.
That which unfolds , and in unfolding
reveals the twofold, allows taking-heedof to get undenvay towa rd the gathering
perception of the presencing of what
is present.l
tUth this we drm.,r to a close the discussion of Heidegger 1 s rethinking of the early Greek philosophy.

It has been an extremely

important end e avor, for as the birth of t{estern philosophy Heraclitus
and Parmenides set the course for what followed.

Therefore, in un-

covering their roots we gain sight of Being as it first stood.

These

Greeks take a crucial place, for they laid the groundwork that
determined the course of Western philosophy.

1 Ibid. p. 94-5.

We can see how as noein
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came to mean a subjective process of the soul, legein statement or
assertion, and

lo~~

logic, they lost the sense of their original

signific m1ces, and Being qua Being, as Heidegger views it, was
covered over.

By going back to the Greeks Heidegger was able to

contrast his quest for the meaning of Being from the metaphysical
and logical tradition, and let Being (logos) come forth in its
originary significance.
The role language played in these developments is not what
might have been expected.

Lege in and

log~

do not have a meaning

of language in the sense of uttering, referring or symbolizing.

Only

when we understand the fundamental nature of language as a gathering
letting--lie does a concern with it become releva nt to the quest
for the meaning of Being.

As Heidegger says, "We have to learn to

think the essence of language from the sayin g , and to think saying
as let t ing-lie-before and as bringing-forward-into - view."

1

This is

why Heidegger says that when we are concerned with the nature of
language we must enter into an experience of it, and not analyze it
as an object among other objects.

In a metalinguistic analysis of

language one language is used to examine the properties of another
language, and thus the manifesting nature of language itself can
never come forth.

On the other hand, in an experience of language

the attempt is to let the nature of language announce itself.

"In

experiences "'hich we undergo _!Tith language, language itself brings
itself to language."

2

libid. p. 91.
2on the Way to Language p. 59.
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In this section we have seen the nature of language as a
gatherer which lets lie.
~

It is in this sense that Heidegger says

.. for words and language are not wrappings in which things are

packed for the commerce of those who write and speak.

It is in

words and language that things first come into being and are."

1

This is not the claim of a subjectivist, saying that Being is in
the hands of our will, rather it is saying that language in its
fundamental nature of a gathering letting-lie is necessary for
things to stand there and manifest themselves.

Human thinking and

language do not create Being, but as we move closer to grasping
the meaning of Being we recognize that it can not be considered apart
from humans.
Finally, an important point for Heidegger has emerged in this
section without our really noticing it.

\ole have seen how his approach

to Being and the corresponding unorthodox interpretations of the
Greeks are consistent with the etymology.

Thus, though the key

terms of the early Greeks have come to speak metaphysically of subjectivity, objectivity and ratiocination, they historically find their
roots in a speaking of Being as the gathered laying out that is
manifested and maintained by a taking to heart.
have emerged is Heidegger's famous claim (which

Thus what seems to
~dll

be discussed later)

that we do not use language, but rather language uses us.

We, in our

tradition of metaphysical language, can not help but see the Greeks
as the proponents of a metaphysical understanding of the world, i.e.,

1

Introduction to Metaphysics p. 11.
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speaking of thinking and saying as proc esses of subj ectivity and
Being as obj ectivity.

And language also used the Greeks, for regard-

less of what they were trying to say, through the history of their
language they spoke of the fundamental belonging together of gathering,
letting- lie, taking to heart, manifesting and presencing.

Could it

be mere coincid ence that the etymologies of the key terms of the
great Presocratics at least allow a thinking of Being as Heidegger
has attempted to think it?

Or has Heidegger successfully retrieved

Being as it underlay the birth, and thus the history, of philosophy?
The question is: Is Be ing a mere word
and its meanin g a vapor, or does what
is designated by the word "Being" hold
within it the historical de stiny of the
West.l

1

Introduction to Metaphysics p. 35.
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III.

The Fourfold and Appropriation
We now turn our attention to Heidegger's last phase, in which

he becomes directly involved with Being and language.

In our

previous sections language and Being seemed to collapse into an
identity.

Logos (Discourse) was seen as one of the primary existen-

tiale of Dasein, and further elaborated into the primordial gathering
associated with Being itself.
entailed

noe~n)

Further, language as

lege!~

(and the

is understood as "gathering-letting-lie" and Being

as presence is understood as a gathered lying there.

However, we

must be careful to understand identity when we say that Being and
language are identical.

In Identity and Difference Heidegger

explains that identity means "belonging- together," and not collapsing
into a unitary sameness. Belonging together is a mutual dependency,
in which each of the two can only first arise out of the relation.
As Joan Stambaugh says in the introduction to Identity and Difference:
"It is perhaps difficult for us to think of a relation as being more
original than what is related, but this is what Heidegger requires
of us."

1

The notion of 'relation' has traditionally meant the tying

of two separate and independent entities.

This is obviously not

the notion Heidegger is after since the gathered togetherness is more
fundamental than the independent "components."

This is why Heidegger

attempts to use the term 'identity' rather than 'relation' to refer
to the belonging together (though he too uses the word 'relation' at
times).

However, since the "components" do have separate integrities

1 rdentity a nd Difference p.12.
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and can be focused upon separat e ly we permit ourselves the use of
I.

the word 'relation' to facilitate our explication, but it is
imperative to understand it as a primordial belonging together
and not a subsequent holding together of two separate entities.
As we shall see in this chapter, this belonging together is known
as Appropriation.
The relation between language and Being is expressed in the
famous quote "Language is the house of Being."

With this quote

Heidegger tries to express the sense of identity of belonging together and needing each other.

Being dwells in its house: it lives

there, i.e., Being has a place to Be thanks to language.
same time language is depend ent upon Being.

At the

Language is a mere

empty shell if it does not constantly keep Being present within its
domain.

Being, when housed in l anguage, keeps it strong, meaningful

and signific ant.

If language lo se s its contact with Being, it

crumbles into idle chatter, i mpotency and finally non-sense (and,
therefore, non- existence).
However, we are getting ahead of ourselves, and in order to
understand the relation of Being and language we must turn to an
examination of Heidegger's development of the topics.
Heidegger ' s philosophy is usually called the

It

This phase of

l a te works. tt

However,

it is important to realize that many of the ideas that get worked out
in the writings of the fifties and sixties began with such works as
"Origin of a

l~ork

of Art" and "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry"

both originally composed in the thirties.

Thus though the writings
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we will be concerned with have a common bond in both subject matter
and style, they do not represent merely a short phase of Heidegger's
thinking.
These works have also been characterized as the poetical phase
of his work.

Though this is a true characterization, it does not

mean that their value lies solely in aesthetic concerns.

As we

shall see the relation of thinking and poetry is a very close one,
in fact Heidegger will argue that authentic thinking has to be
poetical.

Therefore, when his philosophy is poetic, it does not

reduce philosophy to unguided and non-accurate discipline.

Rather,

he is elevating poetical writing to a nethodology that first lets
serious and accurate philosophy take place.

There has been a latent tension in the meaning of Being throughout Heidegger's writing.

On the one hand Being has been the act

of presencing of that which is present:
or noein.

appearing, da-sein, or

~~in

On the other hand, it is the condition of this presencing:

the gathered unity of man and world known as Being-in-the-world,
Dasein, or .logos.

In this chapter these two senses of Being become

explicit, and the meaning of each is worked out.

He start by asking

how it is that things presence, that is, for the Being of things.
In two short essays written in the early fifties ("The Thing" and
"Building Dwelling Thinking")! Heidegger explores what i t means to Be
a thing.

It is not the case that whatever is is a thing; for example

man, works of art and equipment are but they do not presence as things.

1

Both in Poetry, Language, Thought.
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However, things are what we are surrounded with every day; they inelude physica l and nonphys ical, real and nonreal, abstract and concret e
entities.

Thus examining their Being provides us with the best access

to the question of Being itself.

Once we have gained an under -

standing of the Being of things ,.,e turn to the second sense of Being
which, as we noted above, is at this stage called Appropriation.
After unravelling the meaning of Being as Appropriation we will
return to Being as presencing by examining the Being of entities
other than things, and in so doing we will bring to light how the
two senses of Being work together.
Heideg ger discusses the Being of things in terms of the unified
oneness of what he calls the fourfold:
and mortals.

earth and sky, divinities

The unity of these four, which consists in the mirroring

entailment of all of them in each invididual one, is what grants the
Being of things, i.e., is what enable s things to be present.
states it:
This ma nifold - simple gathering is the
jug's pr e sencing. Our language denotes
what a gathering is by an ancient l-Tord.
That word is: thi~g. The jug's presencing
is the pure, giving gathering of the onefold fourfold into a single time- space,
a single stay. The jug presences as
a thing. The jug is the ju£ as a thing.
But how does the thing presence? The
thing things. Thinging gathers. Appropriating the fourfold, it gathers the
fourfold's stay, its while, into some-thing that stays for a while: into
this thing, that thing.l

1

Poetry, Language, Thought p. 174.

As he
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We notice right away the carry over of the notion of gathering that
first emerged in the rethinking of the Greeks.

The task must there--

fore be understood as an elaboration of the thinking of Being as a
gathering, and that is where we will eventually be led.
Heidegger describes the four of the fourfold as follows:
Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock
and water, rising up into plant and animal.
The sky is the vaultinn path of the
sun, the course of the changing moon,
the wandering glitter of the stars, the
year's seas ons and their changes, the
light and dusk of the day, the gloom and
glow of night, the clemency and inclemency
of the weather, the drifting clouds and
blue depths of the ether.
The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway
of the godhead, the god appears in his
presence or withdraws into his concealment.
The mortals are the human beings. They
are called mortals because they can die.
To die means to be capable of death as
death. Only man dies, and indeed contin ually, as long as he remains on earth
1
under the sky, before the divinities.
Though Being is understood as the gathered unity of all four
which is given in the mirroring interplay of the four in each one,
it is valuable to examine them individually.

At first appearance it

seems as if Heidegger has abandoned an attempt to speak philosophically
about Being, and resorted to a mythical explanation in terms of randam components.

However, when we thoughtfully approach the four,

we realize that though poetic, there is nothing magical nor random about
them.

lrbid. p. 149.
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Since the beginning of philosophy there has been an attempt to
define Being in terms of formed matter.

From the peras and bound -

less of Pythagoras to the formal and material causes of Aristotle
to the Categories and sense manifold of Kant, Being has been seen
as the placing of outlines upon an undifferentiated continuum.

It

is as a development of this tradition that Heidegger introduces the
fourfold, for he believes the concept of formed matter speaks of a very
limited conception of Being.

As he states:

The metaphysics of the modern period
rests on the form-matter structure
devised in the medieval period, which
itself merely recalls in its words the
buried nature of eidos and hule. Thus
the interpretation~' 'thing'fby means
of matter and form, 'l<lhether it remains
medieval or becomes Kantian-transcendental, has become current and self evident. But for that reason ... it
is an encroachment upon the thingbeing of the thing.l
In short, the notion of Being as formed - matter limits us to viewing
only concrete physical things which are clearly demarcated or framed
as things, and this blocks us from thinking the Being of things in
its fullness.
But why the fourfold?

How do these four speak of Being?

Examining them separately we first look at earth.

1

Ibid. p. 30.
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(1)

Earth
Earth can be associated with the notion of matter, but it is

broader than the traditional concept.

In addition to physical

matter, earth also means the sphere of life opposed to the spiritual,
and it is also the planet which is our home (to some cultures it was
even associated with a mother).

Thus when Heidegger speaks of earth

as a component of Being, in addition to speaking of the physical
aspects of solidity and spatiality he is also speaking of the characteristics that pervade the things in touch with nature:

the fact

that all living things survive from the nourishment and protection
the earth provides.

However, over and above even this presence of

earth we often describe something as "earthy " when it has characteristics
such as warmth, openness, and an appropriate belongingness.

It is

this notion of "earthy" that arises from the earth being our home and
that Heidegger sees as a "component" of Being.
It is not something that can specifically be explained, for it
speaks of many things and the "earthiness" that all these things hint
at is not a specific thing itself.

Earth is not only being made of

matter, being alive and feeding from the earth's fruits, or having
something in common with these characteristics; it is also having
roots, being fertile, welcoming and caring, yet it is more than any
of these or even the sum of them.

To further understand it,it is

important to note that with all we have mentioned as characterizing
earthiness, the opposites of these also involve earth.

Something can

appear as "unearthy'' only in reference to earthy categories:

just
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as it is only because we are seeing creatures that we can be blind,
it is only because the categories of earthiness are relevant to all
things can they be homeless, arid, eerie or however else we characterize "unearthy."
With this characterization of earth we now turn to things and
see in what way earth is present in their Being.

Clearly in all

material things, whether organic or inorganic, earth is present in
so far as all matter consists of the physical elements found on
the table of elements.

But earthiness is a substantiality and depth

of which the substantiality and depth of physical things are only
a part.

Non-physical things such as aesthetic and emotional experiences

and feelings, mythical beings, and even numbers are also earthy.

The

fact that some music (or other art) can envelope us, or be warm and
refreshing, or alternatively be threatening, annoying, flat, and
removed are a result of there being an earthy element to the aesthetic
experience.

The earthiness of the ba ss is most predominant and evi-

dent, but when we pay attention to the clear depths of experiencing
the fragile violin runs we recognize earth there too.
of words apart from their meaning have an

Even the sounds

earth element,as poets

as well as advertising agents have discovered in manipulating the
phonemes to present a desired atmosphere.

1

Perhaps the hardest place to find earthiness is in the realms
of geometry and mathematics.

Do shapes and numbers have the type of

~ote for example a curr ent lipstick commercial where the rich
sounds of luscious, delicious, shimmering, and moisturizing are
effectively incorporated with the strong and colorful visual presen tation.
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significance that He are speaking of?

As for shapes I believe that

the clearest evidence that they do comes from modern pa inting.
Kandinsky once

~•rote

that the effect of the meeting of an acute

angle wi t h a circle is the same as that of God's finger reaching
out to Adam's in Michaelangelo's Sistine Chapel depiction.

Though

I can not expect the reader to agree with this equation, I do believe
it is visually .possible to question and test it, and this testing
in itself shows the ability to see 'abstract shapes' in respect to
an earthiness.

Perhaps there is security in the narrow-ness of the

corners of angles, cleanliness and order in the strength of a
square, completeness and enveloping in the perfection of a circle.
Questions like these are being explored by many modern artists, and
when

~ve

are concerned .,.lith shapes in this way their earthiness emerges

(whether or not we can verbalize a specific meaning of a shape).
for numbers, we must

re~ember

As

that the Pythagoreans were able t o draw

an association between them and things, which shows that they are not
purely abstract, but rather belong to the earth in some way.

Further,

the fact that some numbers welcome us as lucky and comfortable and
that certain numbers feel different than others are a result of their
earthiness.
We have now

shor~

how, when properly understood, earth is seen

as a " component" in the Being of things.

Besides referring to

physic a l a ttributes, earth has a more fundamental sense of belonging,
of having a substantiality of some kind that gives it raore than a cut
and d r y abs tract existence.

The earthiness of things is what ties

them to our world; no matter how abstract, new, or ethereal anything is,
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it can not be so rarefi e d that it loses all reference to and gro tmdin g
in earthy qualities .
It may be argu e d that all the earthy qualities of which we spoke
are mere subjective feelings or fantasies tacked on to the true thing,
and thus nothing more th an mythical nonsense in the question of Being.
To this criticism we respond that it is true that there is ahuman element
in all we said about earth , but that is because we have seen that to
speak of Being apart from man is impossible.

The earthy elements seem

to be felt by man in th e heart and gut , but why should this be any less
real (i. e ., any

less a part of the true Being of things) than the scien-

tific or abstract thoughts of an analytic brain?

Just because there is

a human element do es not mean that it is mere subj ec tive input up on the
true thing.

A mental effort of abstraction (i.e., an

effort to ignore

certain aspects) is needed to view thin gs apart from th e ir earthy qualities - to hear

1

pure sotmd 1 inputs rather than a meaningful significant

sound that speaks to us with its earthy elements.

Therefore , to con-

stitute these characteristics as mere subjective inputs is to take a
derived state (th at of th e abstractly viewed thing) as the starting
point.l Only if the mistaken prejudice of this view of reality, which
is a carry over from Descartes and the rationalists, is overcome can
the f ull Being of things be seen .

The devastating conseque nces of this

mistaken pre-judgement of what the Being of things consists in must not
be underestimated if philosophy is to make any progress.

1

It is for this

It is interesting to not e tha t while Heide gge r is accused of being
too subjective for including characteristics such as this in his analysis
of Being, an active and difficult process of reduction performed £y ~
subject is needed to reach the Being of any analytic metaphysician.
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reason that Heidegger calls on us to discover earth in our quest for
the meaning of Being.
\-.Te of course can not go through every thing in order to see how
earth is pres e nt, any more than Kant could have go ne through every thing
to see how the cat egories wer e present.

However, now that we have

given a general idea of hmv earth is understood, and how it is presen t
in the Being of all things, we can move on to the second of the four
which is sky.
(2)

Sky
Though each of the four mirrors the other three, sky is best seen

as the complement of earth, as is evidenced by the way Heidegger writes
the four:

" earth and sky , divinitie s and mo rtals. H

Ea rth speaks of

the silent unchangin g security that the substantiality of a home and
roots provide .

Sky , on the other hand, speaks of te mpo rality as th e

cours e o f the sun, moo n an d planets divide our world into segments , and
also of the infinite wonder and beyond that all thin gs point to ("th e
blue depth of the ether").

To a sci entific outlook sky might be under-

stood as a " component" of Being insofar as space-tine is needed as a
cont ainer in which things can Be , and because light is needed for th i ngs
to appear .
Being.

However , this is only a limited way of seeing how sky enters

Space-time is not a container for things, rather things are

spatial and temporal because sky is part of their Being.

Light is not

merely added to the Being of things so they may appear, for to Be means
to stand forth into the open, into the light.
Sky is the ethereal element of things, it is the heady wonder that
is most obvious when staring at the boundless heavens on a summer night.
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But it is also the light softness of the drifting clouds of a lazy
afternoon, and the crystal cl a rity of th e wint e r air, and th e vas tness of op e n spaces, and the light fragrances that go fle e ting by,
and the continual motion of the h e aven's orbit, and varying we athe r
and phases of the moon.

Sky is all these thin gs - chan ge and motion

yet continuance and the same, tran s pa r ency and cl e arne s s ye t in f init e
wonde r.

Non e of thes e fully or exa ctly des crib e it, but that which i s

seen by viewin g th em all th e r e to ge th e r des pite their difference s is
what He idegge r me ans by sky.

We may call it a he a dy aspect rather than

a heart or gut f e lt as pe ct o f earth, but it is bas ically the myst e rious
wonder th a t a ris es in a combination of th e pa ss ing of time (motion) and
yet the i nfinit e e ndurance th a t come toge the r in the sky.
Th e ethereal quality of sky is evident in the Be ing of non-phy s ical
things , but what of th e most mundane phy s ical be in gs - a rock or a pile
of manure?

Even in th es e thin gs, i f they a r e s een in th eir Bein g , sky

must be present (though of cour s e we can be concerne d \vith the m in ways
that ignore this a spect).

The sky is pres ent in these solid and mun-

dane thin gs in sev e ral wa ys .

Fir s t, as ge s talt theory in psychology

and relativity th e ory in physics ha ve shown, the rock has the qualities
it does only within the

horizon o f it s environ ment.

The op en spa ce

of the sky is int e rrupt e d by th e mas sive nes s of the rock, and it is
this int e rruption of th e op en sp ace that gives the rock its mas s ive ,
solid, earthy Bein g.

Further, sky is pres ent Hhen we behold the rock

in its awe inspiring age,

Th e countless ri s ings and settings of the

sun that the rock silently b eheld, th e countle ss rains that helpe d
mold its sha pe , the stars that will still be there to watch this rock
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long after all else is gone.

In all these ways the sky is gathered in

the very Being of the rock.
When approaching any thing in a thoughtful way as we have done with
the rock, we can find sky present in its Being.

And again to assume

that this is a mere subjective or poetic input is to prejudice our understanding of Being by a narrow analytic approach, rather than letting
the thing in its entirety come forth.
(3)

The Divinities
Third of the four are the divinities.

The divinities play an iw.por-

tant role in Being, as attested by the emphasis God h as received in
traditional philosophy.

Divinities speak of the infinite, the eternal,

the unknowable powers, the inexplicable crea tion and beginning, and the
tran scendent meaning of all things.

Heide gger speaks of the divinities

as messengers of the godhead which sometimes shmvs itself and sometimes
remains hidd en .

If

~• e

understand the godh ea d as the All or the \Vhole,

the divinities speak tmvard it in the Being of every thing.

Just as in

every action I perform, the "whole me" is somehow present (though sometimes in a hidden fashion but other times showing itself with a flash
of startling

brightness) the divinities are the aspect of the Being of

things that allows Being itself (the All) to be present.

1

Further, the divinities remind us of Plato's Ideas , and in a way
they have the same

~reaning.

However, because of the problems of think-

ing the Ideas as separate existences we must be careful to distingui sh

1

By 'the All ' and 'the whole me' I do not mean the sum of everything, but rather an encompassing or predominant significance.
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diviniti es from them.

As we have noted earlier , the four are not

separa te existences thems elves; strictly speaking they are not, for
Being itself only occurs as the gathered mirroring interplay of them.
Thus something is bec a us e it speaks of meanin gs and significances beyond itself (divinitie s ) but divinities are not things thems elves, not
the Forms of individual things participating in them.

In the analogy

of myself and my actions, th ere are not t\vO separate entities of whom
I am and what I do, for I am my actions , b ehavio rs and intentions.

But

though I am not other than my actions, I am more than any particular
one of them, or even the sum of them.

I am the style or harmony that

permeates and ties togeth e r everything I do, and thus my action can tell
of who I am only by speaking b eyon d itself , announcing that it co mes
fro m some context of a set of motivations , des ires, view of things and
interpretations.
they

In short , we can say that my actions have the Being

do specifica lly b ecause they are able to tran scen d their own

(immediate) Being.

It is in this way that divinities are to be under-

stood - they are b eyond the imme diate and concrete Being of thin gs ,
yet not completely oth e r than them .

The diviniti es are transcendent,

but insofar as they a re gathered in what e ver is, they are not separate
or outside that in which they are present.

However, the divinities

remain greater than that in which they are gathered.

As a panth eis t

says God is in everything yet does not reduce God to any individual
thing in which It is, the divinities for Heidegger are in everything
yet remain greater than that which they are in.

In this paradoxical

way of being present in things (i.e., b eing present as transcendent)
divinities contribute in making the Being of things what it is. In its
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Being a thin g is

~way s

more than what it is, and there is always a

meanin g and significance over and beyond th e immediate nominalist definition b eca use the divinities are gath er ed in the Being of all thin gs .
(4)

Mortals
Finally we turn to the last of the four:

mortals.

By mortals

Heidegger is obviously referring to man, and his special role in Being.
Being mortal doe s not &mply mean that man will die, it means he is aware
of his own death

as an inescapable occurrence.

The awareness of death

is an important contribution to Being for seve ral reasons.
awarenes s of death means being ah ead of oneself:

First the

I am not yet dead,

but since I am aware of it my current Being is what it is by virtue of
its future.

In this manner of b ein g ahead of oneself mortals are able

to preserve the future in the present, which is necessary for the abiding
presence of Bein g .

If the future were not so foreshadO\ved in th e present,

the world would be disconnected moments, we could not even say a series
of moments for there would be absolutely no connection b e tween them.
Thus nothing could stand forth in an abiding presence, i.e., nothing
could be.
Mortality plays a further and more dire ct role in the Being of
things in so far as it speaks of finitude and its opposite, infinitude.
In the awareness of my death I am at the same time aware of what is
beyond my limits, and as Heidegger says:
Death is the shrine of Nothin g , th at is, of
that which in e very respect is never something
that mere l y exists, but tvhich nevertheless
presences, even as the mystery of Being itself.
As the shrine of Nothing dea th harbors within
itself the pres encing of Being. As the shrine
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of Nothing, death is the shelter of Being.

1

In other word s , it is in the face of Nothingness, or within the horizon
of Nothingness, that whate ver is can emerge or be present.
in the first chapter, Nothing plays
ing of Being.

ar

As we saw

important role in the question-

There we raised the question "Why are there esse nts

rath e r than nothin g? " in order to gain a sense of the meaning of Being
by holding the things of the world over the abyss of non Being.
"Noth ing is that which makes the revelation of what -is as such possible
.

f or our h uman eXlstence .

.,2

It is an undefinable realm, beyond whatever

is, that Nothing can serve to first bring Being to light.
sein can only relate to what-is by projecting into Nothing .
beyond what-is is the essence of Da- sein. "

3

"Man's DaGoing

By being aware of death

man transcends what-is, including himse lf, and confronts non being, and
therefore through man ' s mortality things stand forth against the horizon of Nothingness and into the abiding li gh t of Being .
In Being a nd Time Hei de gge r entered a discussion of death in an

attempt to understand Dasein in its completeness.

Being capable of

death means being limit e d, and insofar as all things have limits, i.e.,
can be discriminated in some way, mortals (and the horizon of nega tion
and Nothingness) are present.

Nothingn ess is the withdrawal of the

1

Poetry, Langua ge , Thought, p. 178-9. Since Nothing can presence
we must paradoxically say that it is. Howe ver, we must understand that
it s mode of pres encing is not that of a thing's, but rather one, as we
shall see ,that first makes the presencing of things possible.
2
3

"What is Metaphysics?" p. 340.
Ibid., p. 348.

89

slippin g away of whatever is, it is th e gap or voi d that r emains when
all the meaning and significance of the presencing of Being withdra\vS.
In the face of our death, when we truly confront ("our own") non b e ing,
the meanin gl ess of Nothing stands before us .

Only in this way can the

world th en stan d in the light of its Being and have the solidity of
meaning and signifi cance and abiding presence.

In the face of God and

the Kingdom of Heaven this world is imperfect, fleeting, meaningless,
and mere appearance (Maya), but in the face of Nothing thi s world can
once again come forth with the full strength and real'i ty of Being.
Nothing ceases to be the va gue opposite o f
what-is: it now reveal s itself as inte gral to
the Being of what-is.
"Pure Being and pure Nothin g a re thus one and
the same." This proposition of Hegel's ("The
Science of Logic," I WWIII p. 74) is correct:
Being and No thing h ang together, but not b ecause
the two things - from the point of view of the
He ge lian concept of thought - are one in their
indefiniteness and imme diateness, but because
Being itself is finite in ess ence and is only
revealed in the Transcendence of Da-sein as
proj ected into Noth ing.l
-----It is in mortals' awareness of thei r fin i tude that they are aware of the
unlimited and undifferentiat e d voi d of Nothing, and it is this gathered
tension of finite and infinite, limit and continuity, and Being and
Nothing that Heidegger has in mind when he speaks of mortals.
(5)

Being as the gathered Fourfold
We therefor e see that rather than precludin g certain areas of Being

with his notion of the fourfold, Heidegger has attempted to give a
broad enough unders tand ing of th e meani ng of Being that (for the first
time ) do es not limit our conc eption of what it i s to Be to certain

1

Ibid., p. 346.
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areas of things or ways of vie\ving thin gs .

Previous conceptions of

Being ( e ternal Idea, formed matter, extension, individual or monad,
spatia-temporal entity) are all too narrow in a double sense.

Firs t

they refuse to grant Being to various realms of things we encounter
or might encounter, and second they are a subjective limitation of
individual things insofar as they limit them in their Being.

What

allows something to Be is that it is both unique and yet common to its
surroundings:

if not unique it would "blend" into something else and

thus not Be, and if it had nothing in common it would not be in an horizon or contex t, \vhich is impossible.
Further, traditional theories explaine d Being in terms of a thing
itself - what it was to Be was to possess a certain existing trait.
This is to be ignorant o f Heidegger 's ontological difference:
ference b e tw een Being and beings.

the dif-

In a ques t for Being to give an

explanation in terms of another bei ng (Idea, matter, extension, etc.)
is really just avoiding th e question of \vhat it means to Be.

\.Je have

merely given ourselves another b eing and we still do not know what i t
means to say that this being is, and is not nothing.
Has Heidegger himself fallen into the trap of reducing Being to a
being?

We have tried to indicate that each of the four are not thin gs ,

they are merely moments of the interplay which first grants Being to
thin gs .

Even by mortals we are not design atin g a thing, for as we

noted, we are referring to the gathered tension between Being and
Nothing that is present in the awareness of death, but which is really
a part of the Being of all things.

Further, it must be remembered that

by the fourfold Heidegger means the unity of the mirrored interplay of
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the four, which is something different from any one of them, or the sum
of them.

"By a primal oneness the four-earth and sky, divinities and

mortals- belong together in one ."

1

It is this gathered in t erplay of

four-in - one that Heidegge r understands as the meaning of Being , and
this is not a thing .

Thus though \ve discus s ed the four separately , and

showed how each one is in someway pre s e nt in the Being of things , the
truth about Being is not the pres ence of on e or th e other of them , but
r ath e r the fact of the occurrin g proc e ss of th e int e rpla y of the four
into a gathered un i ty , " This mani f old-si mp le gathering i s the jug ' s
presencin g . "

2

Hith thi s notion of the tmi f ied Fourfold, Hei de gge r ' s quest for
the meaning o f Being as pre senc i n g or Be in g-th e re h as r e ac he d a cul min a tion.

Thus rather than an att empt at fanciful poetry, the elaboration

of the four f old i s a seriou s at te mp t

to ri s e ou t of t h e shortcomin gs o f

tradition a l me t a p hys ic s , and g ive a vi a ble unders t a nd i n g of what the
Being of th i n gs means.

To the char ge of arbitrari ne ss , and a demand

for justi fi cati on , Hei de g ger responds:
But it never occurs to anyone to ask whence Plato
had a directive to think of Being a s idea , or whence
Kant had the direct i ve to think of Being a s the
transcendent a l clt a racter o f objectness , a s pos ition
(being posited) .. . .
I can provide no credential s
for \vhat I h ave said . . .. Everythin g here is the
path of a respond i n g that examines a s it li s tens .
Any path always risks going a s tray , leading astray . 3

1

Poetry , Language,

2 Ibid. , p . 174 .

3 Ibid ., p. 185-6 .

Thou~,

p. 149 .
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It is l n.portant to note that the notion of the four f old addre s s e s
itself to Leing both

CiS

es s ence and ns existence.

A thing is ".:l ecause

the f ourfold is present, a nd it is what ~t is becaube the four are
gat hered i n the sped fie way in which th(:y are .

Thus when Heidegger

sav s the ta s k of thinking is to think Bein g , he is not callin!1 for a
mystical tran s cendence, or .Jn instantaneous behold i ng of a mere 'thatit-is'.

To think th a t-it-is me ar.s to tl-.ink Being, \vhich n,e nns to pre.-

s erve the four as they ar e gE. there d.

l!eidegger calls th io preserving

a d\,'el lin g :
To d\vell, to be set at peace, means to remain
at peace within the free , t h e preserve, the
free sph ere that safe guards each thing in its
natu re . The f und a mental cha r ac ~ er of dw elling is this s pRrin g a nd ;' reservin g .l
Thus thinking Being is a dwelling, which is a difficult process of
contemplation and meditation .

Thinking is the taking to heart which

we have discussed in the s econd chapter.

It is not so methin g tack ed on

to Be ing , but is rather nece s sary to Bein g itself.

As he says at this

stage:
Staying \vith things is the only \vay in which
the fourfold stay within the fourfold is
accomplished at any time in simple unity.
Dwellin g preserve s the fourfold by bringing
the presencing of the fourfold into things.
But thin gs themselves s ecure the fo urfold
only when they themselves as things are let
be in their presencing.2
To cl arify this we must modify something \ve have been saying up
until this point.

1

2

Rather than calling the fourfold Bein g , Heidegger

Ihid., p. 149.
Ibid., p. 151.
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call s it world:

"Th is a pp ropr i at e in g mirror-play of the simple

fold of ea rth and s k y divi niti es and mortals we c a ll \vorld. ,l
Heidegge r go es on to s ay:

oneHoweve r,

"Wh a t e v e r b e c ollies a thin g occurs out of th e

rin gi ng of the world' s mi rror pla y."

2

In othe r word s , the unity of

the f our fo ld is c a lle d world b eca use it refe r s sp e ci f ically to th e
Bein g o f th i n gs , it is what a ll ows thing s to Be th i n gs .

But, as we saw

earlie r, Be in g i s Bein g- i n-the -world, and thu s the four f old, or \vorld,
ne e ds th i nk i n g man to pre serve it, to let i t Be.

In th i nking man dw e lls ,

and dw e lli n g i s a prese rvin g o f the fourfold ( i ncludin g hi ms elf a s
mortal) and t h us a pre s e rvin g of Be in g .

"Dwe llin g , a s pres e rvin g , k ee ps

th e four fo ld in th a t wit h wh i ch mortals s t a y:

in thin gs . "

3

Thve llin g does not mean me r e ly l i v i ng in a clo se proxi mi t y , it me ans
b e l on gin g t o , b ei n g pa rt of, b ei n g i nvo lve d with.

It i s thus the Be i n g

o f dwe lling t ha t now b e co mes cruc i al fo r He idegger in h is qu e st f or th e
me an i n g of Bein g , fo r th e fo ur f old gav e us worl d , but wo rld n e e ds dwe llin g man t o r ealize i t se l f and Be .

At

ti mes He i degger speaks o f b ei n g

involve d \vi t h a t o pology o f Be in g , b e c a us e he is c onc e rn e d with th e
area o f mee t i n g b etwee n ma n an d world, i. e ., whe re and ho\v they dw e ll
to ge th e r.

Th is meetin g i s call ed Ap pro pri a t i o n ( Er eign i s ), and our tas k

now b e comes an unde r s t a nd i ng of Bein g as Ap prop riation.

1
2
3

Ibid., p. 179.
Ib i d., p. 183.
Ibid. , p • 151.
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( 6)

Approp r i a t i on
Th e thinkin g o f Be ing a s Appropri ati on i s th e culmination of th e

ide a s of Dase in and l o gos th a t took form e arlie r i n his care er.

It i s

an att emp t to ge t aw a y f ro m th e th i nkin g o f Being of b ei ngs ( presencing)
and th i nk Be ing qua Being (th a t wh i c h e n ab l e s presencin g) .

Be caus e o f

th e connot a t i ons ' Be in g ' h as f rom s o me of hi s e arl ie r concern s and fr om
th e work s of oth e r philo sophe r s , he tri es to av oi d the \vo rd - s ome t ime s
writ i n g it wi t h cro ss es through it , s ome time s wr i t i n g i t a s th e ol d
En gli s h ' neon ', b u t most of t en by r efe r r ing to it simply a s Appropriation .

As he

s u mn~ r izes

it i n an swe r t o a ques ti on f r om J oan Stamb a ugh

and J. Gl enn Gr ay :
" Be ing i t se l f " means : Th e Ap pr opriation can
no l on ge r b e th o ught a s "Bein g" in t erms of
pres e nc e . " Appro pr ia t i on " no lon ge r names
an o th er manne r an d epo c h of " Bein g". "Bein g"
th ought wi th o ut r ega rd to b eings (i. e . , ahvays
only in t e r ms of , an d wi th r e spect t o , t hem)
means a t t he same t ime : n o lo nger t hough t as
"Bein g" ( p r esence ) .1
Thi s con ce rn \vi th App ropria t i on rath e r t han Bei ng as pr esen cin g is
on e way of vi ew in g th e ce l ebrat e d r e ve r sal which me t aphys i cal int e rpre t e r s c on si de r to be a t urn f r om s ubj e ct i vit y to obj e ctivity .

Th e

turn i s f rom a ques t i oning o f Bei ngs of bein gs ( i . e ., da- s ein , b ei ngth e r e , presencing) t o a ques t ionin g o f Be ing qu a Being ( App ro p r ia t ion ).
We must no t e th a t thou gh th ese two con ce rn s are di ffe r ent th e y can not
b e full y sepa r a t e d :
Bu t App r opri a tion is differe nt i n n a ture bec a us e
it is r i cher than any conceivabl e definit i on o f
Bein g. Be in g , howe ve r , in r es pec t o f i t s essen tia l
ori gin can be th ought in t e r ms of Approp ri a t i on . 2

1 Th e End o f Philos ophy , p . xiii .

2

On

th e Wa y to La nguage , footnote , p . 129 .
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And as he says e l sewhere :
beings . "

1

"Being comes to lan g uage as the Being of

Therefore, Heidegger is not abandoning the notion of Being

as presencing, he is merely refocusing his attention.
"As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws"

2

For as he said:

and now it is time

to recall Being itself, i.e., that which grants Being as presencing
and thereby grant s all th at is.
"Appropri a tion" is a tran slation of the German word " Ereignis "
the dict i onary translation of which is" e vent or occurrence." But
Heidegger uses it in a special sense arising out of its etymological
roots.

Er- eignen speaks of eigen , own, and th e sense of Ereignis is

an unfolding into one's own, a coming to where one belongs.

This is

the sense that is attempted to be conveyed by " Appropriation", and it
is now our task to show that coming into one's own for man and Bein g
means belonging-together ( or dwelling as we called it above ) with each
oth er - man as a preserver and Being as the presencing of \vhat is
present.

Tho ugh this will b e the ultimate significance that Appropria-

tion will have for us

fue path to this point must meander fo r a while.

The basic meaning of Appropriation is the identity of belonging together
th at first gives rise to "independen t things" which are dependent on
each other to Be what the y are.

Heidegger points out that in order to

think this belonging together we must r ecognize both identity and difference:

identity at their mutual s ource of meeting and yet di fference

in each coming into its own as what it is.

1

Our task is to und erstand

Early Greek Thinking, p. 22. Note that th is was written in 1946
b efo r e the terminology of Appropriation was formulated, but the first
"Being" must be understood as Appropriation and the second one as
pre senc ing.
2

Ibid. , p. 2 6.
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this sense of belonging together, and to do that we start with the
Appropriation of time and Being and then tun1 to Appropriation of man
and Bein g (where the significance of thinking and lan guage will become
crucial).
In On Time and Being the path that leads to a thinking of Appropriation&ises from the questioning o f Being as pres encing.
sense means a coming into the open, an unconcealing.

Being in this

But, as we saw in

Being and Time , this requires a free space or stage, i.e., the "th ere",
in which to occur.

In so far as in the second half of Being and Time

temporality was shown to be the Being of Dasein,
to lie at the root of this free space.

1

temporality is shown

As developed in On Time and Being,

temporality is reveale d as the unified realm of past, present and future
which provides the arena that first al lows things to have an enduring
presence:
Time-space nmv :is the name for the openness
which opens up in the mutual self-extending
of futural approach , past and pre sent. This
opennes s exclusively and primarily provides
the space in >•hich space as we usually know
it can tmfold. 2
To clarify this idea we must note that the metaphor of a stage or
arena is not really accurate for time is not a thin g like a container.
Neither time nor Being are th i ng s , and thus we can not view one as
containing, or even causing , the other.

Being is the presencing of

what is pr esen t, and time is the interplay of th e three ecstases that

1

Bein g and Time , p. 277. "But the primordial ontological basis
for Dasein's existentiality is temporality."
2

0n Time and Being , p. 14.
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turns a momentary now in which nothing could have th e abiding presence
of Being, into an extend e d open realm which first e nabl es things to Be.
From this point it must be asked how it is that time and Bei ng
belong together if time is neith er a cont ainer for Being nor a cause
of it.

How is it that time arises as a tmifi e d extending that enables

things to

presence?

The answer to this l ies in Appropriation:

In th e sending of th e des tiny of Being, in th e
extending of time, there becomes manifest a
dedication, a deliverin g ove r into what is
their mvn, namely of Being as presence and
of time as th e r ealm of th e op en.
\fuat determin es both, time and Being, in their own,
that is, in their b elo n gi ng together, we
shall call: Ereignis, the event of
Appropriation. I
Though it so unds strange to talk of allmving or e nablin g Being,
this is just the way Heidegger vi ews th e situation.

Appropriation as

the b elongi n g t o ge ther of time and Bei n g first makes possib l e the
co min g to pass cf th e presencing of \.Jhat is.
tmderstood as a possibility:

Appropriation itself is

the possibility of b elongi n g together ,

and without thi s gift of belon ging together none of the "compon ents "
could come into their own.

We, the r e fore, say that it is Appropriation

which appropriat es time and Being to

EE.ch other and in so doing allows

or enables thin gs to Be.
Howeve r, insofar a s Appropriation grants Bein g and not the other
way around, it is dif fic ult to know how to approach it.
even call an "it" for "it" is not something that is.
Appropriation n e ither is, nor is Appropriation
there .
To say one or to say th e other is
equally a distortion of th e matter, just as

1

rbid., p. 19.

We can not
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if we wanted to derive the source from the
river.l
Therefore , whateve r is sa id about Appropriation in the mode of an
assertive statement can not be accepted as completely ac curat e .

Hmv-

ever, we can give ideas of how to think Appropriation, though this can
never be a representational thought that specifically answers the question What is Appropriation?

(A ques tion that Heidegger considers mis-

guided and unappropriate.)
In Ide ntity and Differe nce the path to Appropriation is through

the belonging together of thinking and Being:
Now it becomes clear that Being belongs with
thinking to an identity whose active essence
stems from that l e tting belong together
which we call the Appropriation. The essence
of identity is a prop e rty of the event of
Appropriation.2
In othe r \-lOrd s , Appropriation can be seen through the ability of thinking and Being to b elong to each othe r.

As such it i s the mut ual

vibrating of thinking and Being , and this belonging to gether mus t be
unde rstood on its own terms as more primary than the independent Being
of either of the components:
We stubbornly misunderstood this prevailing
belonging together of man and Being as long
as we represent everything only in categories
and mediations, be it with or without dialectic.
Then we always find only connections that are
established either in terms of Being or in
terms of man, and that present the belonging
together of man and Being as an intertwining. 3

1
2
3

Ibid., p. 24.
Identity and Di fference, p. 39.
Ibid. p. 32.

99

Why must Appropriation be more fundame ntal than the "components"
it holds to geth e r?

The an s\ve r to this lie s in th e fact that n e ither

one can lle apart from th e other , an d thus the source of their belon ging
t oge th e r mus t be prior to th e Be ing of any one of th e m.

That which

grants their belon gin g to gether, i . e ., that which enables con s ciousnes s
to reach out t o an object and an object to come forth and be pres ent
for a consciou s n ess , mus t be more fund a mental than either one .

In

Heide gger ' s terms :
Thought is , more simply , t hought o f Be i ng .
The genitive has two me anin gs . Thought is
of Bein g , insofar as tho ught , event uated
by Being , b e lon gs to Be i ng . Thought i s at
the same time thou ght of Bein g in s ofar a s
thought listens to , he e ds , Be in g . l
In other words , Being , a s presenc i ng , can only occ ur i f that which i s
pres ent is maintai ne d in its Being b y a t ak ing to hea rt \vhi ch let s li e ;
and thinkin g , a s a takin g to he a rt which lets li e , mus t ( a s we saw
earlier) be unde r s t oo d as a unique ki nd of pe rc ep t i on or r e ce pt i v i ty
t hat preserves but cert ainly do es not cre a te.

Th us each needs th e

other, and the poss ibili ty of this mutual belon ging toge the r mus t be
the most fundame ntal .
We now see : wh a t let s the two matters belon g
togeth e r , wh a t brin gs the two in to their own
and even more , maintains and holds them in
their b e longing toge th e r • .. is Appropriation.
TI1e matter at stake is n ot a relation retro active ly supe ri mpo sed on Bein g and time . The
matte r at st a ke firs t appropriat es Be i ng and
t ime into their own i n virt ue of their r e la t i on .... 2

1 "L

2

etter on Human1. s mII , p . 149 .

0n Time and Bein g , p . 19 .
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To el aborat e furt he r this identity of thinking and Be ing we turn
to "Le tt e r on Humanis m".
Th e stand i ng in th e cle ari n g of Be i n g I
call th e ex- s i s t ence of man. ~1ly man
has this way to be . Ex-sist ence, s o
unde r s tood, i s n o t only the bas i s of
the possibil i ty of r e as on, r a t i o, but
ex- sis t ence is th a t, wherein th e essa1ce
of man prese rves th e so urce that det e rmin e s hi m. 1
And he go es on to say:
Be i n g clear s it sel f for man i n ecst a tic
proj e ction. But th is proj e ct i on does
not cre at e Be in g. Hore ove r, the proj e ction i s essent i ally a ma tte r of b e in g
cas t. What project s in t he proj e ct i s
not man, but Be in g i t se lf, whi ch de termin es man to th e ex-s is t e nce wh i ch i s
th e e s sen ce of Dase in. Th is des t i n y i s
re a lized in the cl earin g o f Bein g .2
What eme r ges he r e is th a t Be in g n e e ds man to b e prese rve d, but it
it se l f is wha t en able s man t o b e a p r ese rve r ( i . e ., ex- sis t).
th e b ein g

~vhose

}~n

is

Be ing e nt ai l s an invol vemen t wit h Be in g i t se l f - man' s

Being i s to s tand i n th e clea rin g of Bein g .
Thus wh a t ma ke s ma n un i que i s th a t he is e c s t a t ic , in th e origi nary sen se o f be in g b ey ond hims e l f .

It i s as a thinking b e in g , t hou ght

in th e sen se of takin g to hea rt an d l e ttin g wh a t i s s tand i n it s Bein g
rather th an i n lo gical or re-present i n g thin kin g, 3 th a t man ex- sis t s .
Heidegge r sta t es that a s s uch (i. e ., ex- s i s t ing) man s t ands in the

1

2

"Lett e r on Human is m", p. 154.
Ibid., p. 163.

3we hyphe n a t e 're-presentin g ' to e mphasiz e th e tr a ditional mode o f
thought which is conc e ive d a s s omehow mirrorin g or r e-producin g th e
ext e rnal world and be ing clo sed upon its own pres enting of the world.
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clearing of Being, and this clearing of Being must be seen as the open
or fr e e-space in which Being as presencing can occur.

As such man is

not an entity outside this realm, that somehow leaps into it; rather
in his Being man belongs to it for it is what grants him the Being
which he is.

The clearing of Being is fue meeting of man and Being,

and without it nothing could ever manifest itself.

Further, since man

is merely a "co mponent" of this clearing and does not create it, we must
see something else , n amely Appropriation, as that which grants it, and
th ereby provides f or the belonging together of man and Being .

In so

doing Appropriation fi r st makes possible man as ex-sistent and Being as
pres ence.
It may be asked why \ve must speak of Appropriation as granting th e
belon ging toge ther of man and Be ing, when it seems that they b elon g together by their

o•m nature.

To ans\ver this we must see that both man

and Being are historical, and thus the nature of their belonging together
varie s historically.

But no matter how it varies they must be Appro-

priated to each other in some way.

Appropriation is this atemporal pos-

sibility of being appropriated to each other.

It is the granting that

somehow has enabled the "things" which need each other to belong together.

It is not only the granting of the belonging togehter of think-

ing and Being, but also of time and Being, and even the four of the fo urfold.

In each case we can see and analyze the components separately,

but they can come into their own only as a result o f a fundamental
belonging together.

Since this belonging togeth er is prior to the

component s it can not find its source in either one of them, and we
must understand its occurrence strictly on its own terms.

Time, the
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staying presence of Being gathered ear th and sky , divinities and mortals, and man all arise as a gift of b e ing appropriated to each other;
and the historical un folding of their interrelated des tinies could not
occur without the ori ginal Appropriation whfch

first allows them to

belong together and thus come into their own.
Thus Being as Appropriation becomes an Absolute outside the
temporality that was originally exposed as the fundamental ground, and
out side the presencing disclosure of Being.

But t he notion of an

Absolute seems so contrary to the develop ment of historicity and he rmeneutics for which Heidegger is so well known that we must examine it
further.
We must first note that this Absolute (Appropriation) is not something that can be known or represented in thought.

Nor is it a God's

viewpoint on what is, that our thinking might hold above it as an idea l.
In short , it is neither a thing (such as a Platonic Idea ), a vie\vpoint
on things or unde rlying (or rath e r overridin g) Truth of things (as
Hegel's Absol ute), nor an eternal and necessary structure of things (as
the categories of Kant or eidetic laws of Husser!).

It is simply the

awe-inspiring, yet undeniable fact, that man , time and Being have been
given to each oth e r.

Appropriation is not only the answer to why there

are beings rather than Nothing , but the giving of the possibility that
we can raise the question altogether.

It takes various forms through-

out history, but its f und amental truth, its originary granting of the
possibility of an historical unfolding, always remains.

We may sp eak

of broad epochs of Being, s uch as the Greeks, the Middle Ages, the
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Renaissance, the scientific and the technologica l,

1

in which the

presencing of things, i.e. , the \vay the fourfold is stay ed or gathered,
takes a predomin a nt style or form.

However, it is only because of

Appropriation that the fourfold can gather itself in things at all,
and, therefore, that anything can Be.
As the epochs of Being vary, and with them the forms of Appropriation, so too within a single epoch can Being vary when we are concern e d
with differ ent sorts of beings.

He have elaborated the Being of th i n gs

as the gathered fourfold, and thus man is appropriated to things as a
pres e rver of the fourfold.

However, this is only the relatedness for

authentic or thoughtful x;Jan , and, as \ve have seen inauthenticity is
more predominant and just as "n at ur a l" as authenticity.

Thus for the

most part man is not appropriated to things as a preserver of their
fourfold Bei ng - he takes th eir Being for granted and is concerned
solely with the place of thing s within his projects.

However, this too

is only possible because of an original App r opriation , for insofar as
we take th e Being of things for granted, that Being must present itself,
and thus be prese rve d.

Further, since the entities are suited to take

a plac e within man's projects, though they do not pre sent themselves
with the thought f ul Being of the gathered fourfold, they do manifest
the mse lves in th e ir mm way, i.e., with the practical Being of usefulness.

Things are only a part of whatever is, and preserving the four-

fold is only one way man is appropriated to Being.

As Heidegger says

1 r distinguish the cosmic view of early scientific exploratio n ,
from the human ce ntered vi e\v of domin at ion, control and manipulation
of today's technological age.
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at the close of th e essay "The Thing" :
But things are also compliant and modest
in number, compare d with countless obj e cts
every1•here of e qual value, compared with
the measureless mass of men as living
beings.l
Entities other than things include people, equipment , and ••orks
of art.

The Being of these entities is different from that of things ,

and thus man must be appropriated to them di f ferently.

The notions of

man as a thoughtful preserver, of Being a s the pre s e ncing of that which
is present, and th e mutual nee d of one for the othe r,
what it means to preserve and to Be does.

do not vary, but

Just as in Being and Tiwe

Care took various forms such as concern with the ready-to-hand and
solicitude with other humans, the pre serving function of man and the
Being of entities takes various forms .

To understand this further we

turn to the other types o f entities , and see how Appropriation lets
them belong together with man .
Though neidegger does not speak much of the belongi ng together
of man to the Being of other humans, he does speak of the belonging to
our own Being .

This of course was the specific task of Bei,n g and Time,

but it is also an :is s ue in all his other works.

vie have seen the Being

of man as mortal, transcending himself, and ex-sisting in Being , an d
Caring .

Man's relatedness to bis Being is hi s aware n e ss and acknm•l-

edge ment of his death and finitude , and his takin g to he art the world
t hat affec ts h im in his

0"'11

Being .

In short, man is approp riat e d to

his own Bein g by being aware of , an d thus preserving , his role in the

l

Poe tr y , Langu age , Tho ught, p. 182.
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presencing of whatever is .

Thus man is appropriated to other humans

insofar as he can recognize them as special entities , who like himself
ar e not mere things or tools, but rather stand in

tl~ ·

light of Being.

To preserve the Being of another person is not to stay the fourfold
in him, but to preserve him in his own way of Being.

However, it is

again Appropriation itself that grants the possibility of man Being
in a way that he can preserve and let what-is Be what it is in its
Being, in this case let another human Be human.
As for equipment , the most notable characteristic of the Being
is its usefulness.

That is , equipment presents itself specifically

as an aid to accomplish a task.

This usefulness can be further ex-

pressed as reliability, insofar as the equipment silently serves its
task (i.e., is equipment) as long as it func t ions well.

\-!hen it breaks,

or in some other \vay no longer performs as it is suppos ed to, it loses
its Being a s e quipment and becomes a mere thin g in our way .
liability of equipment can b e seen 2s giving

equip rr~ nt

This re-

a Be ing charac-

terized totally in the service of something else ; the equipment itself
remains invisible as it is transcended to the end in whose service it
gains its Being .

"Th e more handy a piece of equipme nt is, the more

'
'
' rematns,
.
1nconsp1cuous
1t
... ,1
Man is appropriated to the Being of equipment by being a project

oriented being , and being able to use that which is given to him to
serve in bringing about the f uture .

In other words, bec ause man is a

being who is ahead of himself and has possibilities (which are

1

rbid ., p. 65.
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possibilities of the world) , he can have equipment to serve as a bri dge
from the present to the future stat e of affairs .

However, man could

not be project ori ented nor have equipment if Being did not lend it se l f
to man in the way it do es .

Being's f u ture possibilities are fore-

shadowed in its present, but certain conditions or changes have to be
met for the po ssibilities to be actualized.

Because man in his Being

stand s in the light of Being he is open to these possibilities and th e
conditions needed to be satisfied.

It is for this reason that he can

be goal directed and manipulate present things s trictly in satisfaction
of conditions neede d for the act ualization of possibilities.

Man do es

not force the world into th e mode of equipment , but rather because man
and world are appropriated to ea ch other t here is eq uip ment and project
orien t e d man .

Once again we see that from Appropriation man and Being

are cast into each other ' s do main ; man as a preserver of Being and
Being as a make r of man in his ex- sistence.

Arising out of Appropria-

tion each comes into its own thanks to t he other .
Finally, we look at the Being of a work o f art.

A work of art ' s

Being consist s in its presenting or bringing forth something else .
Hork e nables some thing to emerge in its Being in a way which would not
oth en.;ise occur .
The art work opens up in its o\m \vay the
Being of b eings. This opening up, i . e.,
this de concea lin g , i . e ., the truth of
bein gs , happ ens in th e work . In the art
work, the truth of what is has se t itself
to work. Art is truth setting itself to
work.l

1

rbid.' p. 39.
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Unlike equipment, however, work does not disappear in the service of something else .

A work is not meant as a mere tool that serves

to merely re-pre s ent something other than itself.

Rather that which

is brought forth in a work can only errerge in its Being through or in
the work, and to do this the work must continually pres e nt itself as
work.

An art work about an obj e ct is not the same as the object pre -

senting itself in and by itself ; the work ope ns it up in a way that
the object doe s not do by :itself.

Th us the work must continually and

explicitly announce its e lf as work in order not to turn into a mere thing
isolated from the world it is meant to open to us or a mere tool that
brin gs something about but does not open it up in its Being, i.e., let
truth happ e n.

Further , as we shall see with lan g uage , the way some-

thing is open e d up affects what is opened up, i.e., the Being of wh a t
is opened up s t an ds forth in a way uniqu e to the Be ing of the op e nin g .
Thus to u1de r stan d what is opened up

\ ole

must maintain an awareness of

the way it is set fo rth.
In a work, by contrast, this fact,

is as a work , is jus t what is
The more essentially the work
the more luminou s becomes the
of the fact that it is rather

th a t it
lli1us ual •.••
opens itself,
unique nes s
1
than is not.

In order to preserve the Being of the work, man must be capable

of tran s cending the work's thingly character to stand in the truth it
is openin g up.

To do this h e must maintain the announce ment of th e

work as work, and this con sis ts in maintaining the fact that it has
been created.

1

"But in contrast to all other modes of production, th e

Ibid., p. 65.
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work is distinguished by being created so that its createdness is part
of the created work. ,l

This is not a matter of recognizing who the

artist is, or what his reputation is, it is rather r e cognizing that
thi s is an ope ning up of the world , i.e., a created work.

Equipment

is of course also created or produced, but its cre atedness is not part
of its Being, because its Being consists in withdrawing itself and
not in announcing itself.
We can therefore say that man is related to the Being of work in
a twofold sense:

in recalling its Being as cre ated he thereby transcends

the thingly character of the work into the openness of man and Being of
work, work can first Be as a brin ging into nearness that

~•hich

is or

has been distant, and man can first Be as a dwe ller and unfold e r of
that which is or has been distant.

Neither the Being of t he work nor

man is primary , they need each other, and they can both Be because they
are appropriated to each other , i . e ., Appropriation grant e d the m the
possibility to dwell toge ther.

At this point we draH to a close our analysis of how Heidegger
views Being in his last phase.

He have taken a round about route

going from the Being of things to Being as Appropriation and then back
to the Being of entities other than things.

In this way we hoped to

expose the meaning of Being , both in terms of the Being of what-is
(presencing) and in terms of that which first grants this Being.
Though they can be looked at separately they really belong togeth e r:

1

Ibid. , p. 64.
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Appropriation can only b e unde r s tood as a granting of the possibility
of Being

(~rescncin g )

and Being (pres encing) can only be understood

with regard to the original gift of the b e lon gin g together of time,
Being and man.
We must nCM ret urn to language , for in the light of Appropriation
the Being of man e merge d as a preserve r, and we have earlier seen
language's crucial role

in thi s .

In Being a nd Time we saw Dasein 's

Being characterized essen tially by Discours e .

In "Letter on Humanism"

we saw l angua ge calle d the house of Being, and a house must be understood as some thin g that shelters and preserves.

In the works on the

Greeks \ve saw the Being of legein and noein as a gathering which preserves th e primordial ga th erin g of logos .

Therefore, langu age emerges

as essential to th e notion of preservation, and th ereby to the notion
of Bei ng (pres encing) and thus, in short, to Appropriation.

Our ta s k

now is to examine the work on l an guage Heidegge r did in his la s t ph as e,
and see how it stands with \vhat has been put for th in this sec tion.
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IV.

The Being of Languag e :

The Language of Being

We do not wish to assault language
in order to force it into the grip
of ideas already fixed beforehand.
We do not wish to reduce the nature
of language to a concept, so that
this concept may provide a generally
useful view of language that will lay
to rest all further notions about it.
To discuss language, to place it,
means to bring to its place of being
not so much language as ourselves:
our own gathering into the appropriation.l
We are concerned with language strictly in terms of its Being.
It cannot be an object among others for us to analyze in terms of
properties, uses, and underlying structures.

" ... the point is to

think of the essence of language in its correspondence to Being,
and, what is more, as this very correspondence, i.e., the dwelling
of man's essence."

2

Therefore, 'He cannot take language as something

already given, i.e., present-at-hand, we must first let it come to
us in its own unique Being.

This means that rather than trying to

step back from language in order to examine it, we must enter into an
experience with it.

"To undergo an experience with language, then,

means to let ourselves be properly concerned by the claim of language
by entering into and submitting to it."

3

To enter into an experience with language means to let language
announce itself in its Being.

"In experiences which we undergo with

lPoetry, Language, Thought p. 190.
2"Letter on Humanism" p. 160.
3Heidegger On the Way to Language (New York:
p. 57.

Harper & Row, 1971)
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language, language itself brings itself to language."

1

This is quite

different from the scientific information gathering about language
with which the current discipline of linguistics is concerned.

For

language itself to come forth we do not want to explain it in terms
of something else:

"Instead of explaining language in t erms of one

thing or another, and thus running away from it, the way to language
intends to let language be experienced as language."

2

The first step in letting language be experienced is to put
aside our preconceived notions about it.
standings of language that we must avoid:

There are three common under1) language is primarily

an activity or tool of man, 2) it is an externalization of an internal
feeling or idea, and 3) it serves to r e -present objects of the world.
These notions about langunge presuppose that it has the Being of equipment, that it is used by man in order to repre sent or stand for something other than itself.

Though in a sense this view is correct, and

is certainly useful for various disciplines, it does not permit a
complete understanding of language in its Being.
We still give too little consideration,
however, to the singular role of these
correct ideas about language. They
hold sway, as if unshakable, over the
whole field of the varied scientific
perspectives on language. They have
their roots in an ancient tradition.
Yet they ignore completely the oldest
natural cast of language. Thus, despite
their antiquity and despite their comprehensibil i ty, they never bring us to
language as language.3

lrbid. p. 59.
2 Ibid. p. 119.
3Ibid. p. 193.
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But how are we to enter into this experience with language?
Until we can actually demonstrate a n ew approach to language, and show
what is learned from this, our claim of the limitations of other
studies of language is empty rhetoric.
as a tool, and it becomes difficult

We constantly use langua ge

to still this use of it, but,

unless we do, no new understanding of language can be reached.

When

we try to describe language we use language itself, and are thereby
using language as a tool, the very presupposition about the Being
of language that we are trying to overcome.

How can we quiet the

attack of language as a tool so that we can openly experience the
Being of language?

At the very point when language fails us.

But when does language speak itself
as language? Curiously enough, wh~n
we cannot find the right word for
some thing th a t concerns u s , c a rries
us awa y, oppress es or encoura ges us.
Then we l eave unsp ok en wh a t we have
in mind and, without r ightly giving
it thou gh t, und er go moments in which
language itself has distantly and
fleetingly touched us with its
essential being. 1
When words fail us a curious thing is revealed, and by examining
what happens, or rather what does not happen, the nature of language
can stand out for the first time.

Entering into an experience with

language can only take place when we do not ta ke it for granted and
merely use it.

The place where this can occur is just where our

language fails us.

1

Ibid. p. 59.

At this limit of language we experience a demand
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to be named, a desired announcement, but the failure of the naming or
announcing to occur.
beckoning.

There is no announcement, no telling, merely a

But what beckons, and what happens when the beckoning is

reversed into a spea king?

In this mystery lies the Being of language.

The beckoning is fleeting and unclear; we cannot quite put a
finger on it.

Its nature might be made clearer by a comparison to the

horizon in a theme-horizon configuration.
is to stand back as a theme comes forth.

The Being of an horizon
However, when we scan a

field and cannot find a theme we do not have an horizon either since
theme and horizon are bound together in their Being.
horizon we have an undelineated lack.
we cannot find the right words:

Rather than an

This is the sense we get when

we get a sense of a gap or a lack

which we want to stabilize, in the same way as finding a theme stabiliz es
the withdrawing field into an horizon.

l-le at tempt to speak in a '-' BY

that will hold down this beckoning mystery before it frustratingly
slips away.

We try to find words that let it echo through and come

to stand - we know when words are inadequate to the beckoning but we
of course cannot point out why, for then we would have found the
adequate words.
Thus by going to where words fail us we see that the failure to
find words is not an inability to match or correspond words to a preestablished (thematized) thought, for i t is only in the words that
the thought comes to ring through and become established and stabilized.
It is a struggeling to be born, to come out into the world, r.ot the
mere tacking on of a sign or label to something already there.

There

114

are no items merely waiting around to be represented by the right word,
rather language is what first allows things to come into their own and
stand in their place.

This coming into one's own and standing forth

in the world is how we have understood the meaning of Being, and
thus we must conclude that "It is in words and language that things
first come into being and are,"

1

or as Heidegger puts it at this

stage of his writings " ••. the word is what first brings that given
thing, as the being that is, into this "is"; •.. the word is what
holds the thing there and relates it and so to speak provides its
maintenance with which to be a thing."

2

No matter how we build up to this claim of the relation of
language and Being, when it comes it still shocks us, and we are
hard pressed to understand how Heidegger can seriously claim that it
is in language that things first come to Be.

Three questions

immediately come to mind that Heidegger's approach to language seems
to ignore:

1) certainly there was a beckoning prior to the words,

how then can he say there is no Being of things prior to the words?
2) how could words, as things themselves, possibly bring things to
Being, i.e., how can something that is be the source of the is itself?
3) if words are the source of Being, are we not back to a subjective
grounding of Being in a human function?

lrntroduction to Metaphysics p. 11. Since this chapter is a quest
for the fullness of language's Being, we will be concerned solely with
authentic language.
2o~ the Way to Langunge p. 82.
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There are answers to these objections, and though it will take
some development to answer them in a way that is completely satisfac tory, we briefly mention how Heidegger will approach them.
To the first we must remember that here Being means the presence
of what is present, and that which is not (which beckons for announcement) is not mere nothingness - as we have seen the encounter with
Nothing is as significant as the encounter with things which are.
Words let things Be, but Heidegger does not have to maintain that
words creats ex nihilo; they arc simply what let things presence, i.e.,
Be things.
As for the second objection, a word is not a thing among other
things; considering it as such leaves us with the expression theory of
language.

In its Being a word is quite different from a thing:

it

is a being whose Being transcends its own presencing and grants presence to that which it announces.

''If our thinking does justice to

the matter, then we may never say of the word that it is, but rather
that it gives

,1

Thus it

~

only insofar as it brings things to Be,

and we cannot say that it is simply a thing itself which after the fact
causes the Being of things.
Finally, to the charge of subjectivism we must come to an understanding of Heidegger's notion that it is not man but language which
speaks.

The relation of language, speaking, and human utterance is

a complicated one, but at this point we can summarize it as follows:

1 Ibid. p. 88.
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"Language needs human speaking, and yet it is not merely of the
making or at the command of our speech activity."

1

To elaborate these points fully and thereby understand the relation of language to Being, we return to our original attempt to
experience language, and examine what happens when the unsaid comes
into language.

" ... language alone brings what is, as something

that is, into the Open for the first time. 11

2

We experience language

as an announcing, it goes beyond itself to show something other than
itself.

The announcing is guided and directed by the original

beckoning, but in the announcement of language the ·Hithdra,ving lack
of beckoning suddenly halts and for the first time finds a place within the world.

"This naming do e s not hand out titles, it does not

apply terms, but it calls into the word.
brings closer wha t it calls." 3

The naming calls.

Calling

When the words are provided, that

which is named is brought into the Open (the Nearness or Neighborhood)
of the Appropriated belonging together of man and Being, and in so
doing first allmvs things to Be.
Language, by naming beings for the first
time, first brings beings to word and
to appearance. Only this naming nominates being !£ their being from out of
their being. Such saying is a pro jecting of the clearing, in which
announcement is made of what it is
that beings come into the Open as. 4

1 Ibid. p. 125.

2~oetry, Language, Thought p. 73.
3on the Way to Language p. 198.
4Poetry, Language, Thought p. 73.
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In the second sentence of this quote an extremely important point
is revealed.

When Heidegger says " ... naming nominates beings to their

being from out of their being .•. "he is referring to the process of
coming into one's own \vhich we previously saw to be the grant of
Appropriation.

Since this coming into one's own of a thing is now

revealed as the gift of naming we are led to understand naming in
the light of Appropriation.
determined by Appropriation."

"The way to language belongs to Saying
1

In this way we see that what escapes

language is not mere nothingness, it is a being which has not come
into its own, i.e., into its appropriated belonging together with
man.

Language does not create things, it provides the opportunity

for them to presence as things.

When the unsaid comes to language

it comes from out of its own, it beckons language, and language provides the vehicle v:hereby it can first stay in the light of abiding
presence.

"Being, clearing itself, comes into language."

2

But we

must once again attempt to focus on the nature of language to understand how we can say things first come to Be in language, yet Being
comes to language itself.
One thing should have been made clear by now, and that is that
the Being of language is an announcing, a letting something Be what
it is.

This Being of language Heidegger names Saying, as used in the

quotes above and as etymologically derived from the Old Norse Saga

lon the Way to Language p. 129.
2"Letter on Humanism" p. 179.
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which means to show or make appear.
_is Sayit!_& as Showing."

2

1

"The essential being E.!_

langu~

Only when language Says something is it

authentic language, otherwise it is mere chatter.

Further, we must

remember that Saying is not something tacked on to words or sentences;
words and sentences can only be what they are if they Say something.
Finally, we note that as uttered sounds may decay into mere chatter
and no longer Say anything, silence, when properly employed, can
Say a grea t deal (e.g., the silent stare of an angry parent) and thus
must be considered as language.
The Being of language, rather than being understood merely in
terms of sounds and sentence structures, may now be seen as lying
in the ability to show, reveal, or bring forth something other than
itself.
than mao.

This is why Heidegger says that language speaks (Says) rather
It is not man directly who can call forth the unsaid (thou gh

he is of course needed) but the power of language itself.

This is

evidenced in the everyday experience of when we are asked "Do you
realize what you are saying?"

and reflect upon all the consequences,

shades of meaning, and implicit judgments that are entailed in what we
just uttered.

This ontic evidence indicates that ontologically the

nature of language is to Say something, and that it is not our vocal
cords, sentence struct ure, or any other human facet that is in complete
control of this essential power of language.

The power to Say belongs

to language itself, and not exclusively to man.

lon the Way to Language p. 93.
2 Ibid. p. 123.
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We must now examine how language brings forth things, i.e., Speaks.
As we indicated, it does this by enabling the thing to stand in the
light of Appropriation, i.e., by bringing it into the Open of the
belonging together with man.

The physicalist may stand before his

class in a search for Being and ask "Does an animal the size of a
skyscraper and able to fly faster than light have Being?" and expect
an obvious "no" answer.

But the correct answer is ''now it does,

though, of course, not physically."

Through language this imaginary

creature has been called forth and placed within a world before us.
Even \vithout being able to represent the thought of flying faster
than light, the magical powers and strengths of this creature shine
forth in their mysterious wonder.

The significance of this power of

naming will become clearer when we discuss poetry, but for now we
have seen how language has granted Being to a thing by placing it in
the light of Appropriation of which man is a part.
This Saying granting of Being may be understood in the case above,
but it seems more difficult to understand for objects which actually
do have physical existence, for they certainly seem to Be prior to
language.

However, we must remember that prior to language things

do not disappear into a sheer void, but neither are they "there"
standing forth in their own, in their Being.

"Where there is no

language, as in the being of stone, plant, and animal, there is also
no openness of what is, and consequently no openness either of that which
is not and of the empty." 1

lPoetry, Language, Thought p. 73.
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Only when we have a name for a thing can it be called forth in its
uniqueness, and thereby stand out in its Being.

A whole world of

a new discipline opens up as we learn its language, be it the language
of a philosopher or a scientist, and without the language the things
of that world remain closed to us.
not be any world.

Without any language there would

Yet there is a circularity in which we must see

that only in the opening of the world does the full significance of
the ne\v language reveal itself.

In this circular relation lies the

Saying of language which by bringing together a world and a particular
thing allows each to come into its

o~~

and Be for the first time.

In other words, the Saying of language brings a ,.,orld to stay in a
thing, and only in this way can a thing Be a thing and a language
Be a language.
their thinging.

"In the naming, the things named are called into
Thinging, they unfold world, in which things abide

and so are the abiding ones."

1

As we saw in the previous chapter, the bringing together of
world in a thing is the gathering fourfold that grants a thing
Being.

Thus, the Saying of language which brings world and thing

together must be the staying of the fourfold in a thing.
There arises the possibility of seeing how Saying, as the being of
language, swings back into the
presence of nearness. Quiet consideration makes possible an insight into
how nearness and Saying, being of
the persisting nature of language
are the Same. Language, then, is

1

On the Way to Language p. 199.
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not a mere human faculty. Its
character belongs to the very
charact e r of the movement of
the f a ce- to-face encounter of
the world's four re gions. 1
Language lets the fourfold ring together in unity by staying it in
a thing, and lets a thing be a thing by letting a world (the fourfold)
shine through it.

The Saying of language does not create this bridge

between thing and world by its own whim.

Language, as it were, stands

in the rift (dif-ference, Unter-schieden) between thing and world
where they come together, and thereby lets their belonging together
stand forth into the open; not mer e ly as a ga p, but for the first
time as a mutual harmony tha t lets each one Be by virtue of its
harmonizing with the other.

" Language speaks.

Its speaking bids

the dif - ference to come which expropria tes world and things into the
simple onefold of their intimacy."

2

In other words, we can understa nd 'world' as a context or horizon
and 'thing' as a theme, and language unites the two insofar as a
word delineates a particular thing but arises out of the specific
cultural cont ext of the language we are speaking.
scientific

~1ord

\fhether it is a

that gathers the scientific world into the thing,

named, or a poetic word that gathers the fourfold world into the thing,
in each case language lets two "things" which need each other (i.e,
world and thing) come into their own through their belonging together.

1

Ibid. p. 107.

2 Ibid. p. 210.
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When we deal with things in a thoughtful or poetic manner language
gathers the fourfold into the thing, since a thoughtful or poetic
language arises out of a world where the fourfold is still preserved.
When we approach things in other ways, language is still an appropriating
of thing and world, but instead of "world" explicitly referring to
the four regions it more generally is seen as the context or field
constituted by the discipline or way of approach.

For example,

naming a green leafy plant with a latin designation of genus and
species gathers (appropriates) the plant with the world of the
botanist.

The plant can thereby first show its Being as a scientifi-

cally distinguished yet interrelated and placed form of vegetation
with certain previously overlooked but now self evident characteristics
(e.g., uses, best conditions for survival, reproductive capabilities,
and its uniqueness from similar species).

"Saying is the gathering

that joins all appearance of the in itself manifold sho\>ling which
everywhere lets all that is shown abide within itself."

1

Saying does not create the harmonizing unity of what is brought
together, it merely lets this unity be manifest.

It is Appropriation

itself that first grants the belonging-together, and Saying moves
this to its fruition.
The moving force in Showing of Saying
is Owning. It is what brings all present and absent beings each into their
own, from where they show themselves
in what they are, and where they abide
according to their kind. This owning
which brings them there, and which
moves Saying as Showing in its showing

1

Ibid. p. 127.
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we call Appropriation. It yields the
opening of the clearing in which pres ·ent beings can persist and from which
absent beings can depart while keeping
their persistence in the withdrawal. ..
That Appropriation, seen as it is shown
by Saying, cannot be represented either
as an occurrence or a happening -· it
can only be experienced as the abiding
gift yielded by Saying.l
As Showing, Saying, which consists in
Appropriation, is the most proper mode
of Appropriating. Appropriation is by
way of Saying.2
In short then, to Be means to presence or show itself in some way
or another, including the presence of withdrawal.

As we have seen

earlier for a thing to appear it must be both unique and yet common
with respect to its context.

The way this happens is for a thing

to come forth in its own individuality, but within the gathered presence of a world.

It is the primordial Saying which allows the

belonging together of thing and world granted by Appropriation to
come forth and announce itself.

Until there is, for example, a poetic

language nothing poetic can come forth and Be.

It withdraws into the

haze of Nothingness where one might get a fleeting call from it, but
until the Saying which gathers the thing into the poetic world is
possible it cannot stand in the light of Being.
So I renounced and sadly see:
3
Where word breaks off no thing may be.

1

Ibid. p. 127.

2Ibid. p. 131.
3stefen George "The Word" Quoted and studied by Heidegger in
many places in On the Way to Language.
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But what of man in all this?

We have seen the Being of languag e

as the Saying which arises out of Appropriation.

We have seen that

man plays an important role in Appropriation's grant of Being.

Now

we must ask specifically how man's speech is related to Appropriation's
Saying.
As could be expected man's speaking is needed for the showing
Saying of language, but man must be understood as a fulfiller and
not as a creator or ground.
For language, after all, remains unmistakably bound up with human speaking.
Certainly. But what kind of bond is
it? On what grounds and in what way
is it binding ? Language needs human
speaking, and yet it is not merely of
the making or at the command of our
speech activity.!
As Saying gathers thing and world and thereby lets the thing come forth
in its Being, man's speech must preserve this Saying.

As we saw,

Being as presence and man as preserver arise in a mutual belonging
together from Appropriation.

Therefore, Saying as the presencing of

appropriated thing and world, must also be the binding together of
Being ("worlded thing") and man (the needed preserver of world and
thing).

Man is capable of speaking insofar as he belongs to the pri-

mordial Saying, i.e., insofar as he is Appropriated to Being.
Saying that shows makes the way for
language to reach human speaking. Saying is in need of being voiced in the
word. But man is capable of speaking
only insofar as he, belonging to Saying
listens to Saying, so that in resaying
it he may be able to say a word.2

lon the Hay to Language p. 125.
2rbid. p. 134.
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Thus man's language must be seen as a listening response to the
primordial Saying of Appropriation, but one which is needed for the
thing which is shown in the Saying to Be, and thus for Saying itself
to Be.

Already in Being and Time silence and listening were seen

as essential parts of Discourse, and now we must reaffirm the essentiality of these to human speaking.

But to what do we listen?

If

Saying itself needs huma n language to be fulfilled we cannot demand
a direct listening to it, it cannot be heard apart from our speaking.
What we must therefore listen to is our own language.
mere words but to a silent Saying of our language.

Not to the

Only then can

we ask whether our speaking has satisfied the beckoning of silent
Being.

Perhaps Merleau-Ponty explains this best:
Speech does not choose only one sign
for one already defined signification,
the way one searches for a hammer to
drive in a nail or pincer to pull one
out. It gropes around an intention to
signify which has at its disposal no
text to guide it, for it is just being
written. And if we want to grasp speech
in its most authentic operation in order
to do it full justice, we must evoke all
those words that could have come in its
place that have been omitted ; to feel
the different way they would have impinged
on and rattled the chain of language, to
know at what point this particular speech
was the only one possible if this signification was to come into the world ... In
brief, we should consider speech before
it has been pronounced, against the ground
of the silence which precedes it, which
never ceases to accompany it, and without which it would say nothing.l

1M. Herleau-Ponty Prose of the World trans. by John O'Neill
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern Press, 1973) p. 46.
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In other words, it is only through some silent aspect of our own
language that the silent primordial Saying, which beckons our speech,
can be heard.

After we listen to our speech we can ask whether it

satisfies what was needed, and at times even recognize a lack in
it, but apart from our own listening speaking there is nothing that
we can hold up that allows us to merely reach into our aviary of
words and find the corresponding one.

It is therefore this silent

aspect of our language that maintains the Saying of Appropriation,
and we must examine it closer.
Everything depends upon bringing into
language the truth of Being and letting
thought penetrate this language. Perhaps then language requires far less
precipitate utterance than correct
silence. 1
Every language presences (gathers) the world differently.
Language speaks, but in a way unique to itself.

This is most obvious

when we consider the different things that poetic and scientific
languages can Say, but, as every translator painfully encounters,
there is even a difficulty in making two languages as close as German and English (for example) Say the same thing.

Every language

has a history, both immediate in respect to current usages and overtones, and long range in terms of etymological developments and the
spirit of the people who gave rise to and maintained the

la~guage.

These histories are one of the factors that influence the silent
Saying of our language, and since the language we speak Speaks in

1

"Letter on Humanism" p. 167.
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a way unique to itself, every wor d and sentence of that language must
be viewed in a similar way.
Projective s a ying is saying which, in
preparing the sayable, simult aneously
brings the unsayable as such into a
world. In such saying, the concepts of
an historical people's nature, i.e.,
of its belonging to world historl, are
formed for that folk, before it.
A language establishes a world or context in which everything we
say in that l a nguage is ordered or "controlled;" yet we must, of
course, understand that a language is not something prior to or
independent of the words and sentences of that language.

Thus our

history (i.e., the history of our language) is somehow contained
in everything we say, and what we say is therefore in the service
of our langua ge rather than lanbuage being in our service.
An example of the way current usage a f fects the way a language
speaks can be seen in the word ''freak" of the American counter culture.
~~en

Originally "freak" designated an abnormal or deformed person.
a natural conservatism developed a fear and revulsion of any-

thing different or deformed, "freak" received a pejorative connotation.
When the counter culture emerged with shocking hair styles and dress
fashion they were called freaks by middle America, which naturally
carried the pejorative sense of what they wanted to Say about this
new phenomenon.

Then a curious thing occurred ; the counter culture

adopted the term themselves and used it to refer to their comrades.
It no longer spoke negatively for those who were a part of the sub -

1

Poetry, Language, Thought p. 74.
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culture.

"A real freak" became an authentic person, one the marginal

members of the culture admired and awed at.

"Freaky" movies, songs,

and experiences were all recommendations and not condemnations.

The

counter culture favored change and uniqueness, and thus it could
readily adopt the word as one of praise.

1

In this transforma tion
)

of the word the language speaks differently}

Says something else,

and it is not at our control to use the word the way we want.

The

language itself speaks, and we must listen to what it Says before
we can use language to say what we want.
If we may talk here of playing games
at all, it is not we who play with
words, but the nature of language
plays with us ... It is as though
man had to make an effort to live
properly with language.2
Further, etymolo gic a l connections to current uses of other
words play an important role in what a language Says.

For example,

"astro-naut" is etymolog ically derived from "star--sailor " but because
of the scientific usages of "astra" in such words as "astronomy,"
"astrophysics," "astrosphere," and even "astrology," the term "astra naut" Speaks in a much more scientific way than the more adventurous
"star-sailor."

Therefore, what man Says, 1. e. , gathers and discloses,

when uttering "astronaut" has a specific Being that is granted by the
silent speaking of our own language, and which can therefore only be
fully revealed when we listen to how language speaks.

lrt is interesting to note that this final transformation of the
word ties it to the original etymology of the middle English "freking"
which means whim or capricious conduct.
2"Letter on Humanism" p. 118.
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The way in which the long range history of a language affects
what it Says are harder for us to see since it has become so ingrained
in the language.

Yet it is important for us to see this in order

to understand how human speech can only Speak by listening to the
Saying of language.
itself.

A prime example come s from Heidegger's work

We saw that one of the reasons he did not publish the com-

plete version of Being and Time was the difficulty of making a new
approach to Being understandable in the language available to him,
i.e., the language of traditional metaphysics.

Only by returning

to etymologies could he show what the language was trying to Say,
and contrast that to what it actually was Saying through its metaphysical history.

The transforma tion of '"ha t a word Says from its

original etymological source to its current sense reveals the historical Being of a language, and the variations of the world it
gathers and opens up.

The significance of what a language Says c a n

only be seen in contrast with the way it originally Spoke, as is
clearly evidenced by the analysis of Logos, legein, and noein in
contrast to Logic, speaking, and thinking as commonly conceived.
The current language reflects its source and historical development the same way as anything present contains its past; not necessarily
as something it still specifically is, but as the context in which
what it now is must be seen as arising out of.

An ex-convict is not

the same as someone who was never arrested, and the significance of
Logos as rational is much clearer when we consider the historical
development of that word.

We cannot ignore the etymology just because
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the word no longe r speaks as its etymology intended, rather it is
for this very reas on that we must consider it.
There is no such thing as a natural
language of a human nature occurring
of itself, without n destir.y. All
language is historical, even where
man does not know history in the
modern European sense.l
In all these ways language speaks, and to understand this
means to experience the nature of language or Saying as the bringing
forth of things in their Being.

Every utterance we make can only

result from the listening to the Being of things that our language
allows to come forth.
Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is listening to the language which
we speak. Thus, it is a listening not
while but before we are speaking ....\\Te
do not merely spea k the lan guage - we
speak~ way of it .... Langua ge speaks
by Saying, this is, by showing, \\Th at
it says Hells up from the formerly spoken
and so far still unspoken Saying which
pervades the design of language ... We
accordingly listen to language in this
way~ that we let it say its Saying to
us.
In short then we have seen that Saying, as the fulfillment of
Appropriation, lies at the source of the relation of language and
Being.

First we saw Saying gathering world and thing in their

tension and letting them come forth.

1

On the Way to Langua ge p. 133.

2

Ibid. p. 124.

Then we came to understand
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Saying as the essence of language to which man has somehow been
granted access.

Man belongs to the Saying, he is able to listen

to it, and respond to it in a fulfilling utterance of his own.
"This way-making (i.e., Appropriation) puts language (the essence
of language) as language (Saying) into language (into the sounded
word)."

1

In this way Saying has brought together man and things

into the resulting light of Being.

Things are because the Saying

of language announces them in their gathered presence.
Saying is in no way the linguistic
expression added to the phenomena
after they have appea red - rather,
all radiant appearance and all fading
2
away is grounded in the showing Saying.
Thus it is language that brings us to Appropriation, the source of
Being as well as man.

This is why Heidegger considers language

the Being of man and the house of Being.

In his Being man is Dasein,

that is, he is ex-sistent, and this means belonging to Saying which
gives him the gift of speaking.
Appropriation, in beholding human
nature, makes mortals appropriate
for that which avows itself from
everywhere to man in Saying, which
points toward the concealed. Man's
the listener's, being made appropriate
for Saying, has this distinguishing
character, that it releases human
nature into its own, but only in
order that man as he who speaks,
that is, he who says, may encounter
and answer Sayin~, in virtue of what
is his property.
libid. p. 130.
2 Ibid. p. 126.

3 Ibid. p. 129.
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This relation of man's speaking to the primordial Saying is
one that must now be elaborated.

We have seen that man's speaking

first requires a listening and then a response.

Human speech must

arise out of the primordial Saying and let it speak.

Since the

primordial Saying has not yet reached voice it is silent, and we
must clarify how the voiced speaking can be true to the silent call.
The encountering saying of mortals is
answering. Every spoken \-lord is already an answer: counter-saying, coming
to the encounter, listening Saying.
When mortals are made appropriate
for Saying, human nature is released
into that needfulnes s out of which
man is used for bringing soundless
Saying to the sound of language.!
What is the nature of human speaking that it is needed for the fulfillment of Saying as Showing, yet is meant to maintain the Saying
in itself?
As has been indicated, we must view our speech as more than
just a sounding utterance.
language, what is said."

2

"What is spoken is never, and in no
Nor can it be viewed merely as a sounding

utterance and a silent sense coupled together.

The voiced sounding

must in itself be determined by, and thus be a unity with, the silent
aspects.

"\fuat is sayable recei:ves its determination from what is

not sayable." 3

In other words, only by virtue of the unsaid can the

said say what it says, and we therefore cannot consider them as two
distinct components.

In addition to the history of a language that

lrbid. p. 129.
2Poetry, Language, Thought p. 11.
3The End of Philosophy p. 78.

133

we discussed above, such

thi~s

as context nnd the Being of the

speaker affect the silence of our speech, and certainly these considerations cannot be seen as disjointed additions to what is said.
In "A Dialogue on Langua ge" Heidegger tries to make this relation
clear by calling the word a hint, which he distinguishes from a
mere sign.

A sign points to

so~ething

other than itself, or repre-

sents that other by itself. Viewing language as a sign leads us
back to the expression theory of language in which we think of the
said and unsaid as t\vo rather than one.

A hint, on the other hand,

is compared to a gesture, of which Heidegger says:
J:Thus you call hearing or gesture:
the gathering which origina rily unites
within itself what we bear to it and
what it bears to us.
!:However, \vith this formulation we
still run the ris k tha t we understand
the ga thering as a subsequent union ..
J: ... instead of experiencing th a t
all bearing, in giving and encounter,
springs filst and only from the
gathering.
Perhaps this difficult point can be made clearer by an analogy.
The grandeur and excitement of an iceberg results from the fact that
despite how big it is on top, we know that most of it remains unseen.
Yet we can see its immensity in the visible part above the surface.
Despite the fact that the major portion is not visible because it
is below the surface, once we learn to understand icebergs, we can
see the unseen portion overwhelmingly present (as an absence) in

1
On the Way to Language p. 19.
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the visible section.

In fact, the foreboding grandeur of the iceberg

is a result of the very fact tha t most of it is present as an absenc e .
If the whole thing were above the surface it would certainly appear
huge, but the fearful awesome ness that results from the mystery of
its being mostly hidden would not be the same.

Thus the experience

of the full grandeur, fascination, and excitement (as well as the
danger of deceiving us) can only be understood if we recognize that
the invisible part is i_mm_ediately present in the small section above
the surface.
In the same way a word has the power it does because of a ringing
silence sounded in the voiced word.

"Only as man belongs within the

peal of stillness are mortals able to speak in their own way in
sounds. "

1

Thus, human speaking must be seen as arising out of the

silent primordial gathering Saying , and yet is n eed e d for this
Saying to show itself, just as the hidden part of an iceberg ne eds
the top to make its hidden awesomeness visible.

The only way this

relation can occur is if human language continues to let the still
depths of the thing's gathered Being resound through the word.
When we understand our language in this way we see that words
are not isolated things which somehow cause things to Be.

Words

and the Being of things are not really separate, they both arise out
of Saying, and are only maintained as long as they join together as
Saying.

1

The thing first rings forth in Being through the gathering

Ibid. p. 208.

135

Saying that lets ii presence as a thing, and the human word as a
listening r e sponse to this Saying maintains the Saying and thereby maintains the Being of the thing as thing.
Language ha s been call ed "the house
of Being." It is the keeper of being
present, in that its coming to light
remains entrusted to the appropriating show of Saying. Language is the
house of Being because language, as
Saying, is the mode of Appropriation.!
We have now presented an ontological account of the Being of
language as the Saying which grants both Being and man (as ex-sisting).
We saw that an authentic speaking of man must also contain the sil ent
reverberation of a list ening .

It is clear that for the most pa rt

our language is not, and cannot be, this language of Being.

\fhen

concerned with information and calculation we are concerned with
getting everything as explicitly de linea ted as possible.

Further,

through const a nt use our language necessarily become s matter of fact,
we take it for granted, and it can no longer speak tm.;ards-and - from
Being. 2

However, when concerned with things in a thoughtful way,

when we are concerned with things in their Being, then we have to
avoid information language and "used up" expressions.

In short, we

1 "The Way to Language" p. 135.
2rhis is not to deny that our everyday language has its own
silent history that gathers its own world and is thus still tied to
Being, but it remains oblivious to the world it gathers and is
characterized in its Being as a forgetfulness of Being.
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have to be what Heidegge r calls poetical.

This does not mean that

all thinking must be reduced to poetry, but it does mean that all
thinking must proceed within the poetical.

"Poetry and thinking

meet each other in one and the same only when, and only as long
as, they remain distinctly in the distinctness of their nature."

1

To understand this, and thereby further elucidate the Being of
language, we now seek out an understanding of the relation of
poetry, language, and thinking.
By poetry Heidegger does not mean rhyming cuplet or any other
categorization by verse structure , but rather a specific mode of
language.

We can understand the different modes of language as a

scale ranging from formal logic at one end to poetry at the other.
While lo gic is precise and accurate, the poetic is rich yet vague,
and therefore not suited for certain areas of information transference.

But what is the nature of poetic language, and for what

is it suited?

The answer is of course for thinking Being, and this

is what we must now explore.
"Poetry's spoken words shelter the poetic statement as that
which by its essential nature remains unspoken."

2

In this way

poetry characterizes authentic language in that its speaking is
what it is by virtue of guarding the unspoken.

Only insofar as the

unspoken remains unspoken, yet is listened to as such, can the speaking

~oetry, Langua ge, Thought p. 218.
2
On the Way to Language p. 188.
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of poetry take place.

However, thinking too must t a ke place with

authentic language , and in order not to reduce thinking to poetry
we must, as lleidegge r indicated in the quote above, find their
sameness (authentic language) in their differences.
But since like is only like insofar
as difference allows, and since po e try
and thinking are most purely alike in
their care of the word, the two things
are at the same time at opposite poles
in their essence. The thinker utters
Being. The poet names the holy.l
The poet names the holy.

But what is the holy?

"The element

of this ether, that within which even the godhead itself is still
present, is the holy." 2

Thus in naming the holy the poet calls forth

what was previously sho\m to be one of the fourfold - the gods or
divinities.

But, in the naming the gods themselves must r emain

unspoken, for they are brought to us in their absence.

" •.• the

god who remains unknovm, must by showing h im s elf as the one he is,
appear as the one who remains unknown."

3

Thus the poet's task is

not to give us any answers, but merely to bring us into the presence
of the mystery of the unknowable.

The poet calls forth the silent

mysteries that are gathered in all Being, and lets them stand, but
stand as a beyond that \ve can never fully know.

This is why Heidegger

says poets stand between men and the gods, and what is ordinarily
referred to as poetic wonder.

1

"What is Hetaphysics" p. 360.

2Poetry, Language, Thought p. 94.
3

Ibid. p. 223.
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But insofar as the gods are brought to stand as unknowable, man
is able to dwell in his proper place.

\fuen we experience a poem

with the awe filled attentiveness that good poetry calls for, we
get a glimpse of the silent mysteries.

We experience how foreign

and delicate a thing that which the poet is trying to Say really is.
We hear the words and they propel us over an abyss that our cognitive faculties cannot fully grasp, that even the poet's words cannot
completely contain.

In naming the holy (the gods, the abyss) the

poet brings to the fore a realm that was totally ignored simply
because it could not be conceptualized.

In this way as the divinities

are held before us, we simultaneously bring ourselves forth in our
finitude.

We see ourselves dwelling as mortals, before divinities,

on earth, and under the sky.
The poet himself stands between the
former-the gods, and the latter-the
people. He is one who has been cast
out- out into that Bet\.re en, between
gods and men. But only and for the
first time in this Be t ween is it
decided who man is and where he is
settling his existence. "Poetically,
dwells man on this earth."l
Poetry is a primordial naming, it lets the gods be present
(in their absence) in words.

To turn the gods into knowable and

explainable entities is the tendency of popularized religion, to
ignore the gods is the tendency of scientific thinking.

Both over-

estimate man's place- the former claiming we can know the infinite,
and the latter saying that what we cannot know can have no place.
Only when the gods are named in their mystery by the poets can
language become language, i.e., a Saying which says what it does

1 "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry" in Existence and Being , p. 288.
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because what is unsaid resides in the said ; and only then can man's
Being d\vell in its place.

"Hence poetry never takes language as

a raw material ready to hand, rather it is poetry which first makes
language possible." 1

Thus poetry do es not use authentic language

but makes it authentic in its responding to the gods.
In the naming of the gods poetry is true to the understanding
of language we reached earlier as the bringing of things to Bein g .
However, that which poetry is concerned with is our place before
the holy, a necessary step towards thinking Being, but not
equivalent.

Thinking, like poetry, always proceeds with l anguage,

and while poetry now is clear as the naming of the holy, we must
see how thinking utters Being.
Thinking 's saying would be stilled in
its bein g only by becoming unab le to
say that which must remain uns poken.
Such inability would bring think ing face
to face with its matter.
What is spoken is neve r, and in no
language, what is said.2
This quote reiterates what Heidegger said in the quote above
from "lfuat is Metaphysics?":

"poetry and thinking are most purely

alike in their care of the word."

Both poetry and thinking must

let language speak towards-and-from the unsayable silence.

1

Ibid. p. 283.

2Poetry, Language, Thought p. 11
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what ways are their concerns different?

Heidegger is never clear

on this issue, but we can take as a clue something he said in
"Remembrance of the Poet":
The vocation of the poet is homecoming
by which the homeland is first made
ready as the land of proximity to
the source.!
As we saw above, the poet allows man to dwell in his place by
giving him a language that allows the gods to be present.
of man to dwell in his proper place is the homecoming.

This allowing

But this is

only the preparation, for now that man dwells and has a language
that allows the quiet stillness to ring through its words, he can
begin to think, i.e., to explore himself and his world in the fullness of their Being.

"And only when man speaks, does he think." 2

And it is poetry that lets man's words speak.
Only insofar as we dwell or belong can we explore the nature of
things

(i n ~ luding

ourselves) in their Being, and not merely in a

subjective re--presentation.
the exploring.

Poetry gives us dwelling, thinking is

Poetry is the language that first brings things into

Being, thinking is the preserving elaboration of the Being of these
things.

As J. Glenn Gray describes thinking in the introduction

to lfuat is Called Thinking:
Thinking is not so much an act as a
way of living or dwelling •.• It is

!"Remembrance of the Poet" in Existence and Being_ p. 266.
2What is Called Thinking p. 16.
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a remembering who we are as human
beings and where we belong. It is
a gathering and focusing of our whole
selves on what lies before us and a
taking to heart and mind these
particular things before us in order
to discover in them their essential
nature and truth.l
In naming the holy poetry gives us a language that lets us speak
of things in their Being, and that means it first lets thinking utter
Being.

It is not that thinking must wait for poetry to give it

specific words with specific meanings, rather, thinking is dependent
on poetry to make the nature of language rich and powerful, to reverberate with the still depths of the unsaid.

Though both poetry

and thinking stem from the primordial call of Appropriation (Saying),
and thus good poetry must be thoughtful and true thinking must be
poetical, their tasks are different.

Poetry gives mortals their

place and language; thinking proceeds with this language to explore
Being, i.e. , the place of himself and the things he encounters.
Without poetry a language becomes flat and sterile, and thinking can
be nothing more than information.
as language is to Being.

Thus, we see poetry is to thinking

Neither half of the analogy is a relation

of equivalency, but they need each other and spring from a common
source - the gathering Saying of Appropriation.

Neither side is pri-

mary, for though poetry gives thinking the language it needs and
language lets things Be, poetry must start as a thoughtful listening
to the holy, and language does not create by fiat, but rather is a

lwhat is Called Thinking p. xi.
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responding to the primordial gatherdness of Being.
being of language:

the language of Being."

In short, "The

1

Everything depends upon bringing into
language the truth of Being and letting
thought penetrate this language. Perhaps
then language requires far less precipitate
utterance than correct silence. Yet who
amongst us today would like to imagine
that his attempts at thought were at home
on the path of silence?2
As a tourist can never understand the Being of a foreign land
as long as he merely observes from the outside, a thinker can never
achieve his goal until he dwells and learns to hear the silent
world that is gathered in

mal~ing

the manifest manifest. Perhaps an

example can show how a thinking which pays heed to the silence of
language proceeds as opposed to other approaches.

We choose the

topic of friendship, more or less at random, but also because it
is an important phenomenon to all of us and one that Aristotle
thought worthy of two books of his ethics yet has since been ignored
as an area worthy of philosophy.
of friendship.

We as thinkers ask for the Being

Aristotle in his scientific style, describes

different types of friendship, situations conclusive to it, important
characteristics of it, and a guide of proper behavior between friends.
As interesting as many of the points he makes are, they tend to be a

l"The Nature of Language" p. 94.
2"Letter on Humanism" p. 167.
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list of facts that may describe certain properties of friendship, but
fail to capture the significance and life of that which he himself
indicates is the most important good there is.
This approach of Aristotle is carried out today in various
scientific studies.

There are anthropological approaches 1 which study

friendship patterns among a variety of cultures (including animals)
and attempt to find biological, psychological, and social causes
of friendship.

There are also psychological approaches

2

which study

the causes of friendships by isolating variables of a test group of
people some of whom become friends and some who do not.

In these

studies we again gain possibly interesting and useful information
about friendship, but over and above the assumed understanding we
must have had in the beginning in order to study its causes, conditions, and behavioral manifestations, we gain little or no insight
into what friendship is.
An alternative to these studies is to turn to art, and view hmv
friendship has been portrayed in books, poems, and paintings.

As

Samuel }fcChord Crothers says in his introduction to The Book of Friendship:

1

See for example: Elliot Leyton editor, The Compact, Selected
Dimensions of Friendship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).
2

See for example: Steven W. Duck Personal Relationships and
Personal Constructs. A Study of Friendship Formation (London: John
Wiley & Sons, 1973).
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"No abstract or philosophical description can satisfy us in regard
to an intimate personal experience Yhich ye all have f e lt."

1

Through

these art forms the beauty, intensity, and struggles of friendship
are brought before us, and in this Yay we are brought to dwell before the divine bonds of friendship.
the Being of friendship can begin.

It is here that thinking of
To help our thinking Ye may turn

to famous quotes and aphorisms about friendship, not to collect more
information and facts, but to silently reflect and meditate on the
richness of these sayings and how they light up with greater and
greater clarity the dimensions of friendship
us.

~•hich

ye noY hold before

By listening to our own statements and thoughts, as well as

those of others, their truth and richness grows

2

/
- even cliches can

sometimes regain their original strength of insight.
No one statement serves as a definitive formularization of the
essence of friendship, but they a ll h e l p ho l d it b ef or e us in the
richness of its actual Being.

We do not yant to cover up friendship

itself with Yards, theories, causes, and explanations; we Yant it to
revea l itself.

Though Ye can not here attempt a full philosophy of

fri endship it may help to suggest a fourfold:

the divinities are the

godlike bonds of friendship which are invisible yet can be stronger

N. Y.:

lsamuel McChord Crothers editor The Book of Friend s hip (Freeport,
Books for Libraries Press, 1910) p. 5.

2o r of cour s e the opposite c an hap pen, the sta t ement r eveals it self more and more as shal low or mi s direct e d. But this can only hap pen
i n so fa r as t he truth of friendship s h i nes cleare r in t he light, and
t h u s by a r ev e rse me thod r eflection on the stat ement still brough t
out t he Being of Friend sh i p.
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than any physical test of them.
soul inspired."

"Two friends, two bodies with one
1

(Homer, The Illiad Bk xvi ).

Mortal is the reality

of the hardships, questions, and limitations of true friendship.
"0 my friends, there is no friend."

(Chilo).

Sky is the ethereal

beauty of a good friend - the loneliness of when you are apart or
the pleasure in sharing a treasured moment.

"In love one has need

of being believed, in friendship of being understood."
The Art of Friendship).
an adventure together.
Three Muskateers).

(Abel Bannard

Earth is the arm around arm comradeship of
"All for one and one for all!"

(Dumas, The

However, if these four are approached merely as

a list, a combination of properties, they will not bring to light
the Being of friendship.

Only if we listen to the silence of the

unity of their interplay, letting that to which and from which they
speak reveal itself, are we properly

unde~·ay

to thinking.

But there would be, and there is,
the sole necessity, by thinking our
way soberly into what (his) poetry
says, to come to learn what is un
spoken. That is the course of the
history of Being,2
The thought of Being guards the Word and
fulfills its function in such guardianship, namely care for the use of language.
Out of long guarded speechlessness and
the careful clarification of the field
thus cleared~ comes the utterance of
the thinker.

1

All of the quotations used in connection with this discussion of
the fourfold are from The Home Book of Quotations edited by Burton
Stevenson (N.Y.: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1964).
2Poetry, Language, Thought p. 96.
3"What is Metaphysics?" p. 360.
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V.

Conclusion.

Be ing , La nguaee and Philo s ophy

At this poin t we have come to an end of the examination of
Heidegger's published work on Being and language.

By unravelling

the key concepts we have attempt e d to show the important place the
thinking of language has in Heidegger's quest for the meaning of
Being.

We must now recapitulate what we have accomplished, and

then raise the question of where it has left us and where we are
to go from here.
Though not an explicit task of this work one of its major
si.gnificances was to show a continuous development from Being and
Time to the late works.

An easy attack on Heidegger could have been

made by juxtaposing apparent subjectivist or idealist statements
against objective or realist ones, and thereby rejecting Heidegge r
as a confused and contradictory thinke r.

For example, comparing

the claim in Introduction to Metaphysics that "It is in words and
language that things first come into being and are."

(p. 11) and

the one in On the Way to Langua ge that states " But man is capable
of speaking only insofar as he, belonging to Saying, listens to Saying,
so that in resaying it he may be able to say a word," (p. 134) we
might find an excuse either to reject Heidegger completely, or at
least to consider him to have made a complete reversal regarding
the relation of words and Being.
However, it is necessary to see these two statements not as
contradictions, nor even as two opposing directions on the same issue,
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but rather as a developed saying of one and the same thing.

If we

fail to do this, we continue to view Ileidegger within the context
of subjectivity and objectivity, the very categories of Being that
his life's work was intended to overcome.

A critique of Heidegger

based on subjectivist and objectiv i st interpretations of various
quotes immediately places the issues in polar tension rather than
letting them speak together on their own terms.

To ask for a

solution to dualism,yet insist on dualistic structures of every
approach to Being, will leave philosophy entangled in its own net.
To evaluate Heidegger we must first understand '"hat he says, and to
do this we must learn his language and meaning, and not persist in
translating it into a form he rejects.
For this reason the first chapter of this work started with
an interpretation of Dasein that attempts to show Being and Time
as raising the question of Being from the meeting point of man and
the world, and not from the idealistic standpoint of man qua
immanence.

In line with this, the discussion of Discourse, as an

existentiale of Dasein, was primordially concerned with it as the
announcement of Being, and not as expression, statement or communication.
Unfortunately, at this stage of his career Heidegger considered
Understanding and its corresponding temporal dimension of the future
to be primordial ("The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic
temporality is the future.")

1

B~ing

and Time p. 378.

1

and, he therefore explored Discourse
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as the announcement of the silent structures of Under s t anding ("Both
discoursing and hearing are based upon Understanding .'')! 'His conc e rn
with language as an announcement of Being was of course never abandoned, but as his understanding of the meaning of Be ing developed,
he realiz ed that the grounding of meaning (the silent source of
Discourse) strictly in Understanding and the future was short-sight ed.
He even recogni ze s this at various points in Bein g and Time :
When the "there " h a s b een comple t e ly
disclosed, its disclosedness is constituted by understa nding , state··ofmind, a nd falling; and this disclosed ness becomes articulated by discourse.
Thus discourse does not t emporalize
itself primarily in any de finite
ecstasis. 2
This is the direction the rest of Heidegg er's \.7orks moved in,
and the n ext stage of his development led him to a study of the
meaning of Being through the source of Western thinking.

By exploring

logos as a gathering-which-lets-presence, his path towa rds Being is
disclosed, and the significance of language to this path is also
indic a ted.

Being of things is understood as original presencing, and

the Being of language as the primordial synthesis which first enables
things to come forth and Be.

The crucial belonging together of

language and Being is thereby exposed by their common root in one
of the most crucial words of Western philosophy.

1

Being and Time p. 208.

2 Ibid. p. 400.
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The meaning of the belonging together of Being and language lies
in the gathering, but

~his

relation cannot be fully seen until we

advance our understanding of both Being and language beyond their
initial roots in Jogos.

Thus, our third section attempted to ex-

plore the meaning of Being, and our fourth the meaning of language.
We traced Being through the various 'vays entities may be present,
to that which enables anything to be present, i.e., Appropriation.
He smv Appropriation as that primordial mystery that is prior to
Being itself, insofar as it grants the belonging together that is
needed for things to Be.

Since a theme needs an horizon and an

horizon needs a theme, their belonging together must be prior to
either one, and in the same way the granting of the belonging together of thing and world, Being and time, and Being and man
arise out of one or the other 'component'.

cannot

Appropriation is nothing

specific in itself, but insofar as whatever is arises out of its
primordial gift of Nearness and Neighborhood, whatever can be revealed about anything comes from, and thus must point to, Appropriation itself.
a thanking

1

It is in this context that Heidegger considers thinking

- when thinking of things in the fullness of their Being

we pay hommage to that which makes things and their availability to
us possible.

In not losing sight of Appropriation by being overly

concerned with facts and uses of things we preserve it and thereby
pay i t its due.

1

See \fuat is Called Thinking part II lecture III.
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Finally, we saw in the fourth section that it is through a
careful r e lation to language tha t Appropriation is acknowledged,
for when we pay thoughtful heed to the silence of our language we
are fulfilling the silent Saying of Appropriation that first grants
things their Being.

''Accordingly, what preva ils in and bears up

the relation of human nature to the two - fold is language."

1

This

is the meaning of the phrase "language is the house of Being," and
why language be comes an intricate part in Heidegger's quest for
the meaning of Being.

Only through man's ability to fulfill the

gathering·-showing of Saying can entities sta nd forth in the light
of Being.
However, as the Being of language is revealed as the Saying
which gath ers thing and world and the reby lets things come forth
in their Being, \•e must ask why Heideg ger considered spoken language
(and its alterna tiv e of s i l ence) as the primary mode.

One of the

limitations of most approaches to language is that they look for the
essence of language in \-That is unique to spoken language (e.g., semantic and syntactic structure) and thereby treat it in a way th a t
overlooks its primary philosophical Being as an opening of (to) the
world.

They treat language as an isolated thing whose unique essence

can be found by the traditional metaphysical analysis of form
(structural analysis) and matter (phonology and morphology).

1

However

on the Way to Language p. 30. The two- fold refers to the unified
difference of things and Being, i.e., things in their Being.
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useful these studies can be they typically start from a recognition
that in its Being our speech is just one of many ways that we are
open to the world.

Understanding our spoken language's unique

essence is an important project, but its commonness within the
context of Being as a whole must also be considered.
Heidegger's thinking apparently falls into a parallel trap.
Though he examines the Being of language in the context of Being
as a whole, he then unjustifiably assumes that only our spoken
language has this Being, and thereby erroneously acknowledges
linguistic analysis as the primary study of the opening of the world
(Saying).

In discussing various modes of art, wh i ch have similar

modes of Being to language, he states:

"Allar~,

as the letting

happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentiallYpoetry."!

In itself this claim is not threatening because we could

interpret it as expanding the notion of poetry to its Being as an
opening of the world, rather than reducing art to our presently
narrower concepti on of poetry.

However, this attempted interpretation

fails to be maintained for Heidegger goes on to say:
Language itself is poetry in the essential sense. But since language is the
happening in which for man beings first
disclose themselves to him each time as
beings, poesy - or poetry in the narrower
sense - is the most original (ursprUnglichste)
form of poetry in the essential sense ....

1

Poetry, Language, Thought p. 72.
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Building and plastic creation, on the
other l1and, always happen already, and
happen only, in the Open of saying and
naming .... They are an ever special
poetizing within the clearing of what
is, which has alreadl happened unnoticed in language.
What is troublesome is not the claim that spoken language
(poesy) must temporally come before any other art form, this very
well may be true, but that all other art forms lie within the domain of its Saying.

In this way language seems to be defined by

its traditional ontic conception rather than the ontological
examination of Saying.

Music, painting, dance, and all the other

arts Say something that emerges within the world of the speaking of
their own languages, and not within that of poesy and the spoken
word.

We have seen that the spoken word is not a representation of

a pregiven, and thus there is no ground on which to claim that its
language has a special priority in the emergence of Being.

Every

art form ga t ; ers and opens Being in a way unique to itself, and to
limit Being beforehand to the world of spoken language is not to
let the other art forms Speak, but (to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty) to
verbalize in paint or music.

2

When learning a foreign language we initially translate what
we learn into our native tongue, and even describe the new language
(both syntactally and semantically) in the one we are more familiar

lrbid. p. 74.
2 rn discussing the English ''the man I love" and the French "1' homme
que j'aime" Merleau-Ponty states: "Thus we must disabuse ourselves of
the habit of understanding the relative pronoun in English. That is
speaking French in English, it is not speaking English." Prose of the
World p. 29.
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with.

But eventually we hope to reach a place where the inability

to discuss

something of our now second language in terms of our

first is no longer a sign of non-understanding, but rather one of
true understanding.

In the same way as we learn to listen to the

language of various art forms we resort to spoken language for
explanations, but eventually we must make a leap to let the art
form Speak (i.e., gather and announce) on its own terms.

This is

not to say that words will no longer have any place in the realms
of the other art forms, but the words must enter into a true dialogue with the piece and, further, be in constant service to the
speaking of the piece and not an explicit alternative to it.

In

short, words can tell us how to look or list en, but not what we
see or hea r.

Only the art work itself can do that, and words can

at best lead us to this non-verbal presencing.
Thus one of the first tasks left open to philosophy is an
examination of similarities and differences of the various ways in
which Being is opened.

This was the attempt of Sartre ' c What is

Literature and Merleau Ponty's "Indirect Language and the Voices of
Silence," but much more work is needed in this line.

If it is to

do this philosophy will of course have to proceed with words, but
its speaking can never replace the other art forms, but simply give
us access to them and thus a broadened openness to Being.

Spatiality,

colors, textures, tones, harmony, etc. all gather a world and thereby open Being in ways we must learn to preserve.

As our spoken

language can decay into idle chatter, it seems probable that the

155

other art forms can do the same.

Though it would be up to the

artist to rejuvenate their medium, philosophy can help by showing
what certain epochs of art can and cannot Say.

In discussing the

relation of poetry and thinking Heidegger says that we must learn
how to have these two enter into a dialogue with each other.

When

we recognize that all art forms are in their Being an opening of
Being,

1

we see that from the ontological definition of language

as a gathering-opening Saying, all art forms can be called languages.
This of course is not to say that all art forms are expressive or
representational, for that is not the fundamental Being of
langua ge.

Nor is it to say that all art forms are reducable to a

common form, since they are alike only in that they are all
openings to and from Being - as we saw this means that they all
gather a world and thin g in their belongin g together, but each art
form silently spe aks from and gathe rs a different world.

In short,

we see that all art forms (including poeisis) "dv.rell near to one
another on mountains farthest apart," and thus one of the great
tasks Heidegger has left us with is an examination of the unique
Being of each.
If Heidegger has left us with these questions we must ask what
he has given us that will aid us in this and other directions of
philosophy.

The first thing we must conclude is that his final

achievement of the thinking of Being qua Being will not serve any

1

See section on the Being of a work of art in chapter III.
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use in the development of philosophy.

Heidegge r hims elf accepts

this for he distinguis he s his thinking of Being from philo s ophy,
and goes on to say tha t as king f or a use of the thinking of Being
is to miss its point.

To clarify this we must remember that the

thinking of Be ing h as two dimensions:

the thinking of entities

in their Being and the thinking of that which makes this possible,
i.e., the beholding of Appropri a tion.

This latter, however, when

consid e red in and by itself is simply a meditation on the unchanging, unknowabl e , unexplainable giver of Being and our ability
to think Being.

There is no doubt that this granting of the

belonging to gether of man and world is a primordia l occurrence
that is awe inspiring

and powerful.

We should not ignore the

non- productive value of meditation on Appro pria tion , but unless we
think Appro pria tion in its sp eci f ic forms of the be longing to gether
of entiti e s in their Being , we achieve some th i ng closed upon itself.

In the quest to understand ourselves and our world the be-

holding of Appropriation is too broad to give us any thing but the
horizon in which all our answers must rest.

Appropriation is the

horizon which l e ts us ask questions and give answers, but in itself giv e s no answers to our never endin g explor a tions.

Tha t is not

a fault of the thinking of Appropria tion, merely its limit a tion.
Thus, though the value of beholding Appropria tion should never be
underestimated, unless we are foolishly content with just that, we
must look for help from Heid eg ger elsewhere than this final achievement.
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This does not mean that Appropriation has no place in our exploring
thinking, but it must be approached as the appropriated Being of
entities and not as the abstract Absolute which is "thought H'ithout rega rd to beings."

1

In fact, perhaps the most i mp ortant notion

Heidegger has given us is the belonging together of man and Being.
As an out growth of Husserl's intentionality and the life- world in
his later works, Heidegger deve loped the concept of Being-in-theworld that finally led him to Appropriation.

The consequences of

this exposed interrelation affects the theoretica l foundations of
every discipline .

Once we know that in each cas e the Being of

the examiner is always an intricate part of that which is disclosed,
every discipline must examine itself in order to understand its
subject matter fully.

Connected with this is the hi s torical dimen-

sions of Being, and the r esul tin g problems of hermeneutics tha t is
beginning to influence a lar ge variety of disciplines.

Further,

heightened by his devastating critique of a correspondence not i on
of truth (which we did not discuss in this work) and r eplacing it
with an underst anding of truth as disclosure, the growth of perspectival approaches to a subject matter has gained respect;
perspectives are not just subjective limitations but the truth of
Being itself.

Finally, Husserl's characteriza tion of phenomenolo gy

in the proclamation "to the things themselves!" is carried out in

~he End of Philosophy p. xiii.
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Heidegger's meditative thinking.

As we saw, Heidegger opposes his

thinking to a subjective will dominated thinking that forces the
things into predetermined categories.

Thus Heidegger's methodo-

logical call is "let things be," and by bringing us along the path
of his thinking he has clarified and developed the basic methodological tenet of phenomenology.
In all these ways Heidegger has made important contributions
to the general intellectual endeavor.

But given the concerns

of this work, the most important developments Heidegger has made
lie in his work on language.

Ontologically revealed as the house

of Being language is forever at \vork in whatever we do.

Thus

the work Heidegger has done on how our language speaks, and the
consequences of our language on what we can Say, are of critical
importance to everything we do.

The revelation of the intricate

belonging together of silence and the voiced, and the decay of
the silence in a fallen language, first teaches us what we are
Saying in everything we say.

When we learn this we recognize that

language speaks, and thus we learn that only by listening can we
speak.

Thus in any endeavor of communication or statement our rela-

tion to language is of extreme importance, and Heidegger has given
us the first adequate examination of this relation.
Though some of these issues are beginning to have an input in
various areas, Heidegger's greatest effect is still in philosophy.
The hermeneutic work of Ricoeur and Gadamer, and all the work spun
off from these figures, finds its source in Heidegger.

Perhaps
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most significant is the connection of Merleau- Ponty's work on
language, and all the issues that arise out of it, to Heidegger's
work.

Already in Phenomenology of Perception Merlea~Ponty had

a chapter on language, and throughout his career the thinking of
language played an important role.

His reflections on language

centered around two of the s ame issues that Heidegger found
important:

the role of the silent (or invisible) in all language

(" •.. language lives only from silence.")

1

and the connected point

that thought can only come to fruition in language and thus
language cannot be viewed as the tra nslation or re-presentation
of a ready made thought

("thus speech, in the speaker, does not

translate ready- made thought, but accomplishes it.")

2

In examining

these points Merleau- Ponty expands the phenomenology of language
in important ways, but h is prime concern is showing the significance
of the analysis of language in psychology and social philosophy.
Language certainly has an inner content,
but this is not self-subsistent
and self conscious thought. vfuat then
does language express, if it does not
e.x press thoughts? It presents or rather
it is the subject's taking up of a position in the world of his meanings.
The term 'world' here is not a manner
of speaking: it means that the 'mental'
or cultural life borrows its structures
from natural life and that the thinking
subject must have its basis in the subject
incarnate.3
lMerleau- Ponty Visible and the Invisible trans. by Alphonso Lingis
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968) p. 126.
2Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perc eption trans. by Colin Smith
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962) p. 178.
3rbid. p. 193.
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We therefore see that Heidegger's work has paved the way for
many areas of study.

An examination of language was necessary to

reach a thinking of Being.

The thinking of Being results in a re-

juvenation of language into its original power, which at the same
time rekindles our ability to think and not merely juggle the
world around in worn out categories.
But the emptiness of the \>Jord ' 'being,"
the total disappearance of its appellative force, is not mer e ly a particular
instance of the general exhaustion of
language; rather, the destroyed relation to being as such is the actual
reason for the genernl misrelation
to language.l
Thus Heidegger is right when he says that while it is true that we
cannot do anything with the thinking of Being qua Being, we should
not consider the project valueless, because th e thinking of Being
does something with us.

2

Most of our studies are concerned with

increasing the horizontal breadth of our knowledge, Heidegger's
thinkin g has hopefully led to an improved vertical depth of knowledge wherever

it is applied.

Thus, rather than putting an end

to the philosophical endeavor, Heidegger has actually laid the
groundwork for a new beginning, a new era of thinking.

Thinking

and poetry dwell near to each other in their service to language,
and now that our approach to Being has helped rejuvenate language,
or at least shown the path towards rejuvenation, the arts and

1 rntroduction to Metaphysics p. 42.
2rbid. p. 10.
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thought can enter a new dialogue with each coming into its own,
and thus a new era of both has gotten Underway.
No transfor~mation comes without an
anticipatory escort. But how does
an escort draw near unless Appro priation opens out which calling ,
needing, envisions human being,
that is, sees and in this seeing
brings mortal s to the path of
thinking, poetizing, building. 1
Whether we take up the path of thinking is the question now
facing us.

Heid egger has given us th e way, he has onc e again brought

us before the power of Being; if we follow it, rather than exclusively
and blindly staying on our path of information, manipulation, and technology is the most important choice we must make.
Most thought-provoking is that we are
still not thinking - not even yet,
although the state of the world is
becomin g const antly more thoughtprovoking.2

1

The End of Philo s ophy p. 110.

2

~at

is Called Thinking p. 4.
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